Leadership and Conflict Resolution
The International Leadership Series (Book Three)

The Middle-East, Greece-Turkey, The Caucasus, Post-Soviet Russia, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, Latin America

Edited by
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I dedicate this book to
my mother and my late father, may God rest his soul

Adel Safty
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Introduction

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Global Leadership

The world today faces a growing number of economic, political, and technological challenges that significantly affect people no matter what national or cultural borders they live within. Our primary source for meeting such challenges is leadership, but the practice of leadership that works across borders—what is often referred to as global leadership—is relatively new, and our understanding of it is still evolving.

In the twentieth century, there have been three major influences on the practice and understanding of global leadership. The first important influence on the practice of global leadership has been the international effort to create organisations whose purpose is to provide such leadership. Two such organisations have been created. The first was the League of Nations. Established at the end of the First World War, it presented its mandate system as a ‘sacred trust of civilisation’. It was to be a triumph of universal values over parochial values, but its operation turned out to be little different from the political balance of power system of the Congress of Vienna, which had restored and defended the conservative monarchical order that had been disrupted by
the Napoleonic Wars. The League became a congress of European powers determined to defend colonialism at all costs against the rising tide of self-determination and the challenge of communism; it turned a blind eye to the danger of fascism in Europe. The result was a failure of leadership, which ultimately led to World War II.

The United Nations (UN) came into existence in 1945. It also promised leadership based on universally shared human values and ideas. But the reservation clause to the statute of the International Court of Justice, which allowed countries to opt out of the International Court of Justice’s compulsory jurisdiction; the veto power held by the permanent members of the Security Council, and the realities of the Cold War meant that the UN initially reflected the balance of power at the end of the World War II.

The end of the Cold War gave rise to hopes that the UN, free from the paralysis of ideological conflict, would be able to provide effective global leadership—especially in the field of peaceful resolution of disputes and the preservation of international peace. Keeping the peace in the post-Cold-War era, however, has proven to be a formidable task. Between 1945 and 1987, the UN established thirteen peacekeeping operations. Between 1988 and 1995, it had to establish another twenty-one. We have seen intense ethnic conflicts, border disputes, disintegration of states, and a massive increase in the number of people the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is concerned with. This number has gone from seventeen million in 1991 to twenty-three million in 1993, to more than twenty-seven million in 1995, with a growing number of states obstructing the arrival of asylum seekers and returning refugees to their countries of origin.

Realising that the end of the Cold War created unique opportunities for institutions of global leadership, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali strove to
strengthen the organisation and emphasise its leadership role. For instance, he stressed preventive diplomacy and introduced the idea of peace building. Resolving a military conflict, he said, is only the first step. Peace building goes beyond the cessation of hostilities, and addresses the underlying causes of the conflict. To build peace, efforts should be directed at improving educational and economic opportunities, building the infrastructure of good governance, and empowering the less privileged people in society.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s agendas – Agenda for Peace (1992), Agenda for Development (1994), and Agenda for Democratisation (1996) – must figure prominently among the UN’s many leadership achievements. They reflect the view of the former UN Secretary-General that peace is prerequisite for development, that democracy is essential for development to succeed over the long term, and that democracy is necessary not only inside states but also among states in the international community.

In June 1997, the UN General Assembly adopted the Agenda for Development. Secretary-General Kofi Annan hailed the achievement as ‘one of the most far-reaching agreements on the central issue of development ever attained by the international community,” because this agenda goes beyond the usual areas of economic growth and poverty eradication. It covers such issues fundamental to development as human rights, good governance, and the empowerment of women. “The Agenda,” said Anan, “represents a major step in articulating an international consensus of the diversity of views concerning the fundamental goals of and requirements for economic and social development.”

However, the efforts of the United Nations on behalf of global leadership have been necessarily restricted because the UN has limited resources and because it is able to do only what its members, especially the permanent members of the
Security Council, will allow it to do. Despite these limitations, the efforts have been praiseworthy. Some good, practical work has been accomplished. Furthermore the UN and, to a lesser degree, the League of Nations have promoted what I think is an essential aspect of global leadership: universal values.

