MILITARIZATION and STATE POWER
in the
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT:
Case Study of Israel, 1948-1982

by
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*To my father, Willy, who inspires me to reach greater heights
and to my son, Yinon, who I hope to inspire in the same way*

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ACRONYMS

AA	ANTI-AIRCRAFT
AAA	ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
AAM	AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE
	AND INTELLIGENCE
AShM	AIR-TO-SHIP
ASM	AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
ATGM	ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE
ATM	ANTI-TANK MISSILE
AWACS	ADVANCED WARNING AIRBORNE CONTROL STATION
C^3	COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION
C^3I	COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION
CAS	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
COMSEC	COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
CTFCS	COMPUTERIZED TANK FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM
DMZ	DEMILITARIZED ZONE
ECCM	ELECTRONIC COUNTER-COUNTER-MEASURE
ECM	ELECTRONIC COUNTER-MEASURE
ELG	EXPORT LED GROWTH
ELINT	ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE
EW	EARLY WARNING
FMS	FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
GADNA	YOUTH BATTALIONS
GNP	GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
HEAT	HIGH ENERGY ANTI-TANK
hp	HORSE POWER
HUMINT	HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
IAF	ISRAEL AIR FORCE
IAI	ISRAEL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES
IDF	ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES
IFF	IDENTIFICATION OF FRIEND OR FOE
IMI	ISRAEL MILITARY INDUSTRIES
IMINT	IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE
km	KILOMETER
LRCR	LONG RANGE CHAFF DECOY ROCKET
MIC	MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZED COMPLEX
mm	MILLIMETER
MNC	MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION
MOU	MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
MQ	MATERIAL QUALITY
MRL	MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER
NAHAL	PIONEER FIGHTING YOUTH
NMQ	NON-MATERIAL QUALITY

NSC	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
P	POWER
PGM	PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS
PHOTOINT	PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
PLO	PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Q	QUANTITY
R&D	RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
RAFAEL	NATIONAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
RPG	ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE
RPV	REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLE
SA	SURFACE-TO-AIR
SAM	SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE
ShAM	SHIP-TO-AIR MISSILE
ShShM	SHIP-TO-SHIP MISSILE
ShSM	SHIP-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
SIGINT	SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
SSM	SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
TASS	ISRAEL ARMS PRODUCTION CONSORTIUM
TOW	TUBE LAUNCHED OPTICALLY TRACKED WIRE GUIDED
U.S.	UNITED STATES
UK	UNITED KINGDOM (GREAT BRITAIN)
UNEF	UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
USSR	UNION OF SOCIALIST SOVIET REPUBLICS
vs.	VERSUS
WDNS	WEAPON DELIVERY AND NAVIGATION SYSTEM

ABSTRACT

A set of propositions and an accompanying theoretical framework that explains the cause-effect linkages between intrastate and interstate power realization that are characterized by militarization are developed. This model establishes the foundation for an explanation of how such power is used to deal with the state's Janus-faced security dilemma. To this end, the model provides the tools needed for such an inquiry from a conceptual and typological standpoint. The goal is to explain how the internal aspect of state power shapes the external one. It was determined that Israel and the primary Arab confrontation states provide important test cases based on the intense interplay prevalent between militarization processes and state power.

INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH PROBLEM

The modern nation state sits at the nexus of society and the international arena. As such, the state interacts and faces challenges to its autonomy on both interstate and intrastate levels. This interplay of domestic and external forces results in a Janus-faced security dilemma for the state.[1] On one hand, the state confronts foreign threats by mobilizing war related resources. Invariably, this results in a struggle over these resources between state and society. On the other hand, the extent to which the state meets external challenges to its security is conditioned by the intensity of the internal state encounter. In general two important manifestations of this security predicament exist. First, the state-society relationship enhances the state's ability to deal with international conflict. This implies a greater level of state autonomy and state power realization in the international system. Second, the state-society relationship erodes the state's ability to deal with international conflict. In this case limitations exist on national autonomy and consequently, on the ability to project power in the international system. Studies pertaining to international conflict focus primarily on interstate power goals such as deterrence and balance of power. What is overlooked is how state power vis-a-vis society dictates the ability of the state to realize these external power goals. The central question put forward for investigation concerns how the realization of intrastate power enables or hinders the attainment of interstate power goals.

States have responded to their Janus-faced security dilemma through a build-up of military capability. This assumption is based on the central role that conflict and war play in international relations. The history of modern nation states is one rooted in the use of military power to achieve national interests, objectives, power, and influence over other states. As a result, the research problem deals with how the process of building military capabilities involving both the mobilization of resources for security requirements, and the build-up of military force structures, defined here as militarization,[2] interact with power realization domestically and internationally. To this end, the state is viewed as possessing both domestic strategies aimed at militarization and foreign strategies directed at a interstate power goals. The focus is on the confrontation between state and society over the resources needed for the state's security needs and how this influences the interstate conflictual interaction. In other words, it is the extent to which the state realizes national autonomy in its domestic environment that determines its ability to deal with external conflict. For the state, the realization of intrastate power (i.e., national autonomy) is a necessary if not a sufficient condition to exercise power internationally.[3] The process of militarization links the aspect of the state-society encounter within the state to interstate conflict dynamics. Based on this assumption, singled out for investigation is the phenomenon of militarization and its impact on state power.

