Understanding International Counter Terrorism

A Professional's Guide to the Operational Art

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Dedicated to all the victims of Terrorist Attacks

. . . the state of things and the dispositions of men were then such, that a man could not well tell whom he might trust or whom he might fear.

<div align="right">Thomas More (1478 − 1535)</div>

Prologue

The Primary Human Right is the Right,
to live in Safety and without Fear

This manual contains information collected and obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Additional research material and further results are based upon and obtained throughout my professional experience as Dignitary Protection Advisor and Security Enforcement Expert.

All reference material is quoted and respective sources are indicated. A wide variety of references are listed for further reading.

Studies of this particular subject and terrorism in general had been excellently carried out by numerous academic, professional and governmental institutions; however, none has offered an adequate guidance toward the operational aspects of countering terrorism.

Recent events and the increasing number of new incidents made the need for a detailed and understandable Counter-Terrorism manual became a priority.

All previous studies were used and served as a foundation for this new manual.

Reasonable efforts have been made to provide reliable data and information, but one can only assume limited responsibility for any changes or the validity of all material due to the rapid path and ever changing patterns of terrorism.

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Introduction

Terrorism, as we experience it nowadays, is a form of warfare that relies principally on inflicting fear to its targets- societies, citizens and people and to deliver its deadly and horrifying message. The targets of this controlled violence often go beyond the immediate victims. Its ultimate goal for the terrorists` point of view, a very well orchestrated and theatrical one, the "World Theater" of terrifying and vicious acts.

This proves to be more a reality, especially today with all the varieties of television news programs, broadcasting images of the terrorist events with gruesome close- ups and fear inducing background sounds. All that, even before any senior official have had time to assess any extend of the event and outcome of the situation itself. This, together with the advent of cell phones, computer networks and Internet, has led to a "just-in-time decision making"- a new phenomenon in managing and approaching a crisis situation.

In most recent years, we have witnessed a never- ending flood of bombings, suicide attacks, assassinations, hostage executions and incidents, where hostages were taken. With every new threat spawning, a new countermeasure has to be developed, and every new counter- measure resulting in a new form of threats. While terrorists are unlikely to give up the concepts of truck bombs or spectacular suicide missions that afford them instant gratification and fame among their ranks. A new cadre of terrorists has been born. This new generation of terrorists may look far beyond, to more non- traditional tactics and weapons and operations. The new terrorist generation of today proved to be computer savvy, with accomplished education, training and possess degrees from a higher education, which is bringing a whole new level of sophistication and flexibility to the battlefield.

Computer technology and the Internet are being used increasingly and more frequently for the planning of terrorist activities, recruiting, fundraising and operational transmissions. While terrorists can afford the latest technological equipment and seemingly unlimited funds- law enforcement and other officials more often find themselves lagging behind, making it difficult for them to keep up with the terrorists.

Furthermore, complicating the terrorism warfare formula is the possibility that cyber- attacks against critical infrastructures may be used as a force multiplier to extend the deadliness of an attack. The target of the attack, the critical infrastructures, mainly owned and operated primarily by the private sector, brings a whole new group of players into the terror- counter- terror game.

To the contrary of the Cold- War- period, when terrorist groups were pre-dominantly motivated by political reasons, the most prominent groups operating today use religious motivation. This makes them particularly dangerous, because the only entity they supposedly need to justify such actions to is God, in whose name they carry out any suitable acts of violence.

Politically motivated groups traditionally looked for targets of symbolic value: a soldier, a government official, etc. Religious groups, on the other hand, feel that any form of attacking the infidel is legitimate, even if it means killing innocent civilians. Anyone, anywhere, anytime can become a target.

What we end up with is an unholy marriage between advances in technology and indiscriminate targeting, an extremely lethal combination. Many experts in the emerging field of counter- terrorism refuse to believe that terrorism will escalate to a level involving *WMD* (**W**eapons of **M**ass **D**estruction), even though the technology and expertise are readily available.

In fact, the *Sarin-* Gas attack, which took place in the Tokyo- subways in March 1995, executed by the religious cult *Aum Shinri- kyo*, resulting in the dead of 12 people and injured thousands of others. Regarded as an anomaly- even by the Japanese, proofed that this next level of terrorism had been initiated in1995 already.

The question is not so much whether or not there is a real probability of a terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction, but to whether one can afford to be prepared or not. The consequences of any incident involving WMD are so devastating that even if there is only an infinitesimal chance of one occurring, the framework has to be in place to swiftly and efficiently deal with the crisis.

