

**PARTY MOBILIZATION, CLASS, AND ETHNICITY:
THE CASE OF HAWAII, 1930 TO 1964**

by
Gary George Aguiar

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
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
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
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*To my loving and supportive parents,
Dennis G. and Margo P. Aguiar*

Acknowledgments

Like Hawaii's ethnic immigrants who voted Democratic, the people who helped me with this project received both solidary and purposive benefits. Since I had few material rewards to offer others, they helped because either they enjoyed participating or they liked the ideas (probably both). Thus, it is with great relish that I acknowledge the many individuals and organizations that assisted me with this project.

First and foremost, I am pleased to highlight my parents' tremendous efforts toward completion of this dissertation. While their supportive activities are too numerous and too diverse to document completely here, I will try to describe the breadth and depth of their assistance. They gave me a healthy, happy, and safe childhood; they encouraged me to seek higher education; they supported me emotionally and financially through several academic degrees; and they taught me to learn from my mistakes. A good set of parents is truly the best foundation for a successful life. Besides keeping house during the critical research and writing stage, my mother served as a wonderful research assistant and sympathetic ear. In particular, she entered a tremendous amount of election data (some of which I analyze in Chapters Five and Six). Along with a myriad of other helpful tasks, she also painstakingly checked my coding on the ethnicity of the legislative candidates analyzed in Chapter Four. My father, who read the entire thesis, used his keen insights into local politics to offer useful comments on my observations. Also, his persistent prodding to "get it done" pushed me to complete the actual writing of my dissertation.

Second, other members of my family gave me timely and critical assistance.

While my sisters, Denise Aguiar Crouch and Candace Aguiar, had little interest in the substantive nature of my work, their own efforts on their academic degrees and successful careers encouraged me. Moreover, along with Keith Crouch and Todd Farrell, they provided important logistical support during the last few trying months of the project. My grandmother (Agnes Perreira), my uncle (Wesley Perreira), and my young nephews (Boden and MacKallen Crouch) continue to inspire me to work hard.

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(and for fear of leaving someone out), they will remain anonymous. Nevertheless, they know who they are who gave me assistance (and a few inebriated respites from work). Moreover, both Dan Tuttle and Michaelyn Chou furnished me with useful direction and understanding of Hawaii politics. Tom Paradise, of UHH's Department of Geography, produced the beautiful maps that accompany this study.

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The university is truly one of the most wonderful inventions of Western society. I have had the pleasure to be supported by two. Indiana University, through its Department of Political Science, offered me a spectacular three year financial aid package. Moreover, the Department was generous in providing other resources like computer facilities, an office and telephone, quiet places to work, and an outstanding faculty. The University of Hawaii at Hilo, through its Department of Sociology and Political Science and the Social Sciences Division, employed me as a lecturer for two and a half years. Furthermore, despite downward spiraling budgets, the Department and Division continued to support my research in innumerable ways. Also, dozens of undergraduates at both universities served as guinea pigs for my ideas and occasional sermons about Hawaii politics.

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and productive scholar. Leroy Rieselbach is the world's best editor. He has this fascinating ability to *see the forest and the trees!* I eagerly looked forward to receiving his comments (always returned within a month and with his characteristic red markings everywhere). Whenever I read them, I knew (1) I would learn more about what I had said, (2) he would ask me to push my analysis further, and (3) he would be willing to read new drafts. In various forms, Leroy has read this manuscript many times. Edward Carmines and David James enhanced the proposal and final product with their useful critiques of my work. Although not on the final committee because he was out of the country, Russell Hanson's comments and questions improved the all-important proposal stage of this project.

This study seeks to enhance our understanding of the connections between political institutions and behavior. Political parties, a key mediating institution, perform a critical role in the proper functioning of democracies. Indeed, imagining a representative democracy without parties is difficult. As parties mobilize and convert voters to cast ballots for its candidates, they function as one channel of communication between masses and elites. This study seeks to specify the relationships between political parties and ethnic voters. How do parties mobilize ethnics' participation in elections? The research problem, which examines party politics in mid-century Hawaii, has three components.

