

**UN PEACEBUILDING
LIGHT FOOTPRINT OR FRIENDLY TAKEOVER?**

Nora Roehner

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*UN Peacebuilding:
Light Footprint or Friendly Takeover?*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Rebuilding societies from the outside after they have just overcome large-scale violence and atrocities is a highly complex undertaking. Even ending the violence and achieving medium-term reconciliation among different groups of people who have not long ago tried to kill each other is difficult – but ensuring that violence will not recur and that a society builds institutions to settle its conflicts with peaceful means is an intricate task. The process involves a multitude of actors and takes place at various levels and in different time frames.

In the public discourse on modern peacebuilding, the assumption prevails that the international community must invest more in post-conflict states and that it is all a matter of ambition to meet “the unprecedented challenges.”¹ It is demanded that missions, which are designed for implementing broad peacebuilding and institution building mandates, require immense capacities, in terms of sufficient manpower and resource endowments, and a longer-term perspective. Additionally, they would have to be vested with wide-ranging authorities to the point where external actors temporarily take on government functions and the administrative control over a state or territory in the absence of functioning local institutions. In his well-known report, Lakhdar Brahimi demanded that peace missions with the directive for civilian protection also need to be endowed with so-called robust mandates, which authorizes the military units to defend themselves and the objectives of the mission (Brahimi et al., 2000: 9f).

Policy trends and policy decisions often result from perceptions on singular events, mainly prominent successes or failures, and are not necessarily based on empirical facts. This study aims at providing such an empirical foundation for the peacebuilding discourse. Two questions arise that have yet not been systematically explored: First, was there indeed a trend in the capacities and authorities of peace missions? Can one statistically detect a gradual increase in the duration, the number of staff deployed – both military and civilian personnel –, the financial resources and executive functions of peace missions established after the end of the Cold War? Second, and more importantly, is the assumption justified that more of everything is the adequate response of the international community to internal conflicts? This is more than a purely academic inquiry. Not only could unwarranted or inappropriately designed interventions prolong human suffering but they would also deplete scarce international resources.

This study will provide comprehensive, well-grounded answers to both questions. First of all, it will track the evolution of interventions. External actors, especially the United Nations, have engaged in post-conflict environments for decades but only relatively recently, there has been a remarkable change in the nature and rationale of peace missions. Until twenty years ago, peace operations fulfilled the vital task of establishing an environment of safety and security after interstate wars. Today, international peace missions aim at far more than just ending wars. External actors have expanded their agendas and have taken on far-reaching responsibilities in post-conflict situations. Led by the imperative to resolve protracted conflicts within states in order to prevent the recurrence of violence, the focus has shifted

¹ Remarks of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to General Assembly in a thematic debate on “UN Peacekeeping - Looking into the Future” on 22 June 2010.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=864

from separating the conflict parties to bringing them together and supporting the process of reconciliation and reconstruction. In the 1990s, the UN started to actively implement comprehensive and multi-faceted peace agreements. Peacebuilding mandates have become multidimensional and include the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants into society, the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, human rights investigations, security sector reform and, ultimately, economic, political and social reform. Since state institutions have collapsed in many cases of intense civil wars, the reform and (re)building of institutions, sometimes from scratch, has become a standard tool in modern peacebuilding. Institution building aims at strengthening the civilian capacities of a society for resolving its conflicts.² It is mostly synonymous with democratization, although research has shown that the process of democratization itself entails the potential for renewed conflict (Collier, 2009; Hegre et al., 2001; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008b; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). Peacebuilding is a long-term process that involves a multitude of external actors, both military and civilian. All in all, the distinction between conflict prevention, peacekeeping, institutional reconstruction, and development cooperation has become blurred.

Over the past twenty years, the number of UN blue helmets in peace missions has increased tenfold: In every month of the year 2010, almost 100,000 troops, police, and military experts were deployed in 15 United Nations peace missions worldwide.³ This figure does not even include the more than 130,000 NATO troops in the UN-mandated operation in Afghanistan, the NATO force in Kosovo of just under 10,000, or other troop contingents provided by the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and others.⁴ In the last five years alone, the number of civilian staff in UN missions has doubled from around 1,000 to more than 2,000.⁵ Presently, the UN alone spends almost 8 billion US\$ annually⁶ on its peace missions; the budgets of the other organizations together are considerably larger.