So far, should a grievous terrorist attack occur on national soil, the United States and other countries counter terrorism strategy, impressive in appearance and number of acronyms could in fact be a recipe for disaster. However, the all so mighty bureaucracy replying to the response, could easily result in a delay regarding the deployment of the right tools to a local community who is dealing with an attack never envisaged by its inhabitants before.

In *Understanding International Counter Terrorism* there is one serious effort to lay out a comprehensive strategy of how to deal with a whole gamut of possible terrorist incidents by using a language that any person or first responders like policemen, security personnel, firemen, paramedics, etc. can understand.

This guide covers everything from bombings and hostage- taking, to *NBC* (**N**uclear, **B**iological and **C**hemical) Terrorism, what needs to be done before, during, and after an event. This manual combines what minimally needs to be understood about Operational Counter- Terrorism by the government- level policy maker, while at the same time helping the personnel on the first responder level who are planning to cope with what must at least initially seem like an overwhelming attack.

Even that the material herein, is in its majority referencing to United States and U. S. related agencies, it is intended for a global application and should in no way be seen as limited or restricted to the U.S. territory or any U. S. security enforcement personnel. Terrorism is global and any part of this guide can easily be adapted and translated to any region, law and government in the world.

This manual should make clear that the only way, to effectively deal with terrorism is to have a thorough understanding of its present-day characteristics such as who is involved and what weapons and tactics are the terrorists likely to be using. The players on the Counter- Terrorism team need to take stock of what is in their tool boxes; what works and what is required; what new capabilities need to be developed in order to face not only today's terrorist, but also tomorrow's as well.

Nature of the Threat and the Response

Terrorism and Terrorists

The word **Terror** derives from the Latin word: **terrere**, which translated means: **to frighten**.

Terrorists, unable to achieve their unrealistic goals by conventional means, attempt to send their ideological or religious messages by terrorizing the general public. Through the choice of their targets, which are often symbolic or representative of the targeted nation, terrorists attempt to create a high-profile impact on the public of their targeted enemy or enemies with their act of violence, despite the limited material resources that are usually at their disposal. In doing so, they hope to demonstrate various points, such as that the targeted government(s) cannot protect its (their) own citizens, or that by assassinating a specific victim they can teach the general public a lesson about espousing viewpoints or policies antithetical to their own. For example, by assassinating Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, a year after his historic trip to Jerusalem, the al-Jihad terrorists hoped to convey to the world, and especially to Muslims, the error that he represented. Another example, Despite Arab protests, a British mandate is proclaimed in Palestine on September 11, 1922. September 11, 2001 was the date of the WTC attack.

This tactic is not new. Beginning in 48 AD, a Jewish sect called the Zealots carried out terrorist campaigns to force insurrection against the Romans in Judea. These campaigns included the use of assassins so called "*Sicarii*", or dagger- men, who would infiltrate Roman-controlled cities and stab Jewish collaborators or Roman legionnaires with a "*sica*" (dagger), kidnap members of the Staff of the Temple Guard to hold for ransom, or use poison on a large scale. The Zealots' justification for their killing of other Jews was that these killings demonstrated the consequences of the immorality of collaborating with the Roman invaders, and that the Romans could not protect their Jewish collaborators.

Definitions of terrorism vary widely and are usually inadequate. Even terrorism researchers often neglect to define the term other than by citing the basic U.S. Department of State (1998) definition of terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."

Although an act of violence, generally regarded in the United States as an act of terrorism may not be viewed so in another country. The type of violence that distinguishes terrorism from other types of violence, such as ordinary crime or a wartime military action can still be defined in terms that might qualify as reasonably objective.

The social sciences researcher defines a terrorist action as the calculated use of unexpected, shocking and unlawful violence against non- combatants (including, in addition to civilians, off-duty military and security personnel in peaceful situations). Further, the attack on other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member(s) of a sub-national group or a clandestine agent(s) for the psychological purpose of publicizing a political or religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government(s) or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause.

In this study, the nouns "terrorist" or "terrorists" do not necessarily refer to everyone within a terrorist organization. Large organizations, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Irish Republic Army (IRA), or the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), have many members-for example, accountants, cooks, fund-raisers, logistics specialists, medical doctors, or recruiters- that may play only a passive support role. We should not be particularly concerned with the passive support membership of terrorist organizations.

