Joyce’s *Finnegans Wake*
By the same author and published by Universal Publishers:

**Finding Joy in Joyce: A Reader's Guide to Joyce’s Ulysses**

**The Sound and the Fury in the Garden of Eden**

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**Joyce’s Finnegans Wake: The Curse of Kabbalab**

*Volume 2*

**Joyce’s Finnegans Wake: The Curse of Kabbalab**

*Volume 3*
Brandi and Egan
Cameron and Seth

May Their Possibilities Be Manifold
# Table of Contents

## Section I: Introduction

Section II: Chapters 1.7 and 1.8

- Summary of Chapters 1.7 and 1.8
- Style and Content
- Mostly New Conceptual Materials
  - Phenomenon and Noumenon: Schopenhauer
  - Gnosticism
  - Garden of Eden Redux a la Schopenhauer and Joyce
  - Creation from Within the Self
- Text of Chapter 1.7: Shaun Shuns Shem
- Text of Chapter 1.8: Ladies Share the Waters

Section III: Summary of Part I

Section IV: Chapter 2.1

- Part II
- Summary of Chapter 2.1
- Mostly New Conceptual Material
  - Bruno the Nolan and Eliphas Levi
  - Shadows of the Text
  - Alchemy
  - Game: Devils and Angels or Colors
  - Rainbow
  - Memory
  - Cosmology of Possibilities
  - Reflections
  - Effect of Father
  - Macbeth
- Text of Chapter 2.1

Section V: General Conceptual Materials

- Kabbalah Primer
- Major Points
- Kabbalah
Joyce’s Finnegans Wake

Foundation of Finnegans Wake .................................................... 441
Curse as Latent Content of Dream .................................................. 442
FW, the Garden of Eden and Curse of Kabbalah ..................... 443
TZTZ God and ES God and FW ................................................ 444
Independent Individuality .............................................................. 446
Tikkun—Why Finnegan Doesn’t Wake Up .................................. 448
Basic Formula for FW—The Power of L ................................... 449
Resurrection—Tikkun in Christian Terms—Trinity ................. 451
Joyce’s Trinity: God, Individuality and Art ................................. 453
Art and the Ultimate ................................................................. 459

Section VI: Debts and Methods..................................................... 461
Section I:
Introduction

This volume is the fourth in a series. It assumes you have read the first three volumes by the same name.

This volume attempts to decode on a word-by-word basis all of chapters 1.7, 1.8 and 2.1 of Finnegans Wake. These chapters end part I and start part II. The first volume covers chapters 1.1 and 1.2, the second chapters 1.3 and 1.4 and third chapters 1.5 and 1.6. See Section V herein for materials on FW generally, Kabbalah and Joyce’s theories. These are repeated from earlier volumes.

I hope my decoding efforts will help you enjoy the riches of Joyce’s last literary blessing, a blessing 17 years in the making. My intent is to explore Joyce’s novel as an art object, to examine how it works as art using the theories of esthetics developed by Joyce himself. I call it a novel, but it fits in no known category other than wisdom literature.

Section VI Debts and Methods contains information on sources, abbreviations, capitalization, meaning of parenthesis and such matters. I am not an academic, do not use footnotes and do not scour all of the literature to find out if someone else has already said the same thing I am saying.

There is plenty of FW to go around. Analysis of FW is not a zero sum game. It was designed so that analysis of its meaning would be an infinite series; some analysis makes more possible. FW’s depth is astounding. Like its god, it is an infinite source of meaning. It exalts connections, any kind of connection. FW suggests these remaining connections are background radiation from a primordial unified and infinite structure destroyed by a big bang.
Section II: Chapters 1.7 and 1.8

Summary of Chapters 1.7 and 1.8

Here Aesthetics meets Theosophy meets Metaphysics, and together they close Part 1 of FW. These the ATM for human knowledge pay out to their common code—the relationship of part to part and part to whole.

This relationship registers how one part or whole treats another part. This is the subject for both chapters. In chapter 1.7, part and whole shun part while in chapter 1.8 part shares whole with part. From shun to share, hurt to help, male to female. In aesthetics, from bad art to good art. In theosophy, from TZTZ god to ES god. In metaphysics a la Arthur Schopenhauer, from male to female aspects of Will. The spirit of TZTZ god is the fumbling artist in chapter 1.7 and the spirit of ES god is the divine shaper in 1.8. Joyce’s style choices reinforce content.