First, social context constrains politicians' choices. Party candidates must operate in a social context that shapes their opportunities to make appeals to groups. In Hawaii, party politicians faced an ethnically stratified electorate. They could choose to use class or ethnic-based appeals to build party coalitions. In the first half of this century, Republicans - the dominant party - formed a coalition of wealthy Whites and poor, rural Hawaiians. After World War II, new Democrats exploited the existing class cleavage and mobilized newly-eligible ethnic immigrants. In particular, these Democrats were very successful in making appeals to Asian - especially Japanese - voters.

The other two components of the problem arise from the elite-mass relationship. The second element emphasizes the strategy of elite actors. Within the limits of the social context, party elites have some flexibility to redefine the political agenda to convert or mobilize new supporters. As predicted by Clark and Wilson (1961), the postwar Democratic Party relied on both solidary and purposive appeals. In particular, the party

used appeals to mobilize both the lower class and ethnic immigrants. The party's class-based appeals included close ties to the major labor unions and the advocacy of educational and land reform. Democrats also used ethnic-based appeals to Japanese and other ethnic immigrants that stressed racial equality. These ethnic-based appeals included ethnically balanced candidate slates and appointments.

The third part of this study centers on mass reactions to these party strategies. Before World War II, Republicans mobilized voters in a diversity of neighborhoods throughout the archipelago. However, in the poorest districts in Honolulu, Democrats did very well. After the war, Democrats made significant gains in many neighborhoods, especially in Japanese and middle class neighborhoods.

In sum, this study shows that the relationship between political parties and ethnic voters is best understood by examining three components (social context, elite strategies, and mass reactions). Further, the data suggest that the Democratic Party relied primarily on purposive and solidary appeals to attract lower class and ethnic votes. Moreover, the party created a group identity among ethnic immigrants to solidify their support for Democratic candidates. Finally, this study posits variation in the organization of the executive may play a role in organizational appeals. After the party factionalized in 1962, it used a variety of incentives to win elective office.

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This study seeks to explain the types of strategies party elites use to attract voters. How do party elites decide which kinds of incentives to offer, at what period, in what way, and to which groups? This study investigates the efficacy of competing and overlapping class and ethnic cleavages. Incentive theory suggests that organizations will offer three types of appeals: material (tangible rewards), solidary (enjoyment through participation), and purposive (policies and programs). First, using U.S. Census data, this study examines the social context of Hawaii in terms of ethnic and class characteristics. Second, using interviews with party elites, it explores the kinds of appeals new Democrats used. Third, using precinct-level election results and neighborhood characteristics, this study examines the party's coalition of class and ethnic groups.

New Democrats in Hawaii shifted from a class-based appeal to an ethnic-based appeal over time. Party elites found that class-based appeals were effective to gain power. However, once they became the majority party, Democrats found that appeals to Japanese-Americans were a particularly successful strategy. Democratic politicians continued to rely on the latter's allegiance. The context of two large ethnic groups (i.e., Caucasians and Japanese) and many smaller ones allowed the party to solidify their ties to Japanese voters. Hence, party elites, constrained by the social context, exploited ethnic differences to maintain their electoral coalition.

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Chapter One

LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study seeks to enhance our understanding of the connections between political institutions and behavior. Mediating institutions, such as political parties and organized interests, are a central feature of representative democracies. If linkage institutions fail to express public demands to decision-making bodies, political participation is likely to be low and public disaffection widespread. Moreover, these institutions function as a channel of communication between masses and elites. Thus, political parties play a critical role in the functioning of democracies. Indeed, imagining a representative democracy without parties is difficult (Schattsneider 1942). A major function of political parties is to mobilize voters to cast ballots for its candidates. This study seeks to specify the relationships between political parties and ethnic voters.