Militarization processes link internal and external aspects of state power. The sum of militarization is represented by the ability of the state to garner intrastate power, and the product is reflected in the competence of the state to meet external challenges to its security. Given this equation, an interdependence exists between internal and external power dimensions. The realization of interstate power is linked to the indigenous factor of militarization of which its intensity is regulated by both the state-society nexus and the exogenous factor of interstate war. States seek to maximize power not only to deter foreign threats and to better their power position, but also to ensure on a basic level their control over society. State managers must not only meet the challenges that society places before them, but also

be able to place and implement demands on society. Such an interdependent relationship frames militarization as a means to realize state power to deal with the state's Janus-faced security dilemma.

The extent to which the state-society relationship influences the realization of power in the interstate system is linked to the intensity levels associated with the state's Janus-faced security dilemma. Such a thesis focuses on the interaction between the severity of conflict on the intrastate and interstate levels. On the intrastate level, this implies that the more severe the power struggle the more militarization processes are constrained by society and henceforth, the less the state is able to realize interstate power. At the same time, the implication exists that if the state is able to deal effectively with a severe state-society confrontation it may be able to offset societal constraints, increase state capabilities and thus, be able to enhance national autonomy and interstate power.[4] In such a case, the realization of intrastate power is linked to the exogenous variable of interstate war which either provides an opportunity for consolidation and intensification of existing patterns of social control or causes them to break down thereby, setting an environment where a reordering of the state-society nexus can occur. Assuming that this solidification or restructuring of state-society relations is exploited to the state's benefit, the state will be able to actualize a high level of internal social control and in the process establish itself as a strong state in the interstate domain. On the interstate level, conflict intensification affects the ability of the state to realize intrastate power and therefore, places limits on the realization of interstate power goals. In general interstate war increases the demand for security related resources and force requirements exacerbating the state-society struggle over these assets. In essence, the outcome of interstate war serves as a feedback loop that impacts the intrastate power dimension.

PHENOMENON UNDER INVESTIGATION

This research endeavor requires at a minimum that conflicts exist and are prevalent on both the intrastate and interstate levels, and that there is an identifiable interdependence between the two. The Arab-Israeli imbroglio fulfills this prerequisite. It is earmarked by an intense period of warring accompanied by intrastate confrontation in both Israel and the Arab state system. The state is confronted by a twofold challenge: one, presented by external challenges to its security; and two, exhibited by the mobilization of societal resources for militarization. As a result, the state is involved in an attenuated period of war preparation and state-building activities accompanied by the need to advance interstate power goals.

By and large, studies pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict ignore the relation between these elements. Accordingly, singled out for empirical investigation is how the transformation of intrastate power through militarization processes in the state of Israel enabled or hindered the realization of interstate power goals of deterrence and stability in the military balance of power from 1948 to 1982. This time period is justified on the basis that it represents the entire spectrum of direct military conflict between Israel and the Arab confrontation states. Furthermore, this research endeavor establishes a comparative case study framework comparing Israel on a theoretical level with the primary Arab confrontation states (i.e., Egypt and Syria) for the same time period. At this stage, an empirical analysis of Egypt and Syria is not undertaken, however, the conceptual basis for such an investigation is established.

Israel

Israel represents an important case study to address the phenomenon of militarization in the intrastate-interstate power equation. Throughout its history Israel has faced both severe and more mild intrastate

and interstate conflict intensities. Israel is typified as a strong state in that it has achieved a high level of social control over society. Thus, the issue per se is not the ability to realize intrastate power but the extent to which this power can be transformed through militarization to effectuate deterrence and a favorable military balance of power. Moreover, the extensive militarization processes that Israel has undertaken owing to the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict provides an appropriate setting for probing militarization as a cause-effect linkage between intrastate and interstate power dimensions.

The Israeli case also provides a unique dynamic that is useful for comparison with the weak state attributes of Egypt and Syria. Israel during the 1947-1949 war of independence was able to make the transition from a weak state to a strong state. This was largely accomplished due to the exogenous factor of war that afforded the opportunity for the state to consolidate its predominance over society. Of interest here is what were the conditions and how did Israel capitalize on this level of control that was translated into interstate power realization. The inherent assumption is that militarization allowed for this transformation to occur. In fact, from 1950 to 1967 intrastate power goals were maximized as to effectuate interstate power realization in terms of deterrence (1956 to 1967), and preventive/ preemptive war (1956 and 1967).

At the same time, an identifiable interdependence exists between both power aspects. It is not only the case of how the cause of militarization processes embodied in intrastate power formation impacts upon the effect characterized by interstate power realization, but also how the outcome of interstate power namely, war, governs the cause. In other words, a two-way relation exists between interstate and intrastate power dimensions. A case in point are the constraints placed on the state after the 1967 war due to the intensification of conflict dynamics (i.e., balance of military forces, arms race, conflict bi-polarization) that resulted in an erosion of intrastate power. This, in turn, led to a reduced interstate power capability relative to 1967 as witnessed in the initial strategic and tactical failures of the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

Arab Confrontation States
The Arab confrontation states prevalent for this research effort, Egypt and Syria, are typified as weak states in that the state is severely limited in its ability to garner social control for purposes of state-building and war preparation. Both Egypt and Syria provide a counterweight to Israel's strong state features allowing for a more comprehensive examination of the research problem. In this case the issue is more so one of the extent to which intrastate power is constrained in contrast to the Israeli case where after 1949 such power was actualized and sustained. This fact complicates the processes of power transformation through militarization. The Arab state, as with Israel, is in a constant state of war preparation and state-building, but in an domestic environment that is threatening to its power base and political survival. Militarization processes in the Arab state are preoccupied with mobilizing resources for security that possesses an inward as well as an outward dimension. As a consequence of the internal security concern, the Arab state engages in two types of domestic battles: the one for political stability and legitimacy; and the one with society for access to its security requirements both for internal and external threats.