Featuring an all male cast, chapter 1.7 is a stinging criticism of Shem by Shaun—brother against brother despite their common underlying substance. First in part against part Shaun himself lists Shem’s shortcomings from the norms of society, and the chapter ends with whole against part—charges of the type the Old Testament TZTZ god would bring against Shem under the Ten Commandments. Shem is charged in company with his biblical associates Cain, Ham and Esau. For Joyce these are the spirits who were put down in the didactic Hebrew Scriptures because they were independent. This is the whole Book against individual parts.

Chapter 1.7 is intentionally bad art. In aesthetic terms, the whole of the chapter is at odds with the parts and the parts at odds with other parts. The presentation is intentionally awkward and frequently uses incorrect English. Moreover, it illustrates Joyce’s theory of literary pornography, kinetic writing designed to make the reader want something or abhor something. The reader is meant to conclude that the bad art is caused by the nitro-kinetic state of the narrator, Shaun’s desire to bad mouth and shun Shem. Such a limited narrator/artist can only reach limited possibilities of which chapter 1.7 is an example. This is the fruit of the finite and limited TZTZ creation.
With an all female cast, chapter 1.8 features a young unnamed washerwoman and old unnamed washerwoman sharing the waters. They are washing clothes and talking together across a river. The main point of the chapter is that they are working together, and Old shares knowledge with Young. Sharing replaces shunning. Part helps part. What Old shares is knowledge of ALP, or the eternal feminine principle, knowledge of the whole. Part shares whole with part. A long catalogue of gifts made by Anna to others outside her family cements the concept of sharing.

The principal subjects in chapter 1.8 are feminine: rivers, charity and mother’s milk. These processes are outside time because once started they will continue absent an outside intervention.

This chapter reviews the treatment registered in scripture and myth by the powers that be of human women, of female part by god whole. These women include Lillith, Eve and Leda as well as the unnamed “fair” human females whom TZTZ god’s angels “chose” to copulate with [registered in Genesis 6]. In Joyce’s view, TZTZ god is already a registered sex offender.

Chapter 1.8 is intentionally divine art. It illustrates Joyce’s rule that in fine art the whole/parts relationship must be exquisitely balanced, which can happen only if the artist creates in a state of arrest, emotional arrest. Unlike Shaun in chapter 1.7, the principal narrator in 1.8 [an old and experienced washerwoman] is calm, like the arrested artist. In that case the artist has access to unlimited possibilities, the fruit of the unified and infinite ES god.

The trellis for both these chapters is the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer [1788-1860]. Both chapters are supported by his philosophy set forth in *The World as Will and Representation*. Representation refers to our sensory experience of objects as mental images only [phenomenon or appearance]. These experiences are per Schopenhauer conditioned by the perceiver’s built-in notions of space, time and causality. We do not see things as they really are, the “thing in itself” or the thing without us. That underlying reality belongs to the noumenon that Schopenhauer called Will: an aimless, strife producing, lifeless, impersonal and always desire producing blind drive or energy. Since each of us is made of Will, you can know the Will by looking within yourself.

Continuing Joyce’s distinction between the female and male principles, Joyce presents men and women as different phases of Will. This is Joyce’s overlay on Schopenhauer. As Joyce puts it, “the he and she of it.” “It” refers to the impersonal Will. In Kabbalah as
viewed by Joyce, the female/male distinction in Will is the distinction between ES and TZTZ god.

The male aspect of the Will is survival promotion of the one self, of killing and strife and discrimination [TZTZ god] by the typically egoist based male. In cave society [the school for the eternal male and female principles], it would involve the father-alpha banishing male offspring in order to avoid sexual competition for the harem, daughters and granddaughters included, and attitude conditioning ritual humping or castration of those males that stayed. The female aspect of the Will is continuation of life, through birth and nurture and sharing, sharing of self. Sharing work and knowledge and no doubt gossip around the cave society circle was the favorite female activity while the men hunted and killed.

These characteristic activities remain in the eternal male and female principles embodied in these two chapters, male in chapter 1.7 and female in 1.8. Shaun knows male and wills to hurt and banish Shem and Old knows female and wills to share knowledge with Young.