Rather, we should be primarily concerned with the leader(s) of terrorist groups and the activists or operators who personally carry out a group's terrorism strategy. The top leaders are of particular interest because there may be significant differences between them and terrorist activists or operatives. In contrast to the top leader(s), the individuals who carry out orders to perpetrate an act of political violence (which they would not necessarily regard as a terrorist act) have generally been recruited into the organization. Thus, their motives for joining may be different. New recruits are often isolated and alienated young people who want to join not only because they identify with the cause and idolize the group's leader, but also because they want to belong to a group for a sense of self-importance and companionship.

The top leaders of several of the groups profiled in this report can be subdivided into contractors or freelancers. The distinction actually highlights an important difference between the old generation of terrorist leaders and the new breed of international terrorists.

Contractors are those terrorist leaders whose services are hired by rogue states, or a particular government entity of a rogue regime, such as an intelligence agency. Notable examples of terrorist contractors include Abu Nidal, George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Abu Abbas of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

Freelancers are terrorist leaders who are completely independent of a state, but who may collude with a rogue regime on a short-term basis. Prominent examples of freelancers include Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, Ahmed Ramzi Yousef, and Osama bin Laden. Contractors like Abu Nidal, George Habash, and Abu Abbas are representative of the old style of high-risk international terrorism. In the 1990s, rogue states, more mindful of the consequences of Western diplomatic, economic, military, and political retaliation were less inclined to risk contracting terrorist organizations. Instead, freelancers operating independently of any state carried out many of the most significant acts of terrorism in the decade.

This study discusses groups that have been officially designated as terrorist groups by the U.S. Department of State. A few of the groups on the official list, however, are guerrilla organizations. These include the FARC, the LTTE, and the PKK. To be sure, the FARC, the LTTE, and the PKK engage in terrorism as well as guerrilla warfare, but categorizing them as terrorist groups and formulating policies to combat them on that basis would be simplistic and a prescription for failure. The FARC, for example, has the official status in Colombia of a political insurgent movement, as a result of a May 1999 accord between the FARC and the Colombian government. To dismiss a guerrilla group, especially one like the FARC, which has been fighting for four decades, as only a terrorist group is to misunderstand its political and sociological context.

It is also important to keep in mind that perceptions of what constitutes terrorism will differ from country to country, as well as among various sectors of a country's population. For example, the Nicaraguan elite regarded the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) as a terrorist group, while much of the rest of the country regarded the FSLN as freedom fighters.

A foreign extremist group labeled as terrorist by the Department of State may be regarded in heroic terms by some sectors of the population in another country. Likewise, an action that would be regarded as indisputably terrorist in the United States might not be regarded as a terrorist act in another country's law courts. For example, India's Supreme Court ruled in May 1999 that the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a LTTE "belt-bomb women" was not an act of terrorism. Because there was no evidence that the four co-conspirators (who received the death penalty) had any desire to strike terror in the country. In addition, the Department of State's labeling of a guerrilla group as a terrorist group, may be viewed by the particular group as a hostile act. For example, the LTTE has disputed, unsuccessfully, its designation on October 8, 1997, by the Department of State as a terrorist organization.

By labeling the LTTE a terrorist group, the United States compromises its potential role as neutral mediator in Sri Lanka's civil war and waves a red flag at one of the world's deadliest groups, whose leader appears to be a psychopathic serial killer of heads of state. To be sure, some terrorists are so committed to their cause that they freely acknowledge being terrorists. On hearing that he had been sentenced to 240 years in prison, Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the WTC bombing, defiantly proclaimed, "I am a terrorist, and I am proud of it."

The Nature of Terrorism

The *Rand Corporation* has defined terrorism as- the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change. While the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has defined terrorism as- the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.

The three most serious types of conflict short of nuclear war are identified as:

- Conventional warfare
- Guerrilla warfare
- International warfare: Terrorism

In the first two types of conflicts, the non- combatants are usually able to distinguish themselves from combatants. This is not to say that non- combatants are never killed, because they are. It is just that these are isolated or unusual incidents, because in both guerilla and conventional warfare the major focus of killing is, one armed- force against another.

Conflicts can be either highly intense, or of low intensity in nature, such as the more than 93 confrontations currently taking place around the globe involving everything from former republics of the Soviet Union and former colonies of European countries to ages-old ethnic hatreds and narcotics trafficking.

However, the exploitation of non- combatants (i.e., their suffering and death) is the essence of international terrorism. Because of the covert nature of the activity, terrorist attacks are carried out by a small cohort of operatives who receive financial and logistical support from radical political and activist organizations, which can include governments of rogue nations. Political and other activist groups may be suspected of acting in support of terrorist goals, if not actually fostering and furthering those goals. Questions have been raised, and continue to be concerning

the integrity of some persons and groups or whether, in fact, they are being exploited or misused.