A very influential force, for both good and bad, in the understanding and practice of global leadership is the prominence of what I call the field of leadership. This field, the product of many areas of interaction among researchers, consultants, and practicing managers, is universally recognised because of its success; it has generated ideas that have worked, and many that have not. It is a large field, with a great deal of prescriptive work (done by such people as Peter Drucker and Stephen Covey) and a small but growing body of work on public policy leadership (done by such people as Warren Bennis, James McGregor Burns, Harlan Cleveland, Howard Gardner, and Ronald Heifetz).

Although in theory concerned with all types of leadership, the field is in my opinion almost exclusively dominated by leadership understood as effective corporate management. Essentially, according to this view, an effective leader-manager is one who thinks proactively, reacts situationally (finding solutions that come out of the needs of the situation), striking a balance between task orientation and people orientation, has a vision, inspires commitment to work, empowers and communicates well. The prominence of this understanding of leadership is certainly a consequence of its many successes, and there is a lot that we can learn from it. Many of the leadership skills and attitudes associated with effective corporate management are transferable to other environments.

Lately, people in the field have made great efforts to take a global perspective. This is largely because of the increasingly
international conduct of business: trade, finance, and investment opportunities for multinational corporations. This is not a bad development per se, but whatever its other merits, such globalisation has left out the notion of universally shared human values. It is axiomatic that effective management of the corporation is first and foremost measured by the economic interests of the corporation. If and when there are other economic and social benefits to the society at large, they come as a by-product, not as a principal goal. For instance, the economic benefits of globalisation, if measured by direct foreign investments, have largely gone to East Asia (70 percent, with China alone accounting for 40 percent), whereas Africa, suffering already from a fall in official development assistance, is receiving only 4 percent of foreign investments.

Prominent French writer Ignacio Ramonet reminded us in a recent issue of *Le Monde Diplomatique* of some UN statistics that rarely come up when the benefits of globalisation are being enumerated. In 1960, the income of the 20 percent of the world’s population living in the richest countries was thirty times greater that that of the 20 percent of in the poorest countries. In 1995, it was eighty-two times greater. In more than seventy countries, per capita income is lower today than it was twenty years ago. Close to one-half of the world’s population lives on less than two dollars a day. Almost one-third of one billion people living in developing countries have no safe drinking water. Every year, nearly thirty million people die of hunger. This at a time when the total wealth of the world’s three richest individuals is greater than the combined gross domestic product of the forty-eight poorest countries.

According to UN calculations, the basic needs for food, drinking water, education, and medical care for the entire population of the whole world could be covered by a levy of less than 4 percent on the accumulated wealth of the 225
largest private fortunes. To meet the world’s sanitation and food requirements would cost only $13 billion, less than the amount that the people of the United States and the European Union spend every year on perfume.

Globalisation has not caused this dismal state of affairs, but it has created the environment in which a market-driven survival-of-the-fittest attitude has undercut political leadership—which I see as the third major influence on global leadership.

Amartya Sen, the winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in economics, suggests that the absence of democracy and a free press may be the principal culprit in the politics of hunger. He asserts that greater responsibility for the well-being of society must be given not to the market but to the nation-state. He urges states to be sensitive to the needs of their citizens and, at the same time, show concern for human development throughout the world. But are the states up to the challenge? This is a question of political leadership.

There was a time when leadership was equated with political governance, and there were many examples to support that idea: Churchill, de Gaulle, Gandhi, Nasser, and Roosevelt. These and others were leaders who spoke to and strongly represented the aspirations of their people, guiding them through times of upheaval. The state was supreme, sovereignty and nationalism were well established, and leaders were larger than life. Charisma and authority were synonymous with leadership.