This trend of a mounting engagement of external actors in post-conflict situations can be explained by a number of factors, including the altered nature of the conflicts from interstate to predominantly intrastate conflicts, the erosion of state sovereignty, and a 'responsibility to protect' by the international community together with an increased cooperation with and within the UN Security Council (Caplan, 2005). The renewed activism of the UN after the Cold War – in a phase when the number of active conflicts has actually decreased – is reflected in a number of documents on peacekeeping and peacebuilding published by the organization, including the Agenda for Peace, the Brahimi Report, or the World Summit Outcome Document. These documents critically assess the shortcomings of these undertakings and suggest new challenges and strategies.

In a second step, the study will take a close look at the modern peace missions since the end of the Cold War. It will present an innovative measure for mission intrusiveness. Despite its negative undertone, it is a value-neutral concept that depicts the extent of the involvement of

² To identify how the international community can mobilize and organize specific civilian capacities to assist post-conflict countries, the UN Secretary-General has established the Senior Advisory Group for the Review of International Civilian Capacities chaired by Jean-Marie Guéhenno in 2010.

³ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/>

⁴ For an overview on military deployments by various organizations, see the figure on Military Deployments in Global Peace Operations from 1998 to 2008 on p.3 in the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009 (CIC, 2009).

⁵ See part III.1.2.4.

⁶ See part III.1.2.5. In the fiscal year 2010 to 2011 the budget for peace mission was projected at US\$ 7.26 billion (A/C.5/64/19).

international actors in a post-conflict environment. Although data on mission scale size in terms of duration, manpower, and expenditures have been collected by other scholars (e.g. CIC, 2009, 2010a), these have not yet been combined into a single index and have also not been analyzed for their effects on the outcomes of peace missions. Also, mission size is only one aspect of intrusiveness: More important than the ‘visibility’ of the peacebuilders is the range of functions that they are mandated to take on. This work presents an original operationalization of the range of external decision-making authorities, termed mission scope. The more a peace mission has features of an international interim administration, the higher the level of external commitment in the post-conflict state. The indices of mission scale and scope are combined into a single index for mission intrusiveness. This is an expression of the weight and authority of the international community to act as a credible guarantor for those local actors who endorse the peacebuilding agenda and as an enforcer for those rejecting it. It will be shown that there has indeed been a trend of increasing intrusiveness levels in the 1990s – but the trend has been halted after the missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have not produced the desired results of a sustainable, democratic peace.

The study builds on previous work by Zuercher (2006) who is skeptical of the ability of highly intrusive peace missions to establish security and (democratic) statehood. So far, efforts to empirically examine the effect of mission scale and scope on peacebuilding outcomes have been rare. A notable exception is the study by Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) who find that, *ceteris paribus*, intrusive multidimensional peacekeeping operations, operationalized by the broadness of their mandates, were positively and significantly associated with peacebuilding success compared to traditional peacekeeping. One must note, however, that the results of their study suffer from some methodological flaws (see literature review).

One of the reasons that there are not more quantitative studies on peacebuilding might be the lack of appropriate research and analysis methods. Since the number of UN peace missions is relatively small with a total of 64 since 1948, most standard regression analyses cannot be performed. A more promising, yet widely underestimated approach is the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) that draws on Boolean logic. This study will present a statistical two-step fuzzy set QCA analysis of 22 modern peace missions. It uses the measures of mission scale and scope to detect their effects on peacebuilding success, conceptualized as security and statehood. The advantage of QCA over other statistical methods is that it combines the virtues of qualitative and quantitative research. QCA works with the notions of necessity and sufficiency and allows for the existence of ‘multiple causality’, i.e. a certain outcome can be produced by alternative, non-exclusionary paths. Thereby, it unravels complexity and detects intricate relationships between several causal factors and a specific outcome.

A major drawback of contemporary research on peacebuilding – both quantitative and qualitative research – is that it entirely ignores the context into which peace missions are deployed.⁷ As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said, “institutional change should not be approached as a technical exercise. Rather, it should be viewed and pursued within the broader context of a country’s political processes, development and social change.”⁸ Although policy makers seem to have learned from past experiences that the informed and demand-driven use of resources is more constructive than an unreasonable increase in mission size and

⁷ Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) include local capacities and the level of hostility in their analysis.

⁸ http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1048

intrusiveness, social science research does not offer any systematic evaluation of how the context matters.