The U.S. Department of Defense has described terrorism as a phenomenon in transition and indicated that the nature of the terrorist threat has changed dramatically. The Defense Department attributed these changes to five factors, which is not being shared by everybody and opinions are even considering those factors being under stated:

- Collapse of the Soviet Union
- Changing motivations of terrorists
- Proliferation in technologies of mass destruction
- Increased access to information and information technologies
- Accelerated centralization of vital components of the national infra-structure, which has increased vulnerability to terrorist attack

Much of the thrust of terrorism will continue to be directed toward U.S. targets, whether in North America or overseas. The attacks will be concentrated in urban locations, perpetrated by those acting on behalf of religious and ethnic causes and, as in the past, political points of view.

Terrorism by Numbers

The total significant international terrorist attacks and total associated dead in 2004:

Total number of attacks: 651
Total number of dead: 1907

Region	Attacks	Dead
Africa:	9	17
South Asia:	307	502
Europe and Eurasia:	24	636
East Asia and Pacific:	8	17
Near East:	270	726
Western Hemisphere:	13	9

The total number of victims of significant international terrorist attacks by type of victim in 2004:

Total number of dead: 1907
Total number of wounded: 6704
Total number of hostages: 710

Region	Dead	Wounded	Hostage
Africa:	17	25	93
South Asia:	502	1694	61
Europe and Eurasia:	636	2950	362
East Asia and Pacific:	17	232	3
Near East:	726	1794	172
Western Hemisphere:	9	9	19

The methods used in significant international terrorist attacks in 2004:

Type of Attack	Total	%
Kidnapping:	111	16
Suicide Bomb:	18	3
Arson:	5	1
Fire Bombing:	2	0
Assault:	26	4
Chemical:	0	0
Bombing:	196	29
Armed Attack:	314	46
Other:	13	2

Note: Multiple methods per attack are possible.

The Purpose of Terror

Terrorism for political purpose is usually a form of theatric performance and as such, there are a number of factors, which are almost universal in modern terrorist activities.

The use of violence to persuade, where bombings or other attacks are employed to "make a point" with target victims. The targeted victims are not necessarily those who are injured or killed. Rather, the attack may have been carried out to influence a government, or a group of governments, to take a certain course of action or perhaps to terminate or cease a course of action.

Selection of targets and victims for maximum propaganda value means choosing targets and victims, which will assure the heaviest possible media coverage. This consideration was particularly evident with terrorist attacks such as the World Trade Center bombing in New York City in 1993 and the hostage-taking of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games in

Munich. These were followed by terrorist activities including the bombing of the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City, and the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania.

The use of unprovoked attacks, which, truth be told, is just about any terrorist attack, because they were "provoked" is only the convoluted rationale offered by the terrorists themselves.

Maximum publicity at minimum risk is the principle behind many terrorist actions, particularly those involving explosive devices. Bombings typically generate a good deal of publicity, depending upon time and placement, so targets are usually selected for symbolic value, such as embassies, internationally known tourist attractions, and similar facilities.

The use of sophisticated timing elements allows detonation to be programmed well in advance, reducing the risk to the bomber or bombers, who can be long gone by the time the devices are discovered or exploded.

Moving up on the list of favored terrorist activities, kidnapping or assaults and assassinations may generate greater or prolonged publicity, but they also present a higher risk for the attackers. There is something of a cyclical pattern to terrorist activities. That is, if there has been a rash of kidnappings, the public may become somewhat inured and subsequent abductions may not generate the same degree of front-page coverage, television news exposure, or Internet. Bombings, just because they have been less frequent during the same period, may well generate more publicity than another kidnapping. A change in tactics, then, would produce more publicity than another kidnapping. Terrorists always want to remain in the forefront, so they will switch tactics in order to maximize publicity.

Use of surprise to circumvent countermeasures is one way terrorists try to attack hardened targets. Even though there are guards, detection devices, and increased perimeter security, the element of surprise can be employed to undermine the hardware and overwhelm the human factor in a fortified security system. Time is the terrorist's best friend.

Even a well-protected and hardened target will experience slackened security measures during long periods of terrorist inactivity. Unless a suicide attack is planned, terrorists will wait to strike when security is relaxed.

Threats, harassment, and violence are tools terrorists use to create an atmosphere of fear.