Today the information and communication revolution has loosened the grip of sovereignty and made its relevance tenuous. Globalisation has defeated protectionism. Economic liberalism has diminished the power and size of many states. Although the challenges facing the world are formidable, our leaders are no longer larger than life. In fact, in many places
political leadership is in a state of crisis. Despite this, many in the media still equate leadership with political leadership.

**Developing Global Leadership**

I believe that we are witnessing a change in the understanding and practice of leadership in general. There are people all over the world engaged in leadership activities, deriving their charisma and authority from what is being accomplished.

This change acknowledges that the problems we face today are too widespread to leave their solutions to states and political leaders, corporate leaders, or leadership institutions. The men and women engaged in important leadership activities can be found in public and private sectors, governmental and nongovernmental organisations, national and international institutions, the academy, and citizen movements. We are, in fact, seeing the democratisation of leadership.

An essential question, however, remains: How can this new kind of leadership be made global? We can certainly draw on what has been learned by our institutional experience (namely that it is crucial to be guided by universal values), corporate experience (that it is essential to take a proactive approach to problems, one that balances tasks and people and that uses vision to inspire, empower, and communicate), and political experience (that it is key to strongly represent the aspirations of people in any change process).

In addition, truly global leadership will require the ability to bring about a harmonisation, not a clash, of cultures; to facilitate crossing borders, not only with goods but with people and ideas; to sensitise people to the imperative of both resolving conflicts and building peace; and to advance the
cause of human rights not only for individuals but also for groups.

Such global leadership will challenge and modify the dominant discourse on globalisation. When we talk about the globalisation of business, we will also talk about the globalisation of human concerns. When we discuss the globalisation of national security, we will also discuss the globalisation of human security. And when we consider the international interests of states, we will also recognise the interests of the emerging global civil society. In order to do this, management that is driven by economic interests must be complimented by leadership that is driven by human interests.

Finally, developing such leadership will not be easy. There is a need for leadership training that is oriented toward public service, focuses on good governance and good management, and promotes the peaceful resolution of disputes and multilateral cooperation. Emerging global leaders should be encouraged to create a network among themselves so that they can pursue together the articulation and practical affirmation in their leadership activities of universal human values.

Leadership and Conflict Resolution

This book completes the series of publications on Leadership that started with Leadership and the United Nations, and continued with Leadership and Global Governance. Leadership and Conflict Resolution is a natural extension of the two previous books because conflict resolution was an integral part of the multidisciplinary approach to global leadership that I proposed at the first United Nations-sponsored International Leadership Conference in Amman, Jordan, in 1997. This conference and the Second
International Leadership Conference in 1998 led to the first two books. Conflict resolution figured prominently in the reflections and discussions that distinguished leaders from the United Nations and from member states shared with the participants in the leadership conferences.

The question arose whether conflict resolution was an adequate concept to deal with the complexities of conflict situations that characterised the end of the twentieth century. Peaceful resolution of disputes may have been a primary purpose for the United Nations organisation in 1945; but how adequately can this concept deal with both the sources and consequences of conflicts in light of the mixed record of the past fifty years? It was within such frameworks that other competing concepts such as conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, and peace building came to the fore. In particular, former Secretary-General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali highlighted the importance of conceptual innovation to better address the sources of conflict and help, as he says, the process of peace building. In that process, he linked peace to development and democracy, as he had outlined in his series of agendas.

The first selection in the book is a tour d’horizon of the field of management and resolution of ethnic conflict. Dr. John Darby is Chair of Ethnic Studies and former Director of the Initiative on Ethnic Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland. In an analytical and detached fashion, Dr. Darby discusses the management and resolution of ethnic conflicts. He starts by expressing reservations about some conventional views about conflict resolution. He argues that leadership in conflict resolution is a long-term process, and one must learn to think in terms of ups and downs where the periods of relatively low tensions can be used to prepare for the next period of high tension. Dr. Darby argues that the forces favouring violence in any conflict resolution situation is usually greater than those supporting moderation. He points out that although
ethnic conflict is often described as a conflict of cultures, i.e. ethnic cultures, the real struggle is very often between a culture of violence and a culture of accommodation. Dr. Darby states that all leaders from all countries and all cultures and all walks of life should be strongly encouraged to meet and interact, and form networks and bonds of friendship; only in this way, he concludes, can we hope to develop the trust necessarily for helping the culture of accommodation and moderation triumph over the culture of violence.

