

**WINNING WARS
BEFORE THEY EMERGE**

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FROM KINETIC WARFARE TO STRATEGIC
COMMUNICATIONS AS A PROACTIVE AND
MIND-CENTRIC PARADIGM OF THE ART OF WAR

TORSTI SIRÉN



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Winning Wars Before They Emerge: From Kinetic Warfare to Strategic Communications as a Proactive and Mind-Centric Paradigm of the Art of War

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Cover illustration: Yin and Yang as the complimentary opposites of the dark and light as well as war and peace – War is a violent- or killing-prone state of human mind, but it may be peace as well, if only we (as individuals, communities and societies) would give a chance to our reflective and emancipatory capable human minds.

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**To Human Ideas of Republican Peace,
Tolerance and Pluralism**

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ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAGC	Assured Access to the Global Commons
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AOR	Area of Operations
ARM	Anti-Radiation Missile
ASAT	Anti-Satellite Missile
AT	Anti-Tank
AU	The African Union
BLU	Bomb Live Unit
BMS	Battlespace Management System
CHOD	Chief of Defence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-Operation
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMO	Crisis Management Operations
CNA	Computer Network Attack
CND	Computer Network Defence
CNE	Computer Network Exploitation
CNO	Computer-Network Operations
CoG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
COMPUSEC	Computer Security
COMSEC	Communications Security
CoS	Chief of Staff
CPO	Combat PsyOps
CRPO	Crisis Response PsyOps
C4ISTAR	Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
DARPA	The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EA	Electronic Attack

EBAO	Effects-Based Approach to Operations
EBO	Effects-Based Operations
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EM	Electromagnetic Mind Control
EMR	Electromagnetic Radiation
EP	Electronic Protection
ES	Electronic Warfare Support
EU	The European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
EWR	Early Warning Radar
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FM	Field Manual
F2F	Face to Face (Contact)
GBU	Guided Bomb Unit
GPS	Global Positioning System
HARM	High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
HELMID	Helmet Mounted Image Display
HPM	High-Powered Microwave
IADS	Integrated Air Defence System
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICCS	International Civic and Citizenship Education Study
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
IMD	International Management Development
InfoSec	Information Security
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IO	Information Operations (am.)
IO	International Organization (am.)
IR	Infrared (also International Relations)
Info Ops	Information Operations (br.)
IT	Information Technology
IW	Information Warfare
JASSM	Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile
JDAM	Joint Direct Attack Munition
JFC	Joint Forces Commander

JOA	Joint Operations Area
JSOW	Joint Standoff Weapon
JSTARS	Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
KLEP	Key Leaders Engagement Plan
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersexual
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MBT	Main Battle-Tank
MC	Military Committee
MCP	Malayan Communist Party
MMS	Multimedia Messaging Service
MNE	Multinational Experiment
MOAB	Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb
MOE	Measuring of the Effects
MOEff	Measuring of the Effectiveness
MOOTW	Military Operations Other than War
MOP	Measuring of the Performance
MP	Member of Parliament
MPA	Military Public Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NTC	[Libyan] National Transitional Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	The Organization of the Islamic Conference
OODA-loop	Observe, Orient, Decide and Act
OpSec	Operations Security
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
OST	Outer Space Treaty
OWS	Occupy Wall Street Movement
PA	Public Affairs
PAK	Panzerabwehrkanone (in English anti-tank gun)
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information systems

PPP	Presence, Posture and Profile
PR	Public Relations
PSE	PsyOps Support Element
Psyoper	PsyOps conductor
PsyOps	Psychological Operations
RAF	The Royal Air Force
RFC	The Royal Flying Corps
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SDI	Strategic Defence Initiative
SEAD	Suppression of the Enemy Air Defences
SETA	<i>Seksuaalinen tasa-arvoisuus</i> ; The Finnish National Organization for Sexual Equality
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM	Submarine Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
SMS	Short Message Service
SOME	Social Media
SPO	Strategic PsyOps
STRATCOM	The United States Strategic Command
StratCom	Strategic Communications
TAA	Target Audience Analysis
TPT	Tactical PsyOps Team
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCAV	Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle
UN	The United Nations
USAF	The United States Air Force
USN	The United States Navy
USNAF	The United States Navy Air Force
WCC	World Competitiveness Center
WGA	The Whole-of-Government Approach
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