Egypt and Syria in addition to providing an important comparison to the Israeli case, represent different societal structures each of which have implications for the research problem. In the first case, Egypt is characterized by a homogeneous society where the state represents the interests of the dominant

community in society (i.e., Sunni Muslim Arabs). In the second case, Syria is characterized by a heterogeneous society (i.e., Sunni, Alawis, Druze) where an incompatibility exists between state and societal interests exacerbating the struggle between the two. Of significance is to explore the impact of the weak state structure characterized by the ongoing struggle for political survival on militarization and thus, on the realization of interstate power.

RESEARCH GOALS

From a macro perspective, the goal of this study is to develop a set of propositions and an accompanying theoretical framework that explains the cause-effect linkages between intrastate and interstate power realization that are characterized by militarization. This establishes the foundation for an explanation of how such power is used to deal with the state's Janus-faced security dilemma. The idea is to explain how the internal aspect of state power shapes the external one. It was determined that Israel provides an important test case based on the intense interplay prevalent between militarization processes and state power in its history. In addition, the case study objective is to facilitate a theoretical comparative analysis between Israel and the primary Arab confrontation states. To this end, the study provides the tools needed for such an inquiry from a conceptual and typological standpoint. As a whole, the attempt of this endeavor is to provide a fresh insight into the well worn subject of the Arab-Israeli conflict by illustrating the dynamics of interaction between internal processes of power formation and interstate military power capabilities as a way in which to account for the relative strengths and limited failures of Israel in relation to the Arab confrontation states.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION:

[1]The term Janus-face implies that the state is concerned with challenges in both the domestic and international arenas. See Michael N. Barnett, <u>Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Israel and Egypt</u>, 1992, p. 26.

[2]Militarization refers to the process by which civil society organizes itself for the production of defense. This includes both weapons accumulation and the process of mobilizing resources for purposes of war preparation and the maintenance of the state's security. Militarization does not imply the formal political and ideological dominance of the military. This term should not be confused with militarism which refers to the direct control of the military over state political processes. See Michael N. Barnett and Alexander Wendt, "The International System and Third World Militarization," University of Wisconsin, Madison, April 1992, pp. 5-10.

[3]See Joel S. Migdal, <u>Strong States and Weak Societies: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World</u>, 1988, pp. 11-41; Krasner has also made the point that a state's strength in external relations rests on its strength in relation to its own society. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Domestic Constraints on International Economic Leverage," in Knorr and Trager (eds.), <u>Economic Issues and National Security</u>, 1977.

[4]The importance of massive social dislocation which severely weakens intrastate power stands out as a necessary condition for creating strong states. When existing patterns of social control break down they enable the creation of a strong state as is related to its ability to control society. This process of building a strong state, in turn, is contingent upon the emergence of a serious military threat that favors concentrated social control that is exploited through an institutional power base and skillful leadership abilities See Migdal, op. cit., pp. 268-277.

CHAPTER 1: STATE POWER and MILITARIZATION

In order to develop a theoretical model and a typology for the case study analysis, it is essential to recognize what theories and concepts of state power and militarization bear on the phenomenon under investigation. This allows for an identification of the aspects of these theories that are singled out for refinement and elaboration. The intended purpose of Chapter 1 is to identify trends, patterns, and terms relative to an explanation of the subject matter. This establishes a conceptual foundation crucial for the development of the theoretical framework that follows in Chapter 2.

STATE POWER

The famous guns versus butter argument frames the dimensions of state power. It is not an either/or proposition, but of how one impacts the other. The assertion is that military power is linked to economic power. In this regard, power is related to the relationship between the state's internal and external power formation processes. Kennedy has illustrated this point in arguing that the uneven pace of economic growth promotes shifts in the military power of states over the course of history:

The fact remains that all of the major shifts in the world's *military power* balances have followed alterations in the *productive* balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources {emphasis in original text}.[5]

As a result of these dynamics, state managers must simultaneously provide military security, satisfy socio-economic interests of the society, and ensure sustained economic growth to ensure a favorable power position within the interstate domain. Military power serves as an important means to achieve these ends.

In examining both the internal and external aspects of state power and the linkages between them, it is noteworthy that the notions of interstate power offered by the realist and neorealist schools of international relations admit the role of domestic actors. A fundamental assumption of the realist paradigm is that states seek to maximize power. This outlook is characterized by a power-politics model of international relations set in a self-help anarchic international system. In such a case, each state ends up investing a substantial portion of its efforts in providing the means to protect itself against other states. Neorealism deduces that states seek self-preservation at a minimum and drive for hegemony at a maximum.[6] The importance of the intrastate power struggle challenges the unit (state) level of analysis so central to the realist paradigm. Waltz, for example, has recently admitted domestic factors are important dimensions to consider in the study of international relations.[7] Thus, the logical deduction is that linkages exist between internal and external power dimensions.

The concept of state power in international relations is based upon a behavioral empiricist notion: a causative effect. Power can thus be analyzed on the basis of how its utilization by states cause occurrences of empirical events. Dahl's definition of power has laid the basis of this positivist viewpoint: power is the ability of state A to get state B to do something B would not otherwise do.[8] The proof of

power lies in how behavior is changed. Power over resources and actors is what determines military power balances. This approach has several limitations that need to be considered. To think of power as a causal concept is not necessarily to imagine that there will always be some states possessing power over other states or over society.[9] The 'power over' approach also fails to distinguish between power potential, possession of power resources, and power realization. It fails to account for a conversion process that is necessary if power is to be used to change behavior. These limitations, however, can be sidestepped if power resources are contextualized.