The presumption in this study is that friendly takeover missions may lead to a successful outcome in some contexts but not in others. The same goes for light footprint missions that might be the right policy choice in some contexts but not in others. It is not per se a certain level of mission intrusiveness that leads to peacebuilding success in terms of security and statehood – but it is the design of the peace mission as an adequate response to the situation on the ground. When devising peace missions, it is crucial to match the intrusiveness of the peace mission with the respective context. Context refers to the intensity of the previous conflict, the demand of local actors for peace and peacebuilding, and the socio-economic development of the post-conflict state. All these factors were identified in the literature as having an effect on the termination of the conflict and the duration of peace, but so far they have rarely been analytically linked to peacebuilding strategies.

Mission intrusiveness is not a stand-alone concept. The new index also indirectly depicts the antagonism of mission intrusiveness and ‘local ownership.’ The concept of local participation and ownership originated in the development assistance community (OECD DAC, 1996) and has been adapted to peacebuilding. Many scholars argue that there is a principal tension between the promotion of autonomy, self-government, and democracy by means of outside control and oversight (e.g. Chesterman, 2004; Gutteri and Piombo, 2007; Paris and Sisk, 2007; Wilde, 2001). They claim that domestic actors must have the responsibility for both the process and the outcome of peacebuilding. The reasoning is that structures will not be effective and sustainable when they are imposed from the outside and do not correspond to the needs and values of the people in the host country. Peacebuilding can only be successful if local ownership is both the means and the goal of an intervention. At the same time, if local actors had the capacities and the will to rebuild their state themselves, there would not be the need for external assistance in the first place. Hence, the challenge in peacebuilding is to reconcile the needs for an intervention with the objective of fostering sovereignty and local ownership.

In order to qualitatively test the results of the fs/QCA analysis and to detect the effects of agency, two detailed case studies in the third part investigate the causalities of the relationship between the context, mission intrusiveness and local ownership, and peacebuilding outcomes. UNMIK in Kosovo was a transitional administration during which all government functions were taken on by international actors and were only gradually transferred to national institutions. UNMIL in Liberia, by contrast, was merely mandated to assist the Liberian government which formally had exclusive ownership of the peace and reform process. The two case studies examine the interaction process between external and domestic actors to identify societal follow-up conflicts that emerge during an intervention but that are not linked to the previous armed conflict (Bonacker et al., 2010). In the interplay between mission intrusiveness and local ownership, mutual perceptions of the asymmetric roles of international and national actors can make the difference between peacebuilding success and failure.

The overall results indicate that peacebuilding missions can establish security and statehood if the context conditions are favorable. In these cases, it does not even require a massive deployment of international troops but rather civilian reconstruction assistance. On the contrary, a large military presence and unwanted civilian interference can even work against security and statehood in cases of poor structural conditions. Domestic demand, both by the local elites in a post-conflict state and by the population, is necessary for peacebuilding

success. When a peace mission supports this demand with appropriate means and allows local actors to control the peace process and to develop their own political responsibilities, the prospects for sustainable peace are good.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This study makes an important contribution to the literature by relating the design of peace missions to the case-specific context in which they are deployed. So far, the two branches of research on peacebuilding and mission intrusiveness and on the context factors that shape the war end and the post-conflict environment have been kept more or less separate.

One branch of the literature focuses on the nature of peace missions. The scholarly literature has only relatively recently begun to thoroughly investigate the question of what peace missions can achieve. During the Cold War, when traditional peacekeeping missions were primarily deployed to interstate conflicts, the literature was mainly descriptive, provided historical overviews, and limited itself to detailed case studies (Burns and Heathcote, 1963; Harbottle, 1971; Higgins, 1969-1981; Rikhye, 1984; Traynor, 1988; Wainhouse, 1966, 1973).⁹ Following the revitalization of the UN and a renewed interest in peace missions in the early 1990s, the literature presented a number of comparative case studies in order to identify factors that contribute to success and failure (Baranyi and North, 1992; Barrata, 1989; Durch, 1994, 2006; Fleitz, 2002; Jett, 1999; Thakur and Thayer, 1995). During this period, the literature focused on new perspectives for UN peacekeeping (Biermann, 1994; Boulden, 1991; Clements and Wilson, 1994; Daniel and Hayes, 1995; Diehl, 1993; McDermott, 1994; Ratner, 1995; Renner, 1993; Rikhye and Skjelsbaek, 1990; Snider and Schwartzstein, 1995) and inspected other tools for conflict resolution that the international community has at its disposal, including peacemaking and humanitarian intervention (Bercovitch, 2002; Crocker et al., 2001; Finnemore, 2003; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003; Malanczuk, 1993; Sisk, 2001; Wheeler, 2000; Zartman and Rasmussen, 1997).