Plugging into Schopenhauer’s concepts, chapter 1.7 is built on male Will and representation, which means a repeat presentation: Shaun’s presentation to others about Shem is based on Shaun’s own sensory experiences of Shem and is made in order to convince others to shun him. His often-unconvincing criticism of Shem tells us more about Shaun than Shem.

Chapter 1.8 is built on female Will and Schopenhauer’s take on knowing the Will by knowing yourself. Young has a strong desire to learn; she has the will to know. Old is willing to help; she knows Will and knows the weedworld. Will to know meets know the Will. What Old teaches Young is the life story of ALP, the eternal feminine. That knowledge will help her know herself.

At the end of the chapter as Old departs, Young sees phantoms of Will and morphs into a stone, an inorganic object in which per Schopenhauer the substance remains the same but the form can change. In Joyce’s terms, Young hasn’t matured into an indivisible individual yet. Her form can change for others. Old morphs into an elm, an organic object in which per Schopenhauer the substance constantly changes but the form remains the same. Old is already a finished individual and knows the way of the world and herself. The many individual rivers embedded in the text partake of the same formula— the water is always changing but the river remains the same.
In Schopenhauer’s terms, Young cannot be conscious of herself as a subject of knowing and willing independently of the objects of knowing and willing. Since at the end of the chapter Old and further knowledge of the feminine principle have departed, Young is left with [in Schopenhauer’s words] a “wavering and unstable phantom” of Will in the form of dark flying and crawling objects and a wavering and unstable sense of herself. As a result, she is in the dark as part 1 closes.

In terms of the Eden legend, to which Joyce regularly returns, the one unnamed river flowing in and four different and named rivers flowing out of the Garden into weedworld sponsor the hundreds of river names embedded in the text. And Young is Eve before eating from the Tree of Knowledge, when she knows only her desire for the fruit and does not as yet know the fear of the knower, the fear brought by knowledge of good and bad, including the fear of death [if you eat of it you shall surely die]. To make this connection, Joyce has Old tell Young she will die when she knows Anna’s story [and thus knows herself].

At the end of chapter 1.8 and Part 1, and as with Adam and Eve out of the Garden, everyone is alone.

Style and Content

Joyce’s masterful synergism of style and content continues. In these chapters, that synergism reaches the ultimate: style becomes content. Joyce’s writing reaches the state of music, in which form and content are one. Thou are that as thou style are that content.

With this fusion, style or what is normally the mere appearance, the phenomenon, becomes one with content as the fundamental reality, the noumenon.

The contrast between phenomenon and noumenon sponsors the emphasis in these chapters on outer and inner, husks and sparks, and appearance and spirit. The notion of the Will sponsors pity and terror as channels for the best art because they are channels based on the horrors of Will.

The whole to part pattern of relationship also works in related theme areas visited in these chapters: In psychology, this whole-part relationship is referred to as the effect of The Other. In literary analysis, this is criticism. In the Old Testament, it is the Jewish religious agenda to criticize the independent characters Cain, Esau and Ham.
In social interaction, it is popularity or unpopularity, preparatory to sexual selection.

The TZTZ god curse of the Flood is reflected by run on sentences. There are few connectors in the male/TZTZ god based chapter 1.7, and many in female/ES god based 1.8. Bound modifiers and hypotaxis or subordinate clauses are used in 1.7 and free modifiers and parataxis or independent clause construction in 1.8. In 1.7, the syntax often interrupts the flow or uses run on sentences that like the flood lose their way. Spelling is wrong. Metaphors are mixed. Sentence structure is mutilated.

The individual river is the chief symbol in chapter 1.8. It is suitable for this job because it like organic life consists of a reasonably permanent form with ever changing material. In this sense, the river is like the individual human.

The shadow of darkness ends chapter 1.8 and part 1 with Plato’s cave metaphor, the captives in a cave who can only see shadows on the cave wall of objects behind them drawn between them and a fire.