Baldwin states that power is situationally specific favoring a relative-infungibility explanation of power resources. Power is relative in the sense that power resources useful in one policy-contingency are not necessarily equally advantageous in others; power is infungible in that power resources are not easily transferable from one issue area to another.[10] In this regard, it is important to specify who is influencing whom with respect to what: both the scope and domain of power must be specified.[11] A contextualization of power within the military sphere allows for a more accurate consideration of the bonds between military capabilities and state power.

Military power dominates in situations where either interstate or intrastate conflict is intense over a prolonged time period. This implies that the state encounters a Janus-faced security dilemma. In such a scenario, Keohane and Nye indicate that military force eclipses other forms of power.[12] "Survival is the primary goal of all states, and in the worst situations, force is ultimately necessary to guarantee survival. Thus military force is always a central component of national power."[13] The domination of military power in interstate conflict is based on a realist school of thought. Power at the state level is the ability to achieve one's purposes or goals through primarily the threat of or use of military means. At a minimum, realism views interstate power as the ability of state A to deter state B from engaging in conflict with A; at a maximum, interstate power is the ability of A to compel B to change behavior.[14] The changed pattern of behavior is largely achieved through balance of power formations. In more general terms, realist oriented authors focus on the bond between state power and war. Cline in his study of power, for example, puts forward an empirical proposition that state power is the capacity to wage war.[15] Gilpin further reinforces this contention by emphasizing military force as the ultimate form of power. War according to Gilpin serves as a measuring rod of national power.[16] What these authors fail to distinguish, in contrast to Baldwin, Keohane, and Nye, is that military force dominates only in specifically defined contexts. For this study it is the intensity of the Janus-faced security dilemma which frames the context in which military capabilities are used to realize state power.

Such a proposition implies that both internal and external processes of power formation impact upon militarization. Foreign threats require the build-up of military capabilities (guns) and the challenges that society places before the state affect the state's ability to produce butter and consequently, guns. As a result of this dynamic, a plausible conclusion is that the domain of power lies in its use to deal with conflict on the interstate level and with societal confrontation on the intrastate one. The scope of power is based on the notion of the 'power over' concept. On this level, an important distinction must be made between power over other state actors and power over outcomes[17]. Power over actors is based on Dahl's causation model, whereas, power over outcomes deals with how power resources affect shifts in balance of power formations among states. Hart expands on this idea by proffering three approaches for measuring state power: one, control of resources; two, control over actors; and three, control over outcomes.[18] This framework provides a useful measuring rod for analyzing how states realize power.

As such, this study elaborates on this 'power over' approach by contextualizing and applying it not only to the international realm of conflict but also to the domestic one.

INTRASTATE AND INTERSTATE POWER REALIZATION

The power over approach deals with both intrastate and interstate power realization. Both the control over resources and over domestic actors represent intrastate power goals, and the control over foreign actors and over outcomes represent interstate power goals. Intrastate power is enabled by state-building processes that allow for the state to control resources and actors. State-building processes relevant for this study are directed at the advancement of socio-economic modernization and political development.[19] Modernization involves a process of social mobilization that results in a confrontation between traditional society and modern ideas. State-formation instills modern institution-building norms through a fundamental reorganization of the traditional social structure. Political development pertains to the institutional power and capability to handle socio-political pressures that are generated by modernization. Interstate power in a self-help anarchical system is chiefly enabled by militarization processes that are an outcome of the state's intrastate power formation processes.

Control Over Resources

Control over resources indicates that the state is able to mobilize the resources it needs to meet its security requirements. This mobilization can take place in both the domestic and international environments. Barnett has identified three important mobilization strategies that regimes pursue: one, international; two, accommodation; and three restructural.[20] An international strategy distributes the costs of security on foreign actors. This allows for a state to alleviate its domestic defense burden and increase the resources available to realize state power. At the same time, the recruitment of a foreign benefactor is usually accompanied by restrictive conditions that undermine the very reason for requesting such assistance. The state's level of dependency on such a relation determines to what extent its autonomy is restricted. In turn, this provides an impetus for indigenous military industrialization that increases the state's national autonomy while decreasing its reliance on foreign actors.

In order to forge a greater level of national autonomy, state managers are able to accommodate society or restructure the state-society nexus. Accommodation implies a strategy of upholding the status-quo between state and society. Since this option propounds no real political costs beyond what has already been incurred states normally begin with this approach. "However during periods of increased security demands it is highly unlikely that the state's security needs will be satiated through accommodational measures."[21] States that face a prolonged and intense international conflict attempt to revise the state-society status-quo through a restructural strategy. This leaves the state in a difficult dilemma. As the state strives to adjust and cope with the demands of national security it is confronted not only by foreign threats, but also by the prospect that those policies designed to repel external challenges may undercut its domestic power base. Notwithstanding, a restructural strategy provides the state with the maximal extraction capabilities. National autonomy is enhanced assuming that the costs of power realization are effectively imposed on society. The state's ability to achieive this end is related to the societal constraints both in economic and political realms.

Control Over Actors:

Foreign Actors

Control over foreign actors in terms of their actions and foreign policy behavior is based on the realist paradigm. Neorealists expand this notion by viewing the goal of states to uphold their power position within the international system as a means of maintaining one's national autonomy in the face of force that others wield.[22] Even though realists admit the role of internal processes in the interstate power equation such factors tend to be underemphasized. An alternative explanation is that states seek to control actors in the external environment in order to control actors in the internal environment. Moreover, states are constrained in actualizing both external and internal autonomy not only by other states in the system and by the structure of the system itself, but by domestic actors.