On occasion terrorists have planted small bombs or incendiary devices in public locations, such as department stores and movie theaters. In recent years, anti-government terrorists in Egypt have attacked groups of tourists visiting the Pyramids and other monuments. To the public, there is no rhyme or reason to the time or placement of the devices, and soon the mere threat of such activity is sufficient to send waves of fear through the population.

Disregarding women and children as victims, often to the extent that locations with innocent victims are selected specifically to heighten the outrage, and fear, at the boldness of the terrorists' actions. This is yet another tactic to garner wider publicity and media coverage of the suffering and death of non-combatants. This characteristic differentiates the terrorist from a soldier or guerrilla. A soldier fights with the authority of a government for the protection of that government. A guerrilla fights the same kind of warfare as the soldier in technique and code of behavior, i.e., women and children are not specifically targeted. A terrorist, on the other hand, will focus on women and children, just to create a greater atmosphere of fear. Thus, the ethnic cleansing evidenced in Bosnia and Kosovo involving various population factions of the former Yugoslavia crossed the line from warfare to terrorism by militia.

Propaganda is used to maximize the effect of violence, particularly for economic or political goals. To carry out a particular operation without getting any publicity out of the action would be wasteful to a terrorist's cause. Thus, Black September, at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972, and all those groups that mimicked that hostage- taking by claiming responsibility for attacks in other high- profile circumstances, wanted worldwide publicity for both political and economic goals. From a political standpoint, a group wants to show that it is a viable organization, a power to be reckoned with, and a force to be feared.

On the economic level, the group shows sympathetic governments and others who support different terrorist groups that it, too, is worthy of funding. Even when terrorists do not publicly claim responsibility for an attack, many leave a signature or obvious clues during the action.

Loyalty to themselves or kindred groups is a common element of terrorist groups, existing among Armenians, Croatians, Kurds, Tamils, and Basques, to name a few. With these, and similar groups, the loyalty is so intense - distorted is not too strong a word - that the more radical elements of an otherwise peaceful movement will commit unspeakable criminal acts on behalf of that loyalty and associated cause. For the most part, however, second- and third-generation terrorists have diminished loyalty to the original cause, the sense of pride associated with it, and a reduced vision of the original goal. Many of them engage in terrorism as a form of gratification and perpetuate criminal activity as an end in itself. They have thus become nihilistic and interested primarily in financial remuneration for themselves. College- age individuals and educated political activists carried out the terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s for the most part. Now much of the low- intensity conflict and terrorist actions is being perpetrated by child soldiers, children, many of whom have not even reached puberty, who have become inured to violence and human emotion.

The Profile and Characteristics of Terrorists

The Terrorist's Motivation

In an attempt to explain terrorist motivation and to answer questions such as, who becomes a terrorist and what kind of individuals join terrorist groups and commit public acts of shocking violence, one has to use a political science and sociology approach, as well the discipline of psychology.

Although there have been numerous attempts to explain terrorism from a psychiatric or psychological perspective, Wilkinson notes that the psychology and beliefs of terrorists have been inadequately explored. Most psychological analyses of terrorists and terrorism, according to psychologist Maxwell Taylor[1], have attempted to address what motivates terrorists or to describe personal characteristics of terrorists, on the assumption that terrorists can be identified by these attributes. However, although an understanding of the terrorist mindset would be the key to understanding how and why an individual becomes a terrorist, numerous psychologists have been unable to adequately define it. Indeed, there appears to be a general agreement among psychologists who have studied the subject that there is no one terrorist mindset. This view, however, itself needs to be clarified.

The topic of the terrorist mindset was discussed at a Rand conference on terrorism coordinated

by Brian M. Jenkins[2] in September 1980. The observations made about terrorist mindsets at that conference considered individuals, groups, and individuals as part of a group.

The discussion revealed how little was known about the nature of terrorist mindsets, their causes and consequences, and their significance for recruitment, ideology, leader- follower relations, organization, decision making about targets and tactics, escalation of violence, and attempts made by disillusioned terrorists to exit from the terrorist group. Although the current study has examined these aspects of the terrorist mindset, it has done so within the framework of a more general tasking requirement. Additional research and analysis would be needed to focus more closely on the concept of the terrorist mindset and to develop it into a more useful method for profiling terrorist groups and leaders on a more systematic and accurate basis.

Within this field of psychology the personality dynamics of individual terrorists, including the causes and motivations behind the decision to join a terrorist group and to commit violent acts, have also received attention.