The section on the Middle East starts with my own essay on whether there can be a peace of satisfaction to the Palestine conflict. I argue that peace is not the absence of war; it is the absence of conflict over fundamental values. Israel's responsibility for the destruction of the Palestinian society, the prevention of its reconstitution in a reduced Palestinian Arab state has now been documented by a number of Israeli writers. I point out that the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is essentially a conflict over fundamental values and so long as these values remain incompatible, no genuine peace is likely to come to the region. The most fundamental value of a people is that of its national existence and so it is logical that both the Israeli people and the Palestinian people consider their respective national existence as a fundamental value. But it is the asymmetry and contradiction between the existential conditions of these two fundamental values that perpetrate the conflict. Israel's national existence is militarily secured, politically and legally dynamic and organically linked to Jews outside of Israel. The Palestinian national existence has been destroyed by the Partition Resolution, and by the Israeli policy of expulsion, dispossession and destruction of Palestinian Arab villages (In 1975 Israeli human rights activist Israel Shakak counted 350 Palestinian Arab villages destroyed by Israel since 1948). It is crucially important that Israeli "peace" plans not obscure the fundamental contradiction between its professed desire for
peace and its practised policies. Israel's desire for peace is doubtless genuine, but inherently unproductive as long as it continues to be based on an exclusivist definition of peace, which denies the very national existence and equality of the Other.

Dr. Abdel Salam Majali, Prime Minister of Jordan at the time of his presentation, passionately discusses his vision of international leadership training based on direct interactions between experienced leaders and distinguished leaders from all over the world, and on extensive travel around the world. He argues that such leadership training can help usher in a new era where the dominant paradigm of competition and conflict among peoples and cultures is replaced by one of cooperation. In the second part of the discussion, Dr. Majali reviews the challenges, which confronted the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation he led to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and argues that there is no substitute to peace in the region because peace is not an option but is the only option.

Secretary Jan Egeland was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Norway when he delivered his presentation. He explains in details how he and his colleagues at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry facilitated the secret negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, which led to the 1993 Oslo Agreement. He also refers to Norwegian roles in facilitating similar international agreements in Central America and in the Balkans. He concludes from these experiences that there are some lessons to be learned which could help facilitate future international peace agreements. In particular he feels that the success of the Oslo Agreement was facilitated by the readiness and the desire of the parties to reach an agreement, by the secrecy of the negotiations, and by the good relations, which Norway had traditionally cultivated with both parties.
Mr. Zeid Rifai is former Prime Minister of Jordan and is currently speaker of the Jordanian Parliament. In his discussion of the lessons of history for peace and security, Mr. Rifai reviews the history of rise and fall of empires, and the various peace treaties, which followed wars. He concludes that peace imposed by force cannot last because it carries with it its own seeds of contradiction. He argues that no empire lasts for ever and when empires fall, and they do fall, they leave behind chaos and destruction which overshadow any benefits they may have achieved from the peace they imposed. Mr. Rifai also points out that authoritarian and despotic regimes have experienced similar fate because their policies always invite disasters and conflicts, whereas democracies normally do not fight each other. Mr. Rifai concludes that a democratic system of government is therefore the first essential requirement for maintaining international peace, and that social justice and development is the essential requirement for achieving internal peace and stability.