Mostly New Conceptual Materials

Phenomenon and Noumenon: Schopenhauer

In reaching for the ultimate in these chapters, Joyce shaped his architecture around ideas of Schopenhauer. We need to review his major ideas, particularly the concept of Will. Apologies for long quotes, but this material is fundamental for an understanding of these chapters. From Magee:

We have at last reached a position from which, for the first time, we are able to give a sketch of Schopenhauer’s ontology [origins] and epistemology [knowledge] in complete outline. *** He taught that the entire world of phenomena in time and space, internally connected by causality, was the self-objectification of an impersonal, non-alive, timelessly active energy which he termed ‘will’. Phenomena and the will comprise between them everything there is: beyond them there is nothing, or at any rate nothing that we could ever have any grounds for postulating. Where and whence this will came is a question that cannot be asked, not because of anything particularly to do with the will itself but because questions about time, space and cause are meaningful only when world of phenomena, not outside it. “The nature of things before or be-
yond the world, and consequently beyond the will, is open to no
investigation.” By the same token the will does not cause the
world of phenomena, it is the world of phenomena, but it is the
not-externally-observable inner nature of that world, just as the ex-
ternally observable acts of my body are, in their not-externally-
 observable inner nature, acts of will. The phenomenal world con-
ists of four grades of the will’s objectification: will has objectified
itself in matter; matter has produced plant life; plant life has led to
animate organisms; and animal organisms have developed minds
and personalities. As all this shows, will is decidedly not a function
of mind. On the contrary, mind is a product of will: mind “is at
bottom tertiary [secondary], since it presupposes the organism, and
the organism presupposes the will.” Similarly, will “is not, like the
mind, a function of the body, but the body is its function.” Will, then,
in Schopenhauer’s sense, is primary, and is more body-like than
mind-like, for it objectifies itself first of all in physical substances
and bodies, a small number of which then develop minds as a sub-
sidiary by-product.

*** But since both knower and known, the subject of knowledge
and the object of knowledge, are self-objectification of will,
 knowledge is at bottom a process of self-awareness, the same enti-
ty knowing itself. Subject cannot exist without object, nor object
without subject. The two are correlative. To say that the subject
has such and such modes of apprehension available to it is only
the same as to say that the objects it knows have such and such
knowable characteristics possible to them. The constitution of
phenomena in space and time, and their causal interconnection,
are as much proclivities of subjects as characteristics of objects,
and can never occur except as activities involving a subject. How-
ever, all such activity is what they refer to is ephemeral, since both
subject and object exist only in the world of phenomena, and that
world consists entirely of things which come into being and pass
away. Only outside time can anything be unchanging and perma-
nent. But there within can be only one such thing, and therefore
nothing else for it to know. This one thing is something we have
decided to call will. Everything other than It, including ourselves,
is its manifestation. When we cease to exist in the world of phe-
nomena we no longer have any being as individuals, and all possi-
bility of knowledge ceases, but what our phenomenal existence
was noumenally grounded in remains unaffected by that. For all
we ever were in the world of phenomena was ephemeral manifesta-
tion of noumenal will; and the noumenal continues outside time
exactly the same as it always ‘was’ and always ‘will be’, undifferen-
tiable and knowledgeless.
Chapters 1.7 and 1.8

The correlative of subject and object as perceived may remind you of the interdependence of TZTZ god and mankind. The correlative also sponsors the complementarity of Young and Old in chapter 1.8: the will to know and know the will. They act as correlatives. If you read noumenon as “new man on,” you are in Joyce country.

It will also remind you [as it did Atwell] of the artist and his artwork: the perceptual experience of an object is the creation of a knowing subject; there is no artwork without an artist and no artist without an artwork; and both arise correlative.

Joyce constantly compares to art the fundamentals of other major aspects of human experience.

For Schopenhauer, there is only one noumenon, only one reality in the “thing as it is” or the thing without us. This is as opposed to phenomenon, how the world as objects appears to us as subjects viewing the apparently separate objects of the world through built in concepts of time, space and causality [e.g. if we see an object, we assume that our vision is caused by an object independent of us]. That one reality for Schopenhauer is the will or energy, “Will” that is undifferentiated, life-less, aimless, purposeless, strife producing and continuous blind seeking. Survival instincts and fear of death are its main human manifestations. Note that the Will is dreary and toxic. Given its nature as continuous seeking, it is no surprise that life consists of suffering. In Joyce’s cosmology, it is the excrement of the never satisfied TZTZ god.