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This research was launched in 2009 already, when I decided to make my individual contribution to the global need for lasting peace. In a way this research is a logical and natural continuum to my doctoral thesis, “*State Agent, Identity and the “New World Order” – Reconstructing Polish Defence Identity after the Cold War Era*”, which was completed in spring 2009. In my thesis I focused on the narrative basis of a national identity structure and the boundaries of Otherness, which are the themes of this research as well. It is wonderful to notice how I have personally managed to give a chance to emancipation during the long years of my career as a commissioned officer and academic. I started my academic career at the National Defence University (NDU), Finland, as a lecturing officer leaning on the classical paradigm of the international relations (IR) theory. During the process of writing my doctoral thesis I turned out to be a constructivist. Now I would consider myself a soldier and academic of Critical Realist IR theory, which stresses the reflective nature of human ideas and human potential to change the injustices of the human world created by human beings. In other words, my world view has changed through reading, writing, listening, thinking, lecturing, living and by opening my eyes and heart to the need for global emancipation from the narrow national interpretations of past narratives, myths and stories.

When I began this research, it became clear to me that were I even to try producing anything novel in the field of war studies or peace research, such key concepts as “war” and “victory at war” should be defined anew. In this way I could produce a much richer and wider interpretation of the art of war than has usually been the case. I hope I have managed to answer this call and will have produced a study that proves to be widely beneficial in the fields of peace research, war studies, IR and world politics.

Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) *Jim Channon* (U.S. Army) earns my special thanks for his novel ideas concerning the need for mental emancipation from the habituation and reification of past stories, myths and narratives presented already in the 1970s in his *First Earth Battalion Operations Field Manual* and later in his book *Go Planet – Adventures in Social Architecture, The Promise of Our Global Civilization*. Even though I have only had some discussions with him on Facebook, his Kantian and Grotian thoughts have opened my eyes to see how it precisely could be the task of the armed forces of the world to save ourselves from ourselves, because the armed forces of the world do have all

the possible means and ways to lead the way in restoring the balance between nature and human being. Jim Channon has presented this as follows:

The Armies can restore the water gathering forests we need to rebuild our atmosphere. The Navies can restock the oceans. The Marines can restore the coral reefs. The Air Forces can provide total global monitoring.

It is amazing to notice that a commissioned officers, such as Jim Channon, have started to present ideas of peace and emancipation in growing numbers, while the political elite in most countries still leans on past ‘wisdoms’ of ‘politics as usual’ without radical and novel ideas of wider global perspective. This is not to say that politicians would not be liberal enough to see the possibilities of human ideas in order to save the Planet from ourselves, but they usually lean on narrow national or political caveats, which prevents progressive policies and actions the world is crying for. This is much what *Paul Krugman*, the winner of the Nobel Prize in economics in 2008, argued in his monograph *The Conscience of a Liberal – Reclaiming America from the Right*. In this way I wish to thank Paul Krugman for opening my eyes as well, even though I have not met him personally either. There are numerous other researchers, who would also earn my gratitude, but since the list would soon turn into being too excessive, I will give a voice for them later in the textual chapters of this study.

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Helsinki, Autumn 2012

INTRODUCTION

“Dare to think the unthinkable?”¹

This research argues that Strategic Communications (StratCom) is a comprehensive mental attitude and the ultimate maxim of the art of war directed toward winning wars before they even emerge. It is a comprehensive mental attitude, because it stresses the need for emancipation from our habituated and reified national narratives, enemy-images, myths and stories of the past in order to construct our human future world as truly a common place of tolerance, pluralism and republican peace (see chapter 4.5). It is the ultimate maxim of the art of war, because it shares the main tactical, operational and strategic features of the past paradigms of the art of war, albeit it defines them in different terms and operates at grand strategic level.