A ‘third wave’ of peacekeeping literature since the 2000s applies qualitative and quantitative methods to test the effectiveness of peace missions (see Fortna and Howard, 2008). This empirical research arrives at the broad consensus that international peace missions have a mixed record of ending civil wars but that they are indeed successful at maintaining peace and security once these have been established (Collier et al., 2004; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004, 2008a; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Greig and Diehl, 2005; Hartzell et al., 2001; Walter, 2002). Several studies have shown that the success rates of UN-led and non-UN-led missions are similar but that the UN was overall more likely to engage in more difficult conflicts (Haas, 1986; Heldt and Wallenstein, 2004; Howard, 2008).¹⁰

As one of a small number of studies, Dobbins et al. (2005; 2003) explore the question of whether the level of mission intrusiveness affects the outcome of post-conflict nation-building. Based on 15 in-depth case studies, the project compares the outcomes of UN-led and US-led nation-building missions. As a measure of external commitment and input to the nation-building efforts, the authors use the duration and manpower of the mission and per capita financial assistance during the mission. Overall, they find that the UN has a higher

⁹ An extensive list of English monographs, working papers, and reports on UN peacekeeping published between 1945 and 2002 is found at <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/pkeep.htm#N>.

¹⁰ In contrast, Regan (2002) finds that interventions by individual states in intrastate conflicts from 1944 to 1999 tended to extend expected durations of the conflicts rather than shorten them. Also, Dobbins et al. (2005: 249ff) argue that “U.S.-led operations have taken place in more-demanding circumstances” than UN-led nation-building operations.

success rate in terms of peace and democracy despite their shorter deployment durations, smaller contingents, and their comparatively low cost structure compared to US-led peace missions. This means that more assistance does not lead to better outcomes, rather quite the opposite. In contrast, Zuercher (2006) finds no link at all between the level of intrusiveness and peacebuilding success in his quantitative study of 17 recent major UN-led peacebuilding missions.

The few quantitative studies on peacebuilding are complemented by a substantial number of case studies on specific highly intrusive peacebuilding missions where UN peacebuilders have temporarily taken over some state functions or have even installed full international transitional administrations.¹¹ These cases are Bosnia (Barria and Roper, 2007; Bose, 2002; Chandler, 2000, 2006; Evenson, 2009; Gromes, 2007; Ignatieff, 2003; Solioz, 2007; Zaum, 2007); Kosovo (Ignatieff, 2003; King and Mason, 2006; Kramer and Dzihic, 2006; Narten, 2008; Rossbacher, 2004); East-Timor (Chopra, 2000, 2002; Myrntinen, 2009); and Afghanistan¹² (Cramer and Goodhand, 2002; Ignatieff, 2003; Nixon and Whitty, 2008; Sedra and Middlebrook, 2004; Suhrke, 2006). Most authors are skeptical of the effectiveness of these highly intrusive missions in establishing peace, statehood, and democracy. Indeed, none of them argues that the large footprint of any of the missions has produced a flawless democracy with well-functioning institutions.

Based on these case studies, a large body of literature since the 2000s discusses the difficulties and dilemmas involved in the ambitious effort of rebuilding states after conflict (Benard et al., 2008; Bertram, 1995; Bonacker et al., 2010; Chandler, 2006; de Zeeuw, 2001; Hill, 2002; Jones et al., 2005; Manwaring and Joes, 2000; Ottaway, 2002a, 2002b; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Pouligny, 2006; Reychler, 1999; Reychler and Pfaffenholz, 2001; Rittberger and Fischer, 2008; Stromseth et al., 2006). Call and Wyeth (2008) and others (Call and Cousens, 2008; Covey et al., 2005) argue that there is an inherent logical tension between the ambition of building a state and ensuring that violent conflict will not recur because institutional reforms are difficult to accomplish even in peaceful societies. Deep social divisions and the influence of spoilers (Stedman, 1997) make the process of institutional transformation after civil war an intricate undertaking.