While this case study examines party politics in modern Hawaii, it should be of interest to scholars who study realignments, ethnic politics, political economy, and elite strategies. The New Deal Democratic realignment occurred in Hawaii much later than elsewhere in the U.S. As Chapter Two details, the components of the Democratic coalition did not reach fruition until the nineteen fifties. The rise of the middle class spurred the maturation of the electorate. For ethnic scholars, Hawaii presents a unique case in the U.S. where most residents are non-White. More important, this polyethnic environment demonstrates the social and political construction of ethnic identity. In political economic terms, the dramatic changes in both global and local economies

provided opportunities for new participants in politics. Finally, those who study elite-mass relations can gain some insight into the constraints that the masses place upon strategic elites. Moreover, within those constraints, elites retain some choices in the ways they attempt to construct their coalitions.

This study attempts to answer the question: How do parties mobilize ethnics' participation in elections? The research problem has three components. First, social history constrains politicians' choices. Party candidates must operate in a social context that shapes their opportunities to make appeals to groups. What socio-historical factors affect the mobilization (and the mode) of political expressions? In early twentieth century Hawaii, most people wanted to become "good" Americans. They adopted many values of nineteenth century American political culture and became active members of their communities. However, the diverse mix of ethnic groups created a social milieu that provided party elites with some flexibility in group-based appeals. In Hawaii, party politicians could choose to use class and ethnicity (or both) to build party coalitions.

The other two components of the problem arise from the elite-mass relationship. The second element emphasizes the strategies of elite actors. While the social context discourages some strategies, elites have some flexibility to redefine the political agenda to convert or mobilize new supporters. What kinds of appeals or incentives do they use to attract and mobilize support for their cause(s)? In the early twentieth century Hawaii, native Hawaiians¹ were the largest numerical group. White Republican Party leaders

¹In this study, the term "Hawaiian" refers to the original Polynesian descendants of the islands. Hawaiians are individuals who can trace their lineage to a person who was present in Hawaii before the arrival of Captain Cook in 1778.

built bridges to Hawaiian chiefs. This White-Hawaiian coalition was founded on ethnic voting, patronage jobs, and traditional allegiances. Whites cast ballots for Republicans, who were usually White. Some Hawaiian voters were rewarded with government positions. Also, some native Hawaiians followed the advice of their former chiefs and kinsmen who supported the GOP. After World War II, new Democrats exploited the existing class cleavage and mobilized newly-eligible ethnic immigrants. In particular, these Democrats were very successful in making appeals to Asian - especially Japanese - voters. The party stressed the opening of Hawaii's society to all ethnics. They constructed diverse candidate slates to attract the support of ethnic immigrants and native Hawaiians.

The third part of the problem centers on mass reactions to these maneuvers. Which kinds of groups respond to which kinds of appeals? Which appeals are useful? Before World War II, Republicans were strong in a diversity of neighborhoods throughout the archipelago. However, Democrats did very well in the poorest districts in Honolulu. After the war, Democrats made gains in most neighborhoods, but particularly in Japanese and middle class neighborhoods. The richest area of Honolulu remained staunchly Republican.

In sum, the research problem can be investigated in terms of contextual setting, elite strategies, and mass behavior. To explore these components, this study builds on a substantial body of work. The next four sections of this chapter attempt to use this existing literature to develop a framework that explains elite-mass relationships between political parties and ethnic voters. The first section discusses the literature on political

parties and the separability of the effects of class and race on politics. The second summarizes and critiques three prevailing theories of ethnic politics. Third, I argue that Clark and Wilson's (1961) theory of political organizations and incentive systems offers a useful framework within which to proceed. The final section presents the research questions and hypotheses studied.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section evaluates the literature on political parties and the effects of class and ethnicity on politics. It addresses three questions: What theories guide our thinking about political parties? Can we separate the effects of class and ethnicity on political behavior? The crucial relationship in this research occurs between two groups of actors: political parties and voters (as ethnics).