Schopenhauer thought the best humans could do was to try to avoid the effects of the Will through momentary artistic experience and more permanent ascetic discipline. This is like the Buddha formula: avoid desire avoid suffering. Avoid Will avoid suffering. The human body is a manifestation of Will, not a product of or subject to but is Will. This Will body is the body to which the human mind is subject; that is to say, the higher functions of the mind are subject to the basic instincts whose primary function is individual survival. Schopenhauer scooped Freud on the unconscious as an override on our conscious mind.

In Joyce’s aesthetics, the artist must write from his own experience, not his direct experience but his own personal experience that has been reprocessed [or reincarnated]. So here Shem writes from his reprocessed waste, the waste products of his own body. Shem has made some progress against Will because in artistic pursuits his mind is not a function of his body. Instead he uses his body functions to
produce very personal but reprocessed art, art written in the excrement of this world experience but in the mode of arrest, after the colon has moved.

Schopenhauer determined the nature of the noumenon by looking within himself directly and analyzing what he found in there as an objectification of that type of Will. This was a permissible way into the ultimate nature because in this analysis, he did not have to use perception, which is troubled necessarily by built-in concepts of time, space and causality. Instead he had direct knowledge of his own body; it is not outside requiring a separate subject and object. It is subject viewing subject body directly. So that is why he was certain he had direct knowledge of some aspects of the ultimate in his own body. And the ultimate is not pretty. The colon is its characteristic residence.

Another method of looking at aspects of Will is through Platonic type ideas, ideas that are expressions of general truths but innocent of desire for any gain or advantage. These include the scientific laws such as gravity. These help understand aspects of Will because these ideas are intermediate between phenomenon and noumenon and as such take of both. They are most easily accessed by completely realized individuals because that is the point on the subject aspect of subject/object complementarity that exactly corresponds to the point of such ideas in phenomenon/noumenon.

From Magee:

All such direct manifestations of the will in the world of phenomena are called by Schopenhauer ‘Ideas’. We have had several examples already - all the forces of nature, such as gravity, and all scientific laws. These function in the same ways as Plato said the Ideas function. They operate in the world like dies that put a uniform stamp on innumerable phenomena which are then, though all different, all the same. Schopenhauer regards the species too as Ideas, stamping out millions of individual plants and animals which are the same now as a thousand years ago, the same here as in China. The reader may say: But if this is so, how are my acts of will, which are direct phenomenon of the will in precisely the sense under consideration, to be fitted in to this explanation? Where does the Platonic Idea come in in me? Schopenhauer’s reply is that that which is directly known by each one of us in the knowledge we have of ourselves in inner sense is indeed a Platonic Idea, and it does indeed have the intermediate status between the noumenon and the world of phenomena which he has accounted
for. However, in this unique case, the Platonic Idea can be and is
directly known by a knowing subject, in addition to being suscep-
tible of indirect knowledge by knowing subjects in general as are
all other Platonic Ideas. This has an immediate further significance
in that, as we know, wherever there is anything that is object of
knowledge there is also a precisely correlative subject of
knowledge. In the case of each human individual there is one and
only one subject of knowledge, distinct and unique, who has direct
knowledge of the Platonic Idea in inner sense - therefore one and
only one Platonic Idea, distinct and unique, is thus known. In
short, each human being instantiates a unique Platonic Idea. Thus,
at the highest grade of the will’s objectification, complete and self-
aware individuation is achieved. The unique Idea that is each hu-
man being also manifests itself in the world of phenomena as the
individual’s unique character or personality. But again, exactly as
with other Ideas, this character cannot be perceived or known di-
rectly, but only in its outer manifestations, indirectly, through the
successive movements and actions of the physical body in space
and time, in other words through behaviour. The truth of this is
brought home to us dramatically by the fact that we do not know
even our own characters directly, but get to know them (in so far
as we ever do get to know them) indirectly, from our behaviour,
over long periods of time, and are commonly surprised, not to say
disillusioned, by what we discover them to be.

The Platonic idea that Joyce uses in chapter 1.8 is the idea of the
eternal feminine. Old knows this idea since she is realized herself.