Many scholars are very skeptical of the idea that external actors can build states and impose peace and democracy at all, regardless of their capacities (Bliesemann de Guevara and Kuehn, 2010). It is also argued that the process of institution building, which is in almost all cases tantamount to democratization, is itself inherently conflict-laden, and even more so in countries which have just overcome internal war (Collier, 2009; Hegre et al., 2001; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008b; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995a; Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). These authors suggest that post-conflict states usually lack strong institutional mechanisms to contain violence that might erupt in the course of electoral competition. Also, societies emerging from civil war are often highly polarized and divided, which risks turning elections, as one of the major elements of democracy, into a winner-takes-all contest and a competition for the ownership of the state (Kumar, 1997; Noel, 2005; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005; Sisk and Reynolds, 1998a; Snyder, 2000). When weighing between security and stability on the one hand and Western liberal democracy and free market economy on the other, external actors should opt for the former, many authors state (Ottaway, 2002a; Paris, 2004). De Zeeuw (2001) has also issued warnings for peacebuilders to be more

¹¹ On international transitional administrations, see e.g. Caplan (2005), Tansey (2009), Wilde (2001; 2004), and Zaum (2007).

¹² For an overview of publications on peacebuilding in Afghanistan, see <http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/?id=11&Publications>.

modest and to focus on readily achievable objectives of conflict management instead of provoking frustration and failure by aiming at wide-ranging democratic and socio-economic transition.

The analytical literature is divided on the level of external engagement that is conducive to successful statebuilding. Some authors bluntly advise to “let states fail” (Herbst and also Weinstein in Paris and Sisk, 2009: 12). Others argue strongly for a more active and intrusive role of the international community (Fearon and Laitin, 2004). Krasner (2005) even recommends that “shared sovereignty” arrangements might be a permanent option. In response to such demands, authors bring up two important points of caution. From a theoretical perspective, the complete take-over of state functions by external actors raises the question of the legitimacy of transitional administrations because the ends ostensibly collide with the means (Caplan, 2002, 2004; Chesterman, 2004; Guttieri and Piombo, 2007; Lemay-Hébert, 2009; Morphet, 2002). From a more practical perspective, the ‘statebuilding paradox’ points to the fact that highly intrusive missions negate their own ultimate goal of fostering self-government and independence by creating an environment of prolonged dependency (Nixon, 2007; Paris and Sisk, 2007: 11). The longer the post-conflict society is dependent on external assistance in the form of massive influx of international resources and technical expertise, the more difficulties it will have to build up its own governance structures. Based on these considerations, the above named authors imply that careful, less intrusive post-conflict peacebuilding is advisable.

In the last few years, the literature on peacebuilding has methodologically shifted somewhat from structure-based towards actor-based explanatory models. It became evident that quantitative studies, which treated the actions of international actors as independent variables and the outcome of the intervention as dependent variables, neglected the ‘intervened’ and the social system that is being created during an intervention. In a first strand of literature on peacebuilding from within a society, Lederach (1997), Pouligny (Pouligny, 2006; Pouligny et al., 2007) and others have turned the scholarly attention to the intervened societies and to the roles played by local interlocutors. The intention was to reveal how they can interact with the peacebuilders and how contributions from both must be coordinated. In a second strand of literature on the effects of peacebuilding on a society, Bonacker et al. (2010) argue that the intervention itself is de-linked from its original cause – the conflict – and creates its own dynamics and follow-up conflicts. Zuercher and his colleagues (Barnett and Zuercher, 2009; Zuercher, 2010; Zuercher and Narten, 2009) have developed a sophisticated model of the interaction processes between the peacebuilders and the local elites, where they find that the most likely outcome of peacebuilding is “compromised peacebuilding”. In this scenario, the peacebuilders provide resources and international legitimacy for state elites in exchange for stability. Reform will only be possible in a way that the interests of the local elites are protected. The optimal solution, Zuercher and his colleagues say, can only be achieved “if and only if peacebuilders come in with tremendous resources and a strong commitment to liberalization” (Barnett and Zuercher, 2009: 36).