Domestic Actors

It is essential to explain the impact of intrastate power as manifested in control over domestic actors. State power in this sense may either be infrastructural, despotic, or a convergence of the two. Infrastructural power denotes the power of the state to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of the society through its own infrastructure for security-related resources. Two dimensions of this power are worth considering: one, the means available to state managers to mobilize resources which include a monopoly on the instruments of coercion and control over economic and bureaucratic forces in society; and two, societal constraints that condition regime behavior which emanate from economic activities controlled by the private sector or from groups demanding a restructuring of relations with the state. Despotic power involves the control of regime over society: "the range of actions which the elite [state] is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with societal groups."[23] Such power first and foremost rests on a monopoly on the instruments of coercion. The state imposes control over society rather than bargaining for resources. The state-society status-quo is transformed through force. In this case, the state controls the majority if not all key economic and political resources. The focus of state managers is on the security and stability of the regime rather than socio-economic development.

Control Over Outcomes:

Power is also about the ability of states to influence conflict outcomes. Control on this level implies the ability to realize a state's strategic and foreign policy interests and objectives. In regard to military power balances in the Arab-Israeli conflict two issues are important to identify that indicate the degree to which conflict results have furthered interstate power goals: one, limited war; and two, deterrence and stability.

Limited War

Within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict the concept of limited war is fundamental to explain the ability of the parties to influence outcomes.[24] An important dimension of this imbroglio is based on the observation that the Arab-Israeli wars were less than total in that they were regulated by military capabilities and policies of self-restraint. Conflict dynamics interacted with these bounds in accordance with a specific sequence of recognized restrictions defined as limitations.

This concept provides a means by which control over conflict events can be analyzed. It provides a clear link between internal and external factors: military capabilities, military and political policies, and conflict outcomes. Limited war involves restraint on means and political primacy of warfare in which the belligerents practice control by deliberately shackling military power that is mobilized or readily available to them. It makes a distinction between power potential and power realization. Both can be used to

further a state's national interests. Herewith, the limited war variables of self-restraint and military capabilities are significant. Self-restraint implies restrictions on state behavior, namely, limited objectives. This is framed by the proportionality and relativeness of means and military actions, and restrictions on the use of military force. Limited capabilities, on the other hand, indicate that the belligerent is only capable of launching and waging a limited military campaign.

Limited objectives denote political primacy. "In the utilization of military power, military means should be subordinated to the goals of national policy through an objective calculation of the most effective methods of attaining concrete, limited, and attainable security objectives."[25] The dimension of military force should be proportional to the value of the objectives at stake and within the scope of military capabilities. Resources and goals are checked by policy not capabilities. The overall aim is political and to be obtained by tacit or explicit bargaining and not military power requiring the physical destruction of the enemy.[26] In this case capability plays a critical role, for if a state establishes absolute political positions with inadequate military means the end result is a limited war in so far as the belligerent is unable to escalate the conflict. In addition, external constraining mechanisms such as external powers are able to prevent a belligerent with absolute positions and the capabilities to match from extending the range of limitations.

Limitations on military means deal with economy of force and proportionality of means to ends. This implies that the belligerent refrains from making use of the full capabilities of its military arsenal. Both quantitative and qualitative restrictions apply. For example, are the number of infantry divisions, tanks, and armed personnel employed within reason for the task at hand? Limitations on weapon types are more problematic. A state can restrict means in terms of numbers but employ advanced weapons systems that are capable of extending hostilities.[27]

Results are based on the ability of the belligerent to realize political and military objectives. Conflict outcomes are thus a measuring rod for interstate power realization. Limited war scenarios prescribe a specific type of outcome. This as has been shown is crucial to account for. Nevertheless, results need to be measured by defining general interstate power goals that state's pursue. To this end, deterrence and stability as they relate to military power balances are significant. In fact, these goals are viewed as valid policy instruments for the avoidance of total war.[28]

Conventional Deterrence
Deterrence is at the heart of the notion of state power. Klaus Knorr views deterrence as a form of coercion:

When power is used coercively, an actor B is influenced if he adapts his behavior in compliance with, or anticipation of, another actor's (A) demands, wishes or proposals. B's conduct is then affected by something A does, or by something he expects A to do. In consequence B will modify his behavior or will not (if he is deterred).[29]

Realized to its full extent conventional deterrence is to dissuade an opponent from violent action. At a minimum deterrence prevents the escalation of hostilities beyond an accepted level that as prescribed by a limited war. Conventional deterrence to distinguish it from nuclear deterrence rests on objective denial.[30] A defender must establish a relative ability to deny a state's military and political objectives

through an engagement of forces. As such weapon types and balance of forces play a critical role. Conventional deterrence is not aimed at preventing war per se but its relative success lies in gradually changing the strategic calculation, the order of strategic benefits, and the political interests of the adversary. Two factors that relate to conventional deterrence serve as criteria by which to investigate conflict outcomes: one, the balances of military power and capabilities that include type of weapons employed and overall balance of forces; and two, the balances of strategic and political interests that is a function of specific military strategies and the extent they are realized.