As Joyce uses Schopenhauer’s ideas, the reader gets the impres-
sion that Joyce would note that Schopenhauer, when he looked with-
in himself, was looking within a male, and would have received a
different impression if he could have looked within a female. Joyce
creates male and female version of Will: “the he and she of It.” This
separate treatment is justified by the different reactions to neutral
Will by the “egoist” and by the “good person,” which Joyce converts
to male and female: Good persons embrace the life of Will, under-
standing in charity that all are made from the same noumenon. Ego-
ists fear the world and pursue their own interests at the expense of
others. Joyce translates charitably good as female and selfish egoists
as male according to their eternal and principal aspects. Joyce’s fe-
male Will is good will hunting.
Even the value of the world as a whole is determined by one’s will (or character). As Schopenhauer indicates in comparing the world of the egoist with the world of “the good person”: The egoist feels himself surrounded by strange and hostile appearances, and all his hope rests on his own well-being. The good person lives in a world of friendly appearances; the well-being of any of these is his own well-being. Therefore, although the knowledge of the lot of man generally does not make his disposition a cheerful one, the enduring knowledge of his own essence in all living things nevertheless gives him a certain equilibrium and even serenity of disposition . . . . For the participation extended over innumerable appearances cannot cause such anxiety as that which is concentrated on one appearance. The accidents that befall the totality of individuals equalize themselves, while those that encounter the individual induce fortune and misfortune . . . . The well-being of the good person is heightened and extended by the well-being of other persons and even of other nonhuman beings, which entails no doubt that he or she is capable of . . . the taking of joy in any living being’s joy. Hence his or her “world” stretches far beyond the confines of his or her individual position, which is quite unlike the “world” of the egoist. Moreover, the good person inhabits “a world of friendly appearances” (in which he, as it were, feels “at home”), while the egoist inhabits a world of “strange and hostile appearances” (in which he constantly feels threatened and apprehensive). * * * If I have renounced the individual will and thereby become the pure (or impersonal) subject of knowing, the world appears to me as a gradation of Ideas—the contemplation of which engenders peace of mind. But if I affirm the individual will and thereby remain the impure (or personal) subject of knowing, the world appears as a network of particular objects whose changing states are subject to the principle of sufficient reason—the knowledge of which (like the knowledge of the egoist) breeds fear and anxiety. In this latter case I as egoist know arising and perishing appearances, each of which arises in the matter previously occupied by another appearance, and each of which perishes by being replaced by another. And then the world is a pretty frightful place, governed, as it were, by Hobbes’ saying, bellum omnium con/rn omnes (a war of all against all)—this too being a consequence and responsibility of my will.

The egoist person subject to individual Will reacts to many objects as targets of desire or avoidance. A good person free of the individual Will views these same objects objectively and without desire, as one would a painting in a museum rather than one for sale in a gallery.
In chapter 1.8, Young appears subject to the individual Will to know. She wants to know and wants a man in her life. Old recognizes their commonality and tries to teach it to Young. This is a form of “thou art that,” that every other living being is oneself all over again. When after more schooling she will become a mature female fully schooled in female Will [which is not fully realized at the point in time in chapter 1.8], then good person Young will know charity, inclusion, nurture and joy. By knowing the eternal feminine, she will know an important part of herself.

The take on Will by male and female is relativistic [Atwell]:

To sum up: just as I find out what sort of person I am by attending to the world as it appears to me, so the world appears to me as it does (or even if it does) depending on the sort of person I am. “The world is my will” will be “serious and grave” to everyone who fully recognizes its true meaning, namely, that the (value) nature of the world depends on the nature of one’s will; and it will be “terrible” . . to everyone who recognizes that one is responsible for the world’s being, say, terrible, filled with strife, a “vale of tears,” a place of incessant suffering and misery. On this score, Schopenhauer suggests that “the world as such” (if such a concept were legitimate) is value-neutral, that only one’s will makes it either terrible or endurable (even “friendly”). Consequently, when Schopenhauer claims that life is essentially suffering, that nonexistence would be preferable to existence, that existence is a sin for which death is the appropriate desert, and so on, he must mean to report the nature of the world from the standpoint of the egoist; for these claims do not reflect the standpoint of “the good person,” the aesthetic contemplator, the saint, or the mystic. “The world” for each of them takes on the quality corresponding to their (different) qualities, hence each of them can and must say, “the world is my will.”