The three main features of the previous paradigms of the art of war have been an infantry as the sheltering main body of the armed forces, a cavalry as the charging and enveloping element as well as the follow-on-forces attack element. The sheltering main body has been substituted by StratCom with *values and freedoms of liberal democracy* behind which it is always possible to withdraw if the *Self's* acts and policies are conducted in accordance with the expressed liberal democratic narrative. The charging cavalry has been substituted with *the unleashed cavalry of the free world*, namely with the free medias (including social media) and NGOs, such as the Nobel Committee, which will charge even the liberal democracies if they do not act according to their narratives. The follow-on-forces attack element has been substituted with *the mobile troops of liberal-democracy*, namely public diplomacy, official statements, peace-mediations, crisis management operations

¹ Channon, Jim (2010), p. Soft Tactics. See also First Earth Battalion homepage.

and so on, which may support the charges of the the unleashed cavalry of the free world – if a liberal democracy acts according to its narratives. To put it shortly, StratCom is about offering seductive examples of the power of being wonderful society which acts in accordance with its narratives, and which *the Others* would look up towards with admiration. This would consequently change the behaviour of the Others and eventually lead them to reconstruct their value and identity constructions in order to earn positive recognition by all the other Others of the world.

War and warfare have traditionally been approached from perspectives of reactivity. In such cases, nations and other social communities have prepared themselves to defend their values, geographical territories and other nation-, society- or community-related issues by arms against external threats. Such threats may be traditional politico-military ones, economic or environmental, but mere preparedness is not enough to respond to any of them. Small or even greater nations can no longer afford to build their security on a mere reactive preparedness, independently on their own. In ancient China, a military commander or statesman who could win a war without a single battle was considered a master of military skills: “*For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill*”.² In our world, the traditional battle space has been replaced by a global, virtual mind space in which individuals, human societies and communities can be influenced psychologically by messages on the basis of a common state of volition and by a range of means even at times of profound peace that were not possible at the time of ancient China.

Psychological influencing³ has always been a part of the art of war and warfare. Warpaints, colourful uniforms, disciplinary manoeuvring, strategic mass bombings and new weapon systems based on high technology may all be connected to the concept of

² Sun Tzu [Sunzi] (1990 [400–320 BCE.]), p. 86.

³ Psychological influencing is a wider term than Psychological operations (PsyOps). Whatever human act (planned or not planned) may cause psychological effect on human psyche, whilst PsyOps is about planned military campaigning (albeit with words, sounds, pictures, films and photographs) against the psyche of the enemy. The term *influencing* is used throughout the research in a meaning: to cause a change in the character, thought, or action of a particular individual, community or society. The term *affecting*, in its part, is used throughout the research in a generic meaning: ‘to have an effect on’, without any implied (positive or negative) connotations.

psychological influencing. The intention has been to break the psychological backbone of enemy nations both by politics and arms. The purpose has sometimes been to slowly influence the psyche of the enemy in order to gain desired effects, and sometimes to inflict shock effects by sudden armed strike on the enemy. The attempt has been to crush the self-respect, will to fight and identity of nations with immense military attacks and acts of terror. Formerly, psychological influencing was closely related to strategies that directly concern military machinery. It was hoped misleading the enemy would immediately affect the opponent's will to fight. The trajectory of psychological influencing has been changed in time so that the horizon has been widened beyond the traditional, narrow politico-military-material forces axis. Nowadays it takes different sectors of society into consideration and it is not only about affecting directly (kinetically or non-kinetically) the opponent's or potential opponent's psyche, but indirectly by focusing essentially on ourselves. This is to say that nations and societies of tolerance and pluralism (the so-called *wonderful societies*) should act according to their messages of wonderfulness in order to seduce their enemies, opponents and potential opponents not only to behave in more tolerant ways, but above all to internalize peace, tolerance and pluralism as essential values and guiding mental institutions of their identity structures.

The main principles of the art of war, like concentration of forces, exploitation of surprise, deception and affecting the opponent's centre of gravity (*CoG*) have lasted unchanged despite (military) technological innovations. Technological development has sometimes caused an illusion, according to which, e.g., the massive and concentrated use of air-assets (*Douhetism*), or precision strikes against the enemy's decision-making systems could destroy the enemy's cognition and will to continue war (*Effects-Based Operations; EBO*). Often, kinetic measures targeted against the enemy's will have failed and not brought the enemy to despair. For example, the will of the German people to continue war was not suppressed by massive air raids between 1943 and 1945.⁴ Furthermore, rapid and massive precision strikes against Iraqi leadership and decision-making systems prior to the Second Gulf-War ("*Shock and Awe*" phase) probably sped up the victory of forthcoming battles, but did not bring victory in war itself.