Political Parties

Both political parties and interest groups mediate between the public's desires and governmental actions (Beck and Sorauf 1992; see also Key 1964: Chap. 13). Interest groups are social organizations that - at least, on occasion - attempt to affect governmental policies. They may form, grow, and decline for reasons (un)related to politics. Political parties are different from other interest groups in at least one important aspect; parties try to place their members into official government positions. As a result, parties generally make appeals to broader audiences and attempt to aggregate particularized interests. In this formulation, political parties and interest groups are

linkage or mediating institutions. They link the masses to governmental institutions; they function as a voice of the people, expressing people's demands to political leaders. Conceived alternately, parties and interest groups are "gatekeepers" that set limits on mass participation. They steer protests and other disruptive forces into nonviolent, socially-acceptable modes. While parties are unlikely to fulfill all of the functions of a democracy (King 1969), they appear to be mainstays of any democracy (Schattsneider 1942). Thus, while parties and interest groups have broad similarities, parties occupy a unique location in a political system.

In the standard approach to political parties, parties rest on three legs: organization, voters, and officeholders (Key 1964). This threefold framework brings together an enormous body of knowledge about political parties (e.g., see Beck and Sorauf 1992). The party-as-organization literature emphasizes the more formal structures and procedures that parties use. For example, by using clearly measurable variables, Gibson et al. (1985) provide valuable information on the changes in state and local party structures. They argue that subnational party organizations are not dying, but have grown in response to the investment of resources from the national parties.

The party-in-the-electorate literature has grown since The American Voter was first published (Campbell et al. 1960). While the multitude of topics in this area are too numerous to mention, several major works on voting behavior are relevant here. In particular, the work on vote choice, electoral turnout, and partisan realignment enhance our understanding of the relationship between parties and voters. Many vote choice models build on the work of the Michigan scholars. To them, party is an internalized

referent object that elicits the support (or opposition) of voters. Hence, an individual voter's party identification is viewed as a central variable to predict an individual's vote. In the classical formulation, while other variables (e.g., issues and candidates) are important, they are less critical than party identification. A second approach to vote choice (i.e., Columbia school) suggests that group membership and allegiance are central to understanding voter's decisions (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). In particular, the social context in which the voter lives his or her daily life is a powerful predictor of vote choice. Individuals respond to the social pressures from friends, neighbors, and co-workers to make their decisions. The third school (i.e., rational choice) argues that individuals are utility-maximizers who undertake cost-benefit analysis of the choices facing them (Downs 1957). Peoples' decisions reflect which party is most likely to pursue their interests. Thus, voters evaluate each party's overall performance and produce a party differential to guide their decisions.

The voting behavior literature has also examined the question of Who Votes? or the factors that predict turnout at elections (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). These findings indicate that people who have higher incomes, more education, and are white are more likely to participate in elections. Moreover, those with a high sense of civic duty, political efficacy, and strong partisan leanings are also more likely to turn out.

Moreover, the party coalition and realignment literature suggests another way to understand the ways parties relate to the mass of voters. Parties mobilize public support to build coalitions among groups of voters. Party leaders are strategic decision makers; they work to assemble winning coalitions. These coalitions can change as a result of

changes in group size or allegiance (Key 1955, 1959). Social groups play a key role in the formation of party alignments. Parties of the right tend to attract the support of wealthier segments of the electorate; left parties seek support among the lower classes of society (Lipset 1980). Alternatively, new party alignments may form around new issues. Out-of-power party leaders may bring new divisive issues to the top of the agenda to cleave the electorate in their favor (Carmines 1991; Riker 1982; Sundquist 1983). In sum, this vast literature, here subsumed under the label "party-in-the-electorate," provides some guidance in studying the relationship between parties and voters.

Finally, the party-in-government component of Key's analysis suggests that elected officials play a critical role as party adherents. As compared to others, they wear the party label conspicuously and their political careers are tied to party successes and failures. These studies examine the cohesiveness and conflicts among partisans in legislatures and between the branches of government, notably the inherent conflict between the executive and legislative branches.

Thus, from this view, parties consist of leaders, supporters, and voters. Party leaders may or may not be candidates or office holders. These leaders provide and organize resources to make tactical decisions about the party's future. They track, and make decisions about, voters based on election results. Hence, precincts are practical "building blocks" for party leaders. Precinct workers (party stalwarts) canvass neighborhoods, many of which have distinctive social (e.g., class or ethnic) characteristics. Voters are the building blocks from which coalitions are built.