Schopenhauer boils down the nature of Will in humans to the same ingredients as those in Joyce’s definition of pornography, to enlist the reader to want or abhor something. Magee unless otherwise noted:

Whoever is capable of somehow discerning the essential element, even when it is disguised under various modifications of degree and kind, will not hesitate to include among the manifestations of will also all desiring, striving, wishing, demanding, longing, hoping, loving, rejoicing, jubilation, and the like, no less than not willing or resisting,
all abhorring, fleeing, fearing, being angry, hating, mourning, suffering pains - in short, all emotions and passions. For these emotions or passions are weaker or stronger, violent and stormy or else quiet impulsions of one’s own will, which is either restrained or unleashed, satisfied or unsatisfied. In their many variations they relate to the successful or frustrated attainment of that which is willed, to the endurance or overcoming of that which is abhorred. Consequently, they are explicit affections of the same will which is active in decisions and actions. To this context belongs even that which goes under the name of feelings of pleasure and of displeasure. Of course, these are present in a great variety of degrees and kinds, but still they can always be traced to the affections of desiring or, abhorring, that is, to the will itself becoming aware of itself as satisfied or unsatisfied, restrained or unleashed. Indeed, here should be included the bodily emotions, pleasant or painful, and all the innumerable others which lie between these two, since the nature of these emotions consists in this: they enter directly into the self-consciousness as either something which is in accordance with the will or something which opposes it. Even of his own body one is directly conscious, strictly speaking, only as the externally active organ of the will and as the seat of receptivity for pleasant or unpleasant sensations.

So the arrested artist is an example of one who has resisted Will. This is why the reader can gain momentary relief from Will by reading the arrested artist’s work.

The contrast of knower and willer is a contrast embodied in the old and young washerwomen in chapter 1.8:

But one of the things, we must do . . . is to make clear the distinction between willing, in either of the two senses we have encountered so far, and knowing. This can be put baldly by saying that our will is what is known in inner sense, as distinct from the process of that knowing. ‘All knowledge inevitably presupposes subject and object; and so even self consciousness is not absolutely simple, but, like our consciousness of other things (i.e. the faculty of intuitive perception), is divided into a known and a knower.) Now here the known appears absolutely and exclusively as will. Accordingly the subject knows itself only as a willer, not as a knower. For the ego that represents, thus the subject of knowing, can itself never become representation or object, since as the necessary correlative of all representations it is their condition . . .

More on the neumenon, the father:
This is because it is impossible to talk of there being more than one anything, or of anything’s being different from anything else, without making use of concepts that can be defined only with reference to notions of temporal succession or of space location. (For this reason ~ Schopenhauer often refers to space-time as principium individuationis.) But space and time are of subjective origin, and characterize only the world of phenomena, not the world of things as they are in themselves, if indeed there could be such a world. Therefore it is only in the world of phenomena that things can be different from other things. Things as they are in themselves, lying as they would outside all possibility of space and time, would not be differentiable.

The neumenon of our world TZTZ god is undifferentiated but loves to separate as a function of always being dissatisfied. ES is undifferentiated but loves to merge as a function of always being unified.

**Time and knowledge:**

Clearly, then, this direct knowledge of physical objects from within, even though still not noumenal, is partially liberated from the constraints that shape all other empirical knowledge, and brings us closer to an understanding of the inner nature of things (we ourselves being things). It also shows that there is something special about time as being the only one not just of the dimensions but of the categories which is indispensable to knowledge, indeed to awareness. For precisely the reason that the category of time is indispensable to awareness, in addition to the reason given by Schopenhauer regarding the nature of knowledge, we have to accept that we are permanently precluded from any direct knowledge (what Bertrand Russell was to call ‘knowledge by acquaintance’) of the noumenon.

Since time is necessary for knowledge, Old and Young will have to come back another day for more instruction on the eternal feminine.

**Scooping Freud on the unconscious:**

Schopenhauer argued at length, and with a psychological insight which was altogether unprecedented, that empirical evidence points to the conclusion not only that most of our thoughts and feelings are unknown to us but that the reason for this is a process of repression which is itself unconscious; that it is unconscious because our most primitive and powerful emotions and wishes can-