⁴ See, for example, Sirén (2010), p. 114 and BBC Home (2003–2005). See also, Mellenthin (1984), pp. 431–432.

At some point in history the ancient fundamental principle of the art of war (*maxim*) – proactively avoiding wars without losing peace/winning wars without waging any kinetic battle – has been forgotten. New technologies and tactico-operational skill have usually led to victories in battles, but wars have hardly ever been won by technology and tactico-operational skills alone. Nations have been defeated in battles, but causes of the next wars can, at least partially, be causally deduced from experienced injustices of the peace-agreements that ended the previous wars. As an exception one can mention at least the Allies' victory over Germany and Japan in 1945. Germany and Japan were defeated in battle by industrial and quantitative superiority, but they were also defeated in war by destroying their previous nationalistic identity-structures and by reconstructing new ones, based on liberal democracy.

In order to avoid merely preparing ourselves to first wage victorious battles against our potential opponents in future wars, but still ultimately lose the wars, we should proactively and continuously influence the narrative identity structures of our potential opponents during peace-time already. The challenge here is to understand that influencing should be based on indirect approach, truth and shared norms and values. Two major challenges present themselves in this setting. First, the indirect approach necessitates that wonderful societies and their citizens should continuously rehearse self-critique over their own identity structures and congruence between their narratives and actions in order to seduce the Others to hold these wonderful societies as wonderful examples to be looked upon with admiration. Second, while the indirect approach does not neglect the possibility to criticize the Others, this criticism should be based on truth and be focused on the non-commitment of shared norms and values. Even if all the truths and values were relative, culture-bound and spatio-temporal concepts, most of the state audiences, set under critique, are usually at least member states of the United Nations (UN), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and so forth. Thus, they are explicitly committed (at least they should be) to following certain norms that regulate behaviour and policies.⁵ Norms (e.g. equality of

⁵ See, for example, Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (2008), Article 2. According to this article, all the 53 Member States of the OIC are to “commit themselves to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter”. See also, Charter of the United Nations (1945),

the sexes, religious tolerance and freedom of speech), however, only become constitutive and institutionalized values once these norms have been voluntarily internalized as being fundamental principles of individual and societal identity structures that are no longer questioned.

The main concepts of this research are *Group-Self*, *StratCom*, *war*, the *art of war* and *paradigm of the art of war*. By the concept *Group-Self*, which relates closely to the concept of identity, I do understand the continuous process of spatio-temporal social identity formation. In other words, we are born as individual *I*'s and develop into conscious social *Selves* through social learning, which lasts until we die. Communities (e.g. family, of which members do know each others personally) and societies as large-scale communities (e.g. traditional homogeneous nations, of which members do not know each others personally), may be considered as continuously going through the same cognitive and affective development as social human individuals.⁶ Thus, we all are individuals, but also members of various communities and societies with various identities which *inform us about who we are as individuals and members of various social groups, and what our inter-subjectively shared symbols (especially ideas) are*. In other words, *Group-Self* is considered here as a carrier of all kinds of human systems (e.g. decision-making mechanism and the armed forces of a nation), which are understood here as cultural phenomena and as artefacts of human ideas. These *cultural phenomena inform us about how we tend to do things and express our ideas, beliefs and identities, whereas individual or group identities (Group-Self) inform us about sentiments. There is no human systems without initial ideas and shared beliefs.*

Strategic communications, as the second key concept of this study, came into military usage through the need to integrate politico-strategic guidance into military, political, economic and civilian (public) affairs so that it could be used to create, strengthen, or preserve favorable conditions for advancing the U.S. government's interests coherently. Strategic communications were doctrinated in NATO as guiding principles of military information operations and military

Chapter I, Article 2. As the Member States of the OIC are to commit to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, this means then, for example, that they are to commit themselves into "... *promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ...*".

⁶ By anthropomorphism I understand here an attribution of human characteristics to non-living things like human societies.