Mearsheimer has pointed out that deterrence is a function of both the particular military strategy preferred and the type of weapons available.[31] Military strategies vary from the offensive to the defensive.[32] The offensive strategy rests on the idea of objective gain that involves a change in the status-quo (i.e., a shift in the military power balance). Two types of offensive strategies are present in the literature. One, limited aims or compellence which deals with an intended strategy to bring about a specific conflict outcome such as in the case of limited warfare. Included within the limited aims strategy is the static nature of attritional warfare.[33] Two, blitzkrieg which includes preemption and offensive strikes that are initiated in response to foreign threats and actual use of force. In contrast, the defensive strategy is based on objective denial rather than objective gain. Denial relies on deterrence to dissuade an opponent from attempting to achieve objectives.

Stability and Weapons Technology
The nature of military technology affects the likelihood of military conflict and directly impacts military power balances. Conventional military technology is a permissive factor allowing for both aggressive and preventive wars.[34] The characteristics of weapons technology has implications in military offensive or defensive doctrines. It is not only the existence of new military technology, but the form it takes that impacts stability and military balances.[35]

Two primary technological forms exist: offensive and defensive.[36] Offensive forces favor firepower, and tactical and strategic mobility. They are geared to territorial conquest. Such technology is represented by the fighter aircraft and tanks. Defensive forces rely on a counter-force application. Such technologies favor firepower as in the former case but are static. A case in point are conventionally armed ballistic missiles and precision guided munitions (PGMs). Such stand-off capabilities allows for a divorce between force destruction and territorial conquest.[37]

In general, offensive arm's superiority increases the probability of war.[38] The employment of significant new strategic systems increases the incentive to preempt in order to prevent their utilization. Offensive superiority increases both the benefits from striking first and the costs associated with an adversary striking first. Defensive superiority reduces both the benefits to attacker and the costs to defender. The probability of war is reduced since no incentive to strike first exists. This offensive/defensive balance of force distinction is defined as being inversely proportional to the minimum ratio of forces needed by an attacker to overcome an adversary defending fixed positions.[39] The greater the minimum ratio the greater the advantage of the defensive and the lower the probability of war.

MILITARIZATION
Militarization processes primarily take two forms.[40] The first is based on a capital-intensive path and the

second on a labor-intensive one. Capital-intensive militarization relies on the integration of advanced high-technology weapon's systems, whereas, labor-intensive militarization rests on masses of conscripts. In reality, states tend to combine these militarization paths. The build-up of military capabilities consists of mass conscription around a capital-intensive core of military professionals and advanced weapon's systems.

Militarization is a consequence of external threats that a state faces and a cause of the state's drive for domestic power. On the interstate level, militarization allows for power realization. The state's ability to produce the required defenses is linked to its economic abilities and technological-scientific know-how. Cordesman and Wagner have provided a useful outline for assessing how the outcome of conflict can be measured by examining military balance of power and performance.[41] Two interrelated areas of focus are emphasized: one, technology; and two, military tactics, training and organization. The compatibility between one to the other is what determines a favorable balance of power and force effectiveness:

The successful exploitation of military technologies requires that they be adapted to the tactical, operational, and strategic doctrines pursued...New technology will be utterly useless if they remain divorced from the tactics, operations, and strategies pursued.[42]

The more skillful the state can accomplish this task the more effective it will be in realizing military power to further its strategic concepts. On the intrastate level the focus is on the ability of the state to militarize: to consolidate an effective force structure and to develop military industries that are able to produce the required weapon's systems. The ability to adapt and integrate military technology is linked to the level of national autonomy and technological economic capabilities.

Militarization and Balance of Power

Militarization plays into the balance of power associated with force effectiveness and performance. A number of important issue areas are associated with evaluating military balances in the Arab-Israeli theater.[43] First, conflict represents an ongoing interaction between state actors in which the intensity levels vary over time. Limited low-level conflicts, for example, have the propensity to escalate. Second, arms imports impact upon cost and military effectiveness. Cordesman has shown that there exists a correlation between the volume of high technology arms imports, the cost of given conflicts, and the effectiveness of force structures. Notwithstanding, indigenous arm's production especially, in the case of Israel represents an additional factor that may have a greater impact on cost and military effectiveness. A third factor concerns the burden of militarization processes which are maintained by several trends: one, the virtual institutionalization of conflict which relates to the constant state of war preparation; two, the perpetuation of the arms race between states which has a catalyst effect in that any given conflict triggers an acceleration of the arms race; and three, the impact of military technology by example of acquiring or indigenously developing advanced weapon's systems with increasing military costs.

A fourth consideration deals with military manpower as it pertains to capital-intensive and labor-intensive militarization paths. Both routes account for an increased defense burden due to the fact that states in the Middle East region are unable to effectively make use of their defense resources.[44] This is due in large part to the limitations of conscription and the inability of the regime to equip and sustain high levels of manpower. The nature of the weak states, for example, is such that they are unable to conscript on a mass scale while simultaneously ensure their survival domestically.[45] Furthermore, they lack the know-

how to effectively integrate and make-use of high-technology weapons. This is further complicated by the observation that the rise in force levels and the use of advanced weapons systems have become institutionalized in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both Israel and the Arab confrontation states are thus, left in a difficult dilemma exhibited by a continual need for more arms at higher quality levels.

At the heart of this problem of force effectiveness, lies the consideration of quantity and quality. This hinges on technological know-how and adaptation to force structures, and mobilization of security-related resources. In cases where the ability exists to effectively utilize advanced weapon's systems, quality is preferred in that it accommodates the limitations inherent in pursuing a high level of equipment numbers. Quantity is favored where the resources are available to purchase or produce arms on a massive scale to account for the inability to absorb advanced weapon systems. The issue, however, is clouded by the fact that military forces based on quality can cost more than those based on quantity due to the increased cost per force element. This, in turn, impacts upon the economic resources of states that base their force structure on quality to offset quantitative inferiorities. In addition, a state may lack the economies of scale needed to indigenously produce advanced weapon's systems.