Other small-group dynamics that have been of particular interest to researchers include the terrorists' decision-making patterns, problems of leadership and authority, target selection, and group mindset as a pressure tool on the individual.

Attempts to explain terrorism in purely psychological terms ignore the very real economic, political, and social factors that have always motivated radical activists, as well as the possibility that biological or physiological variables may play a role in bringing an individual to the point of perpetrating terrorism. Although this study provides some interdisciplinary context to the study of terrorists and terrorism, it is concerned primarily with the socio- psychological approach.

Knutson[3], Executive Director of the International Society of Political Psychology until her death in 1982, carried out an extensive international research project on the psychology of political terrorism. The basic premise of terrorists whom she evaluated in depth was "that their violent acts stem from feelings of rage and hopelessness engendered by the belief that society permits no other access to information-dissemination and policy- formation processes."

The social psychology of political terrorism has received extensive analysis in studies of terrorism, but the individual psychology of political and religious terrorism has been largely ignored. Relatively little is known about the terrorist as an individual, and the psychology of terrorists remains poorly understood, despite the fact that there have been a number of individual biographical accounts, as well as sweeping sociopolitical or psychiatric generalizations.

A lack of data and an apparent ambivalence among many academic researchers about the academic value of terrorism research have contributed to the relatively little systematic social and psychological research on terrorism. This is unfortunate because psychology, concerned as it is with behavior and the factors that influence and control behavior, can provide practical as opposed to conceptual knowledge of terrorists and terrorism.

A principal reason for the lack of psychometric studies of terrorism is that researchers have little, if any direct access to terrorists, even imprisoned ones. Occasionally, a researcher has gained special access to a terrorist group, but usually at the cost of compromising the credibility of her/ her research. Even if a researcher obtains permission to interview an incarcerated terrorist, such an interview would be of limited value and reliability for the purpose of making generalizations.

Most terrorists, including imprisoned ones, would be loath to reveal their group's operational secrets to their interrogators, let alone to journalists or academic researchers, whom the terrorists are likely to view as representatives of the "system" or perhaps even as intelligence agents in disguise. Even if terrorists agree to be interviewed in such circumstances, they may be less than candid in answering questions. For example, most imprisoned Red Army Faction members reportedly declined to be interviewed by West German social scientists.

Few researchers or former terrorists write exposés of terrorist groups. Those who do could face retaliation. For example, the LTTE shot to death an anti- LTTE activist, Sabaratnam Sabalingam in Paris on May 1, 1994 to prevent him from publishing an anti- LTTE book. The LTTE also murdered Dr. Rajani Thiranagama, a Tamil, and one of the four Sri Lankan authors of *The Broken Palmyrah*, which sought to examine the "martyr" cult.

Joining a Terrorist Group

Individuals who become terrorists often are unemployed, socially alienated individuals who have dropped out of society. Those with little education, such as youths in Algerian ghettos or the Gaza Strip, may try to join a terrorist group out of boredom and a desire to have an action-packed adventure in pursuit of a cause they regard as just. Some individuals may be motivated mainly by a desire to use their special skills, such as bomb- making. The more educated youths may be motivated more by genuine political or religious convictions.

The person who becomes a terrorist in Western countries is generally both intellectual and idealistic. Usually, these disenchanted youths both, educated or uneducated, engage in occasional protest and dissidence. Potential terrorist group members often start out as sympathizers of the group.

Recruits often come from support organizations, such as prisoner support groups or student activist groups. From sympathizer, one moves to passive supporter. Often, violent encounters with police or other security forces motivate an already socially alienated individual to join a terrorist group. Although the circumstances vary, the end result of this gradual process is that the individual, often with the help of a family member or friend with terrorist contacts, turns to terrorism. Membership in a terrorist group, however, is highly selective. Over a period as long as a year or more, a recruit generally moves in a slow, gradual fashion toward full membership in a terrorist group.

An individual who drops out of society can just as well become a monk or a hermit instead of a terrorist. For an individual to choose to become a terrorist, he or she would have to be motivated to do so. Having the proper motivation, however, is still not enough. The would-be terrorist would need to have the opportunity to join a terrorist group. And like most job seekers, he or she would have to be acceptable to the terrorist group, which is a highly exclusive group.

Thus, recruits would not only need to have a personality that would allow them to fit into the group, but ideally a certain skill needed by the group, such as weapons or communications skills.

The psychology of joining a terrorist group differs depending on the typology of the group. Someone joining an anarchistic or a Marxist-Leninist terrorist group would not likely be able to count on any social support, only social opprobrium, whereas someone joining an ethnic