The second branch of research concentrates on the effect of context factors on the termination of wars and the durability of peace without external involvement. There is a sizeable body of literature that examines context variables, such as war duration, the intensity of the war in terms of casualties and refugees, the type of war, the number of parties to the conflict, the circumstances of the termination of the war, its settlement characteristics, and socio-economic development. A number of quantitative studies have found that intense wars of long duration and with high levels of hostility are more difficult to settle (Collier et al., 2004; Cunningham,

2006; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Fearon, 2004; Fortna, 2004; Hartzell et al., 2001; Mason and Fett, 1996; Mattes and Savun, 2009; Oye, 1985; Regan, 2002; Regan and Aysegul, 2006; Walter, 2004), that the war is more durable when the conflict parties signed a peace agreement (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006), and that countries typically recover from war more easily when they have local capacities in terms of high socio-economic development (Collier, 1999; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004b; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006).¹³

Only very few authors have looked at both post-conflict contexts and the nature of peace missions in combination. In their pioneering study, Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006) investigate 124 civil war cases between 1944 and 1997 to identify both domestic and international factors that are conducive to stability and democracy. They look at the peacebuilding context in terms of level of hostility and local capacities. The residual level of hostility after the war is proxied by the number of deaths and displacements, the type of conflict, the number of hostile factions, the level of ethnic division, and the outcomes of the war. Local capacities are proxied by a set of socioeconomic measures of development, including GDP, energy consumption, and natural resource dependence. The measure for international capacities is an index of the mandate of peace operations and the amount of economic assistance.

The results of the study indicate that peace missions can foster peace by substituting for limited local capacities and mitigating factors that produce deep hostility. All else equal, traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement can end violence but they do not significantly enhance the prospect for durable peace and democracy. Intrusive multidimensional peacekeeping operations with a multitude of civilian functions, by contrast, have a significant positive effect on peacebuilding success, once the violence has ended. Intractable conflicts will necessitate both military enforcement and civilian peacebuilding.

One must note, however, that these results suffer from some debatable methodological choices. First, the authors' measure of intrusiveness is a rather crude one as it merely distinguishes between four types of UN peace missions: monitoring or observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. This classification does not take into account the de facto intrusiveness of the missions on the ground but only assesses their broadness according to the competencies of the UN laid down in the mandate and assumes that peace enforcement is the highest level of intrusion, while it can in fact be a simultaneous supplement to other peacebuilding tasks. Also, the authors have chosen very low thresholds for defining peacebuilding success: in the lenient version, the binary outcome variable 'success' only denotes the absence of violence, while in the strict version, peacebuilding success also requires a minimum standard of democracy. Yet, the democracy threshold is chosen so low on the Polity III scale that even cases, which are treated as successful outcomes, have explicit autocratic features.

Doyle and Sambanis conclude from their analysis that an international peace mission "improves the prospects for peace, but only if the peace operation is appropriately designed" (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 795). This statement is daring since the kind of analysis conducted by the authors does not allow for conclusions on the interaction of causal factors. Multivariate regression analysis computes the effect of each single independent variable on the outcome independently of the other independent variables. It suggests that each factor on its own has an impact on the outcome, regardless of the presence or absence of other factors.

¹³ For a detailed discussion of these context factors in the literature, see part III.2.4.

This study will circumvent this problem by using the fuzzy set method to analyze both context and mission-specific factors. Thereby it intends to bridge a gap and aims at making an important contribution to the existing literature. The shortage of quantitative studies on the relationship between context and mission design might not so much result from a lack of interest but supposedly rather from a lack of awareness of appropriate analytical tools and from gaps between different sub-disciplines in political science. The results of this analysis may negate or contradict the findings from the present literature that looks at context factors and peace mission design separately. In addition to the fs/QCA study, it will also offer two detailed cases studies to detect the mechanisms of the causal relationship and disclose problems of intervention societies. From the results of both analyses, policy recommendations can be deducted for decision-makers and practitioners.

III. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. Trends in Peace Missions

Not long ago, any interference in the internal affairs of a state was in essence deemed illegal behavior according to international standards. Although this imperative of non-intervention still applies today and is one of the guiding principles of international law and interstate conduct, it has lost its rigor in view of states in conflict, and especially when taking into account the plight of peoples affected by internal war. Today, external intervention in conflict situations is regarded as standard procedure in international politics and even as an obligation to protect people from the disastrous effects of war.