Lord Gilmour is a member of the British House of Lords. He is former Minister of Defence in the Thatcher government, and a former editor of the Spectator. Ian Gilmour is also a distinguished author of best-selling books. Here he discusses whether the European Union can play a leadership role in the Middle East by providing a counterweight to the American role, which he sees as biased towards Israel. He argues that the European Union’s stated position of principles on the Arab-Israeli conflict, repeated since 1980 and reiterated in the early 1990s, has remained consistent, and has always been based on the requirements of international law and the principles of land for peace set down in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. Unfortunately, Lord Gilmour points out, Europe’s lack of resolve to act on these principles in the face of the geo-political aftershocks of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have left the United States as the dominant third party in the region. Lord Gilmour is
critical of the European Union’s failure to oppose the American and Israeli insistence that the Israelis and the Palestinians should negotiate directly and alone. He believes that such a position weakens the relevance of international law to the negotiations between the parties, which will inevitably be dominated the parties’ respective balance of power. Lord Gilmour concludes that until the EU begins to act in accordance with international law and in accordance with its own vital interests in the region, which clearly rest on the need to achieve political stability through respect for international law, it will have no leadership role in the pursuit of peace.

Ambassador Tahseen Basheer is former Spokesman for Egypt under President Nasser and President Sadat. In his discussion on negotiating a practical peace, he takes issues with the assumptions of the Oslo Agreement. For instance, he rhetorically asks whether Oslo would have been possible at all had it not been for the dispersion of the Palestinian leadership, with its military wing in Yemen and its political headquarters in Tunisia. He argues that the situation for the Palestinians today is worse than what it was before Oslo, with the income of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza falling to 40% of what it used to be before Oslo, even during the Palestinian uprising. Ambassador Basheer argues that there can be no durable peace, which does not reflect the interests of the parties. The Israeli-Palestinian peace may not be a just peace, but it will not be even a practical peace unless Palestinian aspirations, political and economic, are satisfied.

Ambassador Eric Rouleau is a distinguished French writer on the Middle East. He served as ambassador of France in Tunisia and in Turkey. In his discussion of the international dimension of the conflict in the Middle East, he argues that the greater responsibility for the failure of the peace process comes not so much from the people in the region as from the
great powers. He is particularly critical of the role played by the United States, which he holds responsible for the failure to achieve a just and enduring peace in the region because of its uncritical support of Israeli positions. Ambassador Rouleau concludes that it is unlikely that any government in the United States will ever exert meaningful pressure on any government in Israel to revive the peace process because Israel is not simply a foreign policy issues in America, it is primarily a domestic policy issue and no American government can ignore this. Ambassador Rouleau also feels that the US is also unlikely to exert pressure on Israel because Israel is not just a friend, it is a strategic ally for the US. Under these conditions, Ambassador Rouleau concludes, the peace process is not likely to bring peace unless Europeans and other third parties get involved.

Amnon Kapeliok is a distinguished Israeli writer. He reviews the historical background to the Zionist-Palestinian conflict, and explains the changes in Israeli positions during the Arab-Israeli conflict years. He argues that there is a majority of Israelis who directly or indirectly support the Peace Now Movement and its platform for the creation of a Palestinian state. He warns, however, that the situation is dangerous, and that failure to respond to Palestinian national aspirations could lead to more bloodshed, and possibly even another war. Mr. Kapeliok believes that there are people in Israel who think that only another war would force the Israeli right wing to understand that Israel cannot continue its occupation of the Palestinian people and territories and have peace at the same time. Mr. Kapeliok calls on the United States to welcome European participation in the peace process and to work with the EU to help the growing peace constituency in Israel marshal the political support needed for the implementation of peaceful agreements with the Palestinians.

Mr. Shimon Peres is former Prime Minister of Israel, former Foreign Minister and a veteran diplomat. In his discussion of
peace in the Middle East he explains the difficulties he and the late Prime Minister Rabin faced in Israel after the Oslo Agreement and the Washington meeting with Yasser Arafat. He argues that peace is a long-term commitment and a long-term process and its impact cannot be felt right away. Mr. Peres believes that we are in a transition period leaving a world of enemies and entering an age where there are only dangers: the danger of terrorism and the danger of fundamentalism, for instance. Mr. Peres concedes that the peace process in the Middle East is facing a serious crisis, but he remains optimistic because, he believes, no man or politician, or government, or a political party can stop the march of history; and at this time in history we no longer live in an age for occupying land or people.