These observations provide a solid foundation to guide research. However, my

research seeks an integrated explanation that corresponds most closely to the party coalition framework. I am interested in explaining the dynamic process of party strategies and mass reactions. Elites judge the effectiveness of their decisions by their success in the electoral arena. The outcomes of these strategies affect future elite decisions. Thus, the ways in which elites respond to the dynamics of a changing society is a central question. Moreover, mass responses are critical; they constrain elite options and opportunities. In short, for my purposes, the classical approach to party organizations does not provide an obvious link between elite strategies and mass reactions. However, these insights and explanations do contribute to a more comprehensive explanation of elite-mass relations.

Part of the difficulty with employing the standard approach to parties is the lack of conceptual development. In particular, there seems to be widespread disagreement about how to define a political party. Arguing for conceptual clarity, Schlesinger (1984, 1991) presents a useful framework from which to proceed. He begins with Downs' definition of a party as "a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election" (Down 1957:25). This definition has several important implications. First, it largely removes the psychological element from study. This means that we seek to understand party organization and behavior in terms of politics, rather than individuals' motivations and desires. Thus, choices are structured within a goal-oriented, institutional framework. Second, Schlesinger's (1991) approach strips voters from the party membership. Voters choose from among competing parties, but are not adherents or partisans of a particular party. While voters may have partisan allegiances, few are actual

members of the party.

Third, and most important, the emphasis is on candidates (and their close supporters) who seek to win office. These personal organizations of individual candidates and their campaign supporters form a nucleus of the party organization. The important point is that parties *are* teams composed of these individual candidate organizations. Thus, party organizations reflect the interests of a diversity of candidates and their supporters (Schlesinger 1991). Strategic decisions, campaign tactics, and funding are funneled through individual candidates who seek particular offices. *Candidates are the driving force in the party organization.* When it is expedient, they may campaign together, pool resources, and select issues. In any case, since they share the party label, they have some incentive to present a - more or less - common and cohesive platform to the voting public. Since I seek to understand party strategies and campaign appeals, this framework provides a strong justification for studying individual candidates' efforts to win office. In particular, major (visible) offices are likely to provide evidence of issue - and other - appeals. After all, these offices tend to attract the more popular, better financed, and better organized candidates.

Schlesinger (1984, 1991) argues that political parties occupy a unique position in politics. He contends that a theory of political parties must recognize the similarities and differences between parties and other institutions. Three functions of political parties have consequences for its organization. First, like business firms, parties compete in a marketplace (i.e., for votes). Organizational maintenance depends on their success in the electoral arena. Second, political parties are collective goods-producing organizations.

Their output (winning elections, achieving policies) are distributed widely. In comparison, a business firm, a private goods-producing organization, “can use the private goods it receives (usually money) for its product as the incentive to attract workers and other contributors” (Schlesinger 1984:384). Since political candidates have the most incentive to contribute time and effort to a party's development, party organizations are flexible. Third, since parties - like interest groups - cannot directly compensate members, they must rely on the part-time and leisure labor markets. Moreover, these workers attach great significance to their goals.

In sum, parties are similar to interest groups in that both produce collective goods and cannot compensate their workers directly. However, parties must survive a clear market test; they must receive votes to win office. At the same time, parties must make appeals in the market to win elections and manipulate incentives to attract both supporters and voters. Party strategies are hindered by the conflicts between survival in the marketplace, on the one side, and the party's role as a public goods producer with indirect means of compensation, on the other. While these ideas provide much guidance, the theory lacks a typology of the incentives parties might use to attract activists and voters.

Class and Ethnicity

The third question revolves around the meaning of ethnicity and its separability from class. The two general approaches focus on race and class as independent explanatory variables. Some scholars maintain that ethnicity is a separate and unique phenomenon that affects social relations. Others suggest that ethnicity is solely a product

of the class division in society. Moreover, a third group of scholars suggest that the interaction of class and ethnicity affects social behavior.