There are a number of constraining factors that impact upon the effectiveness of a quality based military force. Rising real costs impede the ability to develop or purchase high-technological weapons. In addition, the compatibility issue between technology and force effectivess is problematic. A case in point are military forces that lack the training and tactics to successfully integrate advanced weapons systems within their force structures. Technology also creates a dependency on foreign actors restraining the development of indigenous arms industries and the control over the availability of arms. The supporting technology needed to sustain and utilize advanced weapon's systems lends further support to the incongruities between technology and force effectiveness.[46]

It is also important to consider the role that intrastate power processes play in the ability of the state to impact upon military power balances. In this regard, it is crucial to distinguish between weak states and strong states in the international system. Weak states characteristic of the third world are typified by a fragmentation of power where societal actors directly compete with a regime in power for control. This state-society struggle for power manifests in despotic power patterns in which the state pursues predominance over society. A case in point are the Arab military republics. Strong states aspire to reach an acceptable balance with society through infrastructural power elements. These states are distinguished by the first world and newly industrialized countries such as Israel.

Militarization and the Weak State
In the weak state, the distinction between external and internal environments makes little sense in situations where penetration and intervention by other states and groups is the norm rather than the exception. Buzan argues that the logic of relations between weak and strong states leads to an intrusion of the international balance of power within the weak state.[47] Weak states are distinguished by their relative impotent power position in the global security environment combined with low levels of socio-political cohesiveness. These states lack the infrastructural power necessary to eliminate the use of force as a central feature in their domestic political life. The deficiency of weak states in establishing institutions whereby, a modernist synthesis of state and society can take hold, as in the first world, leads to higher levels of despotic power. In essence, the internal security environment is a reflection of the system of anarchy and self-help prevalent in the security dilemmas of the international arena.[48] Internal

anarchy in the weak state places the burden of national security on the domestic environment. Job has characterized the internal security environment of weak states as an insecurity dilemma.[49] The weak state is insecure in that the central premises of the security dilemma are violated: the state exhibits no socio-political cohesion; the regime lacks popular legitimacy for its security interests; and the state lacks effective political institutions to provide internal peace and order.

In order to explain the intrastate conflict over military manpower and cost, it is crucial to identify the components of militarization development processes. Buzan identifies three relevant elements: the state, the individual, and the international system.[50] Of importance to the security environment, is how these factors interlock with each other. The insecurity dilemma faced by the state is a consequence of the structures and dynamics present at the system level. State-formation processes condition the weak state environment effectively spawning its security composition. The individuals, tribal and ethnic groupings, are the referent objects of national security. Particular ethnic groups are dependent on the state, yet threatened by a particular regime that favors one ethnicity over another. In fact, Mazuri has shown that the basis of recruitment into the armed forces of weak states rests on cultural exclusiveness, a militarized ethnicity.[51] Such ethnicity has catalyzed tribe creation and ethnic consciousness leading to retribilization and retraditionalization of society. The internal security characteristics dictate the need to militarize while advancing the state's weak attributes that shaped the security environment to begin with.

The international system and its ties to state and individual levels of security are manifested through state formation processes and systemic dominance structures providing the incentive for first world-type security development programs. At their inception, the development of weak state militarization programs followed coercive-intensive paths. Tilly points out that the departing colonial powers left little accumulated capital behind, but bequeathed to their successors military forces drawn from and modeled on colonial armies.[52] The security dimensions of the weak state established the basis for coercive-intensive and capital-intensive militarization.

Barnett and Wendt have expanded the domain of security development processes linking them to three important systemic structures that have led to capital-intensive militarization programs characteristic of the first world.[53] One, the structure of informal empires in the state system which concerns relations between weak and strong states as represented through spheres of influence. Two, the structure of the capitalist world economy which involves the relative strengths and weaknesses of state structures as a result of their power position. Three, the infusion of global military culture which deals with the way first world norms have permeated the weak state.

An informal empire is a socially structured system of interaction among juridically sovereign states in which the dominant strong state has de facto political authority over the security policies of the subordinate weak state. These informal empires tie into regional security complexes and their relationship to regional power competition. Essentially, this accounted for the bi-polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Inherent in these spheres of influence is the need for effective modernization and political development. This requires a high level of internal security to not only build-up infrastructural forms of power, but also to overcome the destabilizing challenges posed by the internal environment. Since such levels of internal security are absent, weak state regimes have justified great power political, economic, and military penetration. This strengthens the ruling elites who in many cases represent a particular tribe or ethnicity at the expense of other domestic groupings. In turn, internal strife is intensified. As a result,

local elites in the face of low levels of domestic legitimacy rely on coercive military-security means to maintain power. In such a situation foreign sources are used in an attempt to further fortify their internal security position. At the same time, external sources of legitimacy can also lead to less security or even undermine the domestic power base of the regime.

External military-dependence generates both supply and demand side incentives for capital-intensive militarization programs. On the supply side of the equation, the dominant state makes available technologies that will encourage dependency and capital-intensive militarization in capital-poor weak states. On the demand side, the preference for capital-intensive military industrialization is based upon the need for political legitimacy and security assistance to ward off internal security threats.

Global military culture as that represented by the first world has played a role in the ideas adopted by the weak state. This is based on the assumption that a globalization of ideas and norms has taken place. The military embodies two key norms associated with this convergence: professionalism and technologism. This is manifested in a compulsive urge to emulate the first world regardless of the economic and political consequences for the respective society. Professionalism allows for upward mobility and social mobilization of those privileged ethnic groupings that are promoted, for example, through the military officers corps. This reproduces colonial power models for purposes of maintaining internal security. Technologism deals with the way in which military technology is prioritized: technology represents an attempt to remedy society's social, economic, and political ills and serves as a symbol of modernism.