1.1. The Evolution of Interventions

The following outline is intended to map the historical evolution of external engagements in states to show that intrusiveness of interventions has followed certain trends. Although each intervention and each conflict case is unique and it is a cumbersome task to classify external engagements into rigid categories, this overview of terms and concepts serves as a useful guideline for the progression of debates and issues and gives a good impression of how intervention strategies have changed over time. The evolution¹⁴ of terms mirrors the historical circumstances at the time and gives an idea of the theoretical foundations of intrusiveness and the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a state. The different forms of interventions are arranged chronologically and, for the sake of giving a complete account of external interventions and the question of intrusiveness, are not necessarily confined to post-conflict situations.¹⁵

1.1.1. Military Occupation and Colonial Rule

On a continuum representing the degree of external authority and intrusion, military occupation, and its subclass of colonial rule, is found at the one extreme with maximum intrusiveness. Military occupation entails the occupation of sovereign territory by a state or group of states acting jointly and without the authorization of the United Nations or a similar body (Caplan, 2005: 3). This means that external actors intrude for any discretionary time period into another state without the consent of this state and without legal backing by an internationally legitimized authority. Historic examples include the numerous cases of African and Asian colonial occupation and the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II.

In regards to their level of influence, today's interventions resemble in many aspects historic cases of colonial administration and military occupation but they tend to take on a very different form. Military occupation¹⁶ and colonial rule were instruments to maximize the profits of only the intruders: resource extraction, exploitation of labor, the creation of new

¹⁴ Chesterman (2004: 48) uses the term 'evolution' intentionally as it should suggest "a process of natural selection inspired by essential unpredictable events."

¹⁵ For a graphical overview of typologies of peace operations used by different researchers see Durch (2006: 7).

¹⁶ excluding cases of post-war occupation like Germany and Japan

markets or the annexation of territory were the main objectives. The people in the occupied territory and their interests were completely neglected and mistreated, and many people lost their lives due to the horrors of colonial oppression.¹⁷

Although colonialism is today condemned as an international crime specifically for these objectives, present-day international transitional administration “is sometimes criticized for being colonial in character. [And] such criticism is often accurate” (Chesterman, 2004: 12).

1.1.2. Mandates and Trusteeships

In the aftermath of World War I, the notion of self-determination gained increasing appreciation in international relations. The newly established League of Nations provided a suitable framework for administering and supervising territories which had before the war been controlled by the defeated powers, namely German and Ottoman colonies. Although these former colonies were not administered by the League of Nations directly but by individual member states which were nominated by the League¹⁸, this framework guaranteed that the administering powers were legally obligated to comply with certain standards regarding the right to self-determination of the inhabitants in the mandated territory. The League of Nations decided on the maximum level of authority to be exercised by the administering power for each individual case. Still, the League of Nations mandates were in effect colonies of the victorious WWI powers whose sole obligation was to issue annual reports on the status of the territory. The territories under the League of Nations mandates were thus assigned to one of three categories (A to C) according to their level of development and their chances for independence.

The United Nations trusteeship system was established in 1945 as a successor to the League of Nations mandates system. At the time, the number of people in the territories categorized as non-self-governing amounted to approximately 750 million people (Chesterman, 2004: 37). That included the former mandated territories and the so-called non-self-governing territories which were administered by United Nations member states under Chapter XI of the Charter. All but one territory (South-West Africa) were transferred from League of Nations supervision to the newly-founded UN trusteeship system whose prime responsibility was to oversee non-self-governing territories and to do so in the best interests of the inhabitants.¹⁹

The rules of procedure and the objectives of the two systems differed substantially: First, the Trusteeship Council had greater competencies than the League of Nations to oversee and control the administering authorities. It could send missions to the trust territories, for example to monitor plebiscites or elections (Chesterman, 2004: 40). Second, while the League of Nations sought only to give independence to the best developed territories under Class A mandates, Chapter XII of the UN Charter expressly states that “[t]he basic objectives of the trusteeship system [...] shall be: [the] progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned [...]” (UN Charter, Chapter XII, Art. 76b). These objectives were achieved when Palau as the last non-self-governing territory was released into independence in 1994. For a second group of non-independent states under the auspices of the United Nations, the so-called non-self-governing territories

¹⁷ For a useful discussion of the legal framework for the law of occupation see Roberts (1984).

¹⁸ “[A]dvanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility” (Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919).

¹⁹ “[T]he interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount” (UN Charter, Chapter XI, Art. 73).

which were administered by member states of the United Nations, however, such a course towards self-determination was not envisaged in the Charter. The administering powers were merely obliged to “accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories” (UN Charter, Chapter XI, Art. 73).