The first group of scholars (i.e., assimilationists) suggest three important explanatory variables: (1) culture, (2) identity, and (3) attitudes. Scholars who emphasize cultural explanations seek to understand the historical, religious, and linguistic commonalities that exist among a group of people. Thus, common experiences provide individuals with a means to identify with an ethnic group. However, we must employ this approach with some trepidation. Explanations rooted in values and beliefs can provide a cover for a re-invention of racism (e.g., see Steinberg 1984; Balibar 1989). Some argue that certain groups are more successful because their norms, values, and beliefs are "more appropriately suited" for American society. For example, Jews (or any admired ethnic group, e.g., Chinese, Japanese, or Cubans) who value hard work, education, family ties, and land investment, are able to adapt and succeed in American society. On the other hand, Blacks (Puerto Ricans, Native American Indians, or Filipinos) lack the appropriate values and must be taught them to become "good" Americans.

This approach hints of a neo-racism that is not necessary to explain the success rates among various ethnic groups. Instead of relying on cultural explanations, one could argue that successful ethnics brought the appropriate social skills and relationships that allowed them to prosper (Steinberg 1991). For example, as Steinberg (1991) shows, nineteenth-century immigrant Jews possessed occupational skills as tailors and dressmakers that flowered in industrial America. They succeeded in the garment industry because - in a free market economy - their skills were rewarded and developed. Or,

Chinese - those with familial ties to China - imported foreign goods that were in high demand by both Chinese Americans and others. On the other hand, African Americans, who developed skills as heavy laborers in the South, were needed in Northern factories. However, when combined with racist attitudes, the result was few opportunities to rise to middle class status.²

In attempting to separate the cultural and social basis of ethnicity, some scholars stress people's imagination and inventiveness in creating an ethnic identification (e.g., see Anderson). "Individuals, within certain constraints, will use ethnic identity how and when it suits them" (Royce 1982:3). Moreover, these strategies of ethnic identification reflect three factors: (1) the power to define a situation, (2) "perceptions [that] take concrete forms as symbols and stereotypes" (Royce 1982:5), and (3) the purpose, or ideology, of people. Thus, dominant groups are usually better equipped to label subordinate groups as ethnics.

However, sometimes, minority ethnics may have enough power to control some symbols to achieve a particular purpose. For example, the Zapotec Indians of Mexico use art to maintain a separate identity from both other Indians and Mexicans. Zapotec intellectuals, in particular, use their ethnic identity to obtain resources from the national polity (Royce 1982). In the U.S., Hispanic leaders have formed an ethnic group from heterogeneous Spanish-speaking communities to receive preferential treatment from the government (Chavez 1992). Similar efforts to unify Native American Indians (and Asian

² Of course, the notable exceptions were Black business people, who supplied personal services to other African Americans (e.g., as hairdressers, barbers, morticians, and restaurateurs).

Americans) have also achieved some success (Mathiessen 1980).

Finally, some assimilationist scholars suggest that prejudice and discrimination explain differences in success among ethnic groups. They argue that people's psychological attitudes and beliefs about others are the root cause of ethnic relations. Hence, the deprivation of Blacks in American society is a result of some Whites who fear and loathe Blacks. Indeed, persuasive evidence indicates that some people have strong prejudices against other ethnic groups, even if they have never met a member of the other ethnic group. These scholars suggest that intergroup rivalries are the product of perceived differences between the groups. Thus, any physical difference - no matter how slight - can lead to racist attitudes and actions. In sum, assimilationist scholars, who argue ethnicity is a separate and unique variable in explaining social behavior, focus on cultural, strategic, and attitudinal bases for ethnicity.

This has tremendous importance for this study, because we seek to separate the effects of ethnicity and class on political participation. If ethnicity has an identifiable effect on voting, then elites are likely to take advantage of this opportunity. That is, party leaders will offer incentives to particular ethnic groups to mobilize their support.

Neo-Marxist scholars argue that ethnicity is a reflection of the class basis of society.³ Using a world systems approach, they contend that capitalists seek to exploit new sources of raw materials and cheap labor. Hence, these capitalists either (1) establish colonies or (2) migrate to "underutilized" territories. In the colonial structure, capitalists use their superior weapons and power to dominate native residents. They ignore social

³ The following three paragraphs are based on Part I of Geschwender (1978).

cleavages present in native society and create a two-tier system, with themselves at the top. The natives (usually people of color) are defined as lower status ethnics.