Mr. Amre Moussa is Foreign Minister of Egypt. In his presentation on the requirements for peace and security in the Middle East, he reviewed the position of Egypt as stated by President Sadat during his historic visit to Israel in 1977 and more recently in 1995 by President Mubarak who said: “Peace means reinforcing justice, respect for international legitimacy, the rejection of double standards, a commitment to the principle of the equality of rights and obligations, and achieving a balance between the interests of all parties.” Minister Amre Moussa believes that in the absence of these principles no peace agreement will last. He argues that any comprehensive peace settlement must therefore be based on the principle of land for peace and must address the issues of boundaries, refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, security, and statehood for the Palestinians. Minister Amre Moussa warns that all of the achievements, which have been painstakingly negotiated during the last several years, are threatened by policies such as the Israeli policies of settlements and the reneging on negotiated agreements, which systematically undermine the tenets of the Madrid framework.
Minister Moussa concludes by calling on the parties to refrain from unilateral actions, which would prejudice the results of negotiations. He urges them to marshal the courage and leadership required to fully engage in the historic process of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians and between Israelis and Arabs.

M. James Wilkinson was U.S. special Cyprus coordinator from 1985 to 1989, serving concurrently as deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs with responsibilities for U.S. policy toward Greece and Turkey. In 1989-90 he was U.S. deputy representative to the United Nations Security Council with the rank of ambassador. Since leaving the career foreign service at the end of 1993, he has been consulting and writing, including participation from 1996 to 1998 in the Carnegie Forum on the United States, Greece, and Turkey, a Commission-sponsored project to energize the private sector for Greek-Turkish reconciliation.

He argues that the wellsprings of the Greek-Turkish confrontation arise from two conflicts: the rift between the two communities on Cyprus and competing claims in the Aegean.

On Cyprus, the British-designed bi-communal government broke down not long after independence, vicious fighting erupted in December 1963, and Turks withdrew into ghetto-like enclaves for protection (Turks count these developments as the beginning of the division of Cyprus). The UN dispatched its multinational peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which remains in place. The 1974 Turkish military invasion, precipitated when Athenian Greeks fomented a coup, secured over a third of the island, still held by Turkish Cypriots, who comprise less than one-fifth of the population. UN-sponsored negotiations to reunite the island have repeatedly foundered, with bitter finger pointing by
each side and often at the UN and the United States as well. The outlook today is as poor as it has been since 1974.

In the Aegean, the complexity of the problems arises from Greece's ownership of almost all the islands, the easternmost of which lie only a few miles off Turkish shores. Thus, giving Turkey any substantial share of the Aegean will enclave Greek islands, which is unacceptable to Greece, whereas using the islands as baselines would give Greece most of the Aegean, which is unacceptable to Turkey.

The United States is undoubtedly the best honest broker for the region, but has made little impact because important bilateral interests inhibit Washington from offending either side and taking the tough actions necessary to improve the situation.

Mr. Wilkinson concludes that there is little reason to expect significant improvements soon. In the worst-case scenario, a serious military incident could get out of control in the Aegean (or less likely on Cyprus), and set back peace efforts for years. In the more probable "best-case" scenario, the EU could partially mend fences with Turkey, some confidence-building measures could be instituted, and a negotiating process for Cyprus could be restarted. The tragedy is that such a "best case" equates to political and moral stagnation -- little more than continuation of the unhappy situation that has existed with relatively minor ups and downs since 1974.

It is a given that any U.S. administration has to pursue an activist policy, with goals to advance peacemaking in Cyprus and the Aegean. For Washington, the safest approach is to do more of the same, using temporary solutions and equal pressure on both sides. It is a politically realistic course -- no matter that it promises few or no lasting results. The two sides, argues Mr. Wilkinson, are unlikely to be beguiled by