Militarization and the Strong State
Whether states end up on the strong or weak end of the scale depends on the level of social control.[54] The weak state is limited in its ability to garner social control for purposes of state-building and war preparation. It is obvious then that strong states have achieved a high level of social control in this regard. Migdal has identified three important variables that form the basis for creating a strong state. The first variable prescribes a condition that being the existence of a military threat from other states or from within the state itself. "In brief, war itself and the threat of war induce state leaders to take unusual risks to consolidate social control, creating a strong state."[55] Two, an independent bureaucracy that provides the state with institutional power and the ability to implement control. Three, skillful leadership that is able to take advantage of conditions to advance a strong state. Weak states, by and large, fall short in exploiting the situation characterized by the first variable.

In the strong state, the distinction between external and internal security environments is clearly delimitated. In such a case, the focus is on the conversion of military power to the interstate level. Since the authority of the regime in power is not at stake, the state concentrates on tapping manpower potentials in terms of numbers and training, and establishing force balances between quality and quantity. The strong state is primarily bounded by its economic resources and military industrial capabilities. Accordingly, the state bargains with society over a finite resource base. This simple fact connotes that even in the strong state the state-society nexus is a crucial factor to consider concerning the realization of state power.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1:

[5]See Paul Kennedy, <u>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</u>, 1987, p. 439.

[6]See Kenneth Waltz, <u>A Theory of International Politics</u>, 1979.

[7]In a revised position Waltz concedes that international relations cannot be explained without considering what happens within the state. "Structures condition behaviors and outcomes, yet explanations of behavior and outcomes are indeterminate because both unit level and structural causes are in play...structures shape and shove. They do not determine behaviors and outcomes, not only because unit level and structural causes interact, but also because the shaping and shoving of structures may be successfully resisted." See Kenneth Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to my Critiques," in Robert Keohane (ed.), <u>Neorealism and its Critics</u>, 1986, pp. 343-344; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, <u>Explaining and Understanding International Relations</u>, 1991, pp. 110-118.

[8]See Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in Bell, Edwards, and Wagner (eds.), <u>Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research</u>, 1969, pp. 79-93.

[9]See Jeffrey C. Issac, <u>Power and Marxist Theory: A Realist View</u>, 1987, p. 83.

[10]See David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics," in Baldwin, <u>Paradoxes of Power</u>, 1989, pp. 129-168.

[11]See Ibid., p. 136.

[12]Keohane and Nye view military power as dominating other types in cases were the security dilemmas of the state are extremely acute . The contention of this study is that the Arab-Israeli conflict is typified by exactly such a situation. See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, <u>Power and Interdependence</u>, 1977, pp. 27-29.

[13]See Ibid., p. 27.

[14]For an explanation of the strategy of compellence and its importance in interstate conflict see Thomas C. Schelling, <u>Strategy of Conflict</u>, 1960.

[15]See Ray S. Cline, <u>World Power Assessment</u>, 1975, p. 8.

[16]See Robert Gilpin, <u>War and Change in World Politics</u>, 1981, pp. 31-33.

[17]See Joseph Nye, <u>Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power</u>, 1990, pp. 173-201.

[18]See Jeffrey Hart, "Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations," <u>International Organization</u>, 30: 1976, pp. 289-305.

[19]The two essential aspects of state-building theories are characterized as: (1) state-building on an empirical basis (i.e, institutional, political, socio-economic modernization, territorial); (2) state-building towards a sovereignty oriented goal (juridical oriented sovereignty). Considering the established sovereignty of the states in the Arab-Israeli conflict the focus is on territorial state-building as it is applicable to the institutional, political, and economic aspects of militarization processes.
Empirical state building theories are broken down into three typologies: developmental, functional, and historical. Developmental theories represent standard processes of political transformation in which modernization plays a central role. Functional theories do not propose a pattern of development as modernization prescribes instead they state the empirical conditions that must be present if a national state is to exist. Historical theories account for the dimensions of state-formation and state-building in Europe and its extension to the third world. Most applicable for the present research effort are developmental theories which encompass both modernization and political development. See Samuel P. Huntington, <u>Political Order in Changing Societies</u>, 1968; Charles Tilly (ed.), <u>The Formation of National States in Western Europe</u>, 1975, pp. 603-639.

[20]See Michael N. Barnett, <u>Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Israel and Egypt</u>, 1992, pp. 31-37.

[21]Ibid, p. 31.

[22]See Waltz, op. cit., 1979, pp. 194-195.

[23]See Joel S. Migdal, <u>Strong States and Weak Societies: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World</u>, 1988, pp. 22-23.

[24]For the importance of the concept of limited war as it applies to the Arab-Israeli conflict see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, <u>The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition: Case Study of Limited Local War</u>, 1980; Robert E. Osgood, <u>Limited War Revisited</u>, 1979; J. C. Garnett, "Limited War in the Nuclear Age," in Michael Howard (ed.), <u>Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict</u>, 1979.

[25]Osgood, op. cit., p. 15.

[26]For a discussion of bargaining and its role in limited conflicts see Schelling, op. cit., pp. 53-81.

[27]Such systems involve the deployment of advanced fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft systems, and sophisticated missiles, or a request for direct military assistance of advanced weapon systems from an external power. See Bar-Siman-Tov, op.