Sometimes, the colonialists will elevate one group, or certain members of one group, to act as middleman in their dealings with - and domination of - the native population.

In the other scenario, capitalists claim and establish a new state in land "undeveloped" by natives. In this case, since natives pose a hindrance to the development of a capitalist economy, the new immigrants either eliminate or enslave them. The natives who survive, now defined as ethnics, are marginalized onto poor lands and "protected" under government regulations. After the defeat of the natives, newer immigrants are often imported for further exploitation as cheap labor. These newer immigrants, also defined as ethnics, are relegated to physical work and confined to urban ghettos.

In either situation, these scholars argue, few ethnics are allowed to assimilate into capitalist society. Moreover, in both cases, the capitalists may use an economic or religious ideology to justify their exploitation of the natives. For example, a classical liberal would argue that the "under use" of the land by natives gives the immigrant-capitalists the "right" to appropriate and develop the land. Alternatively (or jointly), the newcomers may proselytize among the natives in an attempt to Christianize them. In sum, neo-Marxist scholars regard ethnicity as an outgrowth of a worldwide capitalist economy.

The ethnic and class approaches have a commonality. Each seeks to explain ethnic behavior in terms of a single variable. The first group of scholars maintain that

ethnicity has a separate effect on social relations; the second claims that ethnicity is a product of the drive for profit. However, within each group, some scholars temper the importance of each variable. For example, Lee (1989) contends that a model of Asian/White relations must include both racist attitudes and economic opportunities. Thus, she attempts to bridge the two approaches by arguing that both economics and attitude may be the basis for ethnic group formation.

Bonacich (1980), an avowed Marxist, suggests that class models of ethnicity can include elements of attitudes and identification. For example, under conditions of a split labor market, the bourgeoisie of the dominant ethnic group control the relations between lower class ethnics. They exploit both groups on a class basis, but encourage racism among the lower strata of their own ethnic group towards the out-group. This allows the bourgeoisie to maintain two separate labor pools, who may be paid at differential rates for the same work. Alternatively, the out-group is limited to "dirtier," less desirable tasks. In either case, capitalists use both class and ethnic differences to divide and conquer lower status individuals. In both examples, each scholar recognizes the usefulness of class and ethnic variables to explain social relations. Indeed, Bonacich (1980) presents several models that include both class exploitation and ethnicity (in the form of nationalism or racism) as explanatory components. As in most social science problems, the answer might be a multi-factor approach. No single variable is likely to explain all of the variance in ethnics' behavior.

Moreover, the explanation may be more complicated than simply inserting more independent variables in the right-hand side of the equation. It is likely that class and

ethnicity have an *interactive* effect on social behavior. For example, Huckfeldt and Kohfeld (1989) argue that the Democratic Party's reliance on Black voters affects the behavior of lower class Whites. As Blacks constitute a higher proportion of the Democratic coalition, lower class Whites are less likely to vote Democratic. Hence, the interdependence of class and race affect Democrats' opportunities to win elections.

Pettigrew (1981, 1985) presents a more general model that explains the interaction between class and race. He argues that the race model (i.e., assimilationism) is correct; there is a disadvantage accruing to Blacks, because they are Black. Moreover, he agrees with the class model; Blacks are injured because they are members of the lower class. Finally, he suggests that beyond these direct effects, the interaction of race and class can explain the severity of being *poor and Black* in America. In other words, "the total condition of being black and poor is greater than the sum of its two racial and class parts" (Pettigrew 1981: 245).

Not surprisingly, this review suggests that an examination of the ethnic and class bases of politics is a complicated endeavor. This study attempts to bring together an understanding of political institutions and mass behavior with a sensitivity to historical context. Each of these approaches illuminates the subject of ethnicity, but fails to address the central concern of my work: the way parties and voters interact. Hence, I review the prevailing theories of ethnic politics to evaluate their usefulness in understanding this relationship.