Although there was increasing disapproval of colonialism and military occupation during the decades of the Cold War, the practice of the trusteeship system and even more so the practical management of the non-self-governing territories through the United Nations in effect resembled the manners of colonial rule regarding the level of external influence. The promotion of self-determination of non-sovereign peoples and a restraint on external authority were generally appreciated as noble causes but political constraints hampered the full realization of these concepts. The differentiation between territories under the trusteeship system and non-self-governing territories was mainly an accommodation to the colonial interests of the British Empire (Chesterman, 2004: 45). The people in the territories of both groupings were given only very limited opportunities to raise their voices and to take part in the political processes of their societies.

1.1.3. Traditional Peacekeeping

Unlike the mandates and trusteeship systems, the UN’s peacekeeping actions are based on consent and cooperation between the interveners and the intervened. The increase in the number of peacekeeping missions in concordance with more non-self-governing countries being released into independence denoted a beginning trend toward less intrusive and more consent-based interventions in states.

Until the 1990s, peacekeeping was the United Nation’s customary instrument for dealing with threats to international peace and security. During the Cold War, when wars were predominantly fought between states, the United Nation deployed UN military observers, lightly armed military and/or police personnel and additional small numbers of civilian support staff in conflict settings in order to “help control and resolve armed conflicts” (Goulding, 1993: 452). UN peacekeepers were typically deployed when a peace agreement had already been concluded between the belligerents – when there was a peace to keep. Thus, the objective of these traditional peacekeeping missions was primarily to oversee a settlement agreement. Peacekeepers’ tasks were mainly restricted to monitoring ceasefires or setting up and controlling buffer zones between former combatants. Peacekeeping was therefore not applied to actively solve the roots of a conflict but only to separate the conflict parties and to contain the threat of a conflict (Bellamy et al., 2010; Connaughton, 2001; Hill and Malik, 1996; Rikhye, 1984; Thakur, 2001).

The legal basis for UN peacekeeping is found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter which deals with “Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression” (UN Charter, Chapter VII). It states that all discretion regarding peacekeeping operations rests with the UN Security Council. The guiding principle for the Security Council in its decision to take coercive action is the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. Only if no other non-violent measures (UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art. 41, 42) are sufficient to give effect to its decisions can the Security Council mandate the use of military force and any other action it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art. 42).

According to Goulding (1993: 453-454), traditional UN peacekeeping efforts are characterized by five distinct features: First, peacekeeping operations are run within a United Nations framework. This means that they are “established by one of the legislative organs of the United Nations; they [are] under the command and control of the Secretary-General, who acted with authority delegated to him by the Security Council and reported regularly to the Council; and their costs [are] met collectively by the member states as 'expenses of the Organization' under Article 17 of the Charter.” Second, peacekeeping operations require the consent of all parties to the conflict in question. This usually implies that the conflict parties have already negotiated a peace agreement and in most cases address the United Nations for assistance in overseeing the implementation of these accords. Third, the guiding principle for all peacekeeping operations is impartiality, which means that peacekeepers must not take any action or even give the impression to favor the interests of one party over those of the other(s). Fourth, as the United Nations does not maintain a standing army, it has to rely on member states' contingents of national armed forces for peacekeeping staff. Under the Charter, member states are not obliged to provide troops to the organization which often makes the planning and implementation of peacekeeping operations a tedious effort and creates considerable constraints on the realization of ambitious peacekeeping objectives. The fifth and most prominent principle of UN traditional peacekeeping is the minimum use of force. Peacekeepers are bound to use force only to the minimum extent necessary, which was commonly interpreted as to be constrained to acts of self-defense. However, the notion of self-defense has been subject to flexible interpretation. Peacekeepers can act in self-defense and accordingly open fire in situations when they are prevented by armed persons to fulfill their mandate.

Due to the principles of impartiality, consent and minimum use of force and due to the fact that they were only deployed after peace has officially been established, UN peacekeepers were mostly welcomed by the former adversaries and the populations in the conflict states. The level of intrusiveness of traditional peacekeeping operations was moderate.

1.1.4. Multidimensional Peacebuilding

The traditional concept of peacekeeping proved to be insufficient for dealing with new types of wars that emerged after the end of the Cold War (Hoffman, 2006; Kaldor, 1999; Muenkler, 2002). Since the early 1990s, wars have predominantly been fought within states instead of between states with insurgent groups challenging the government and the state with violent means. This changing context confronted the United Nations with the need to rethink its peace strategies and concentrate on actively assisting countries to make the transition from war to sustainable peace.

This new generation of peacekeeping is often referred to as multidimensional peacebuilding. Led by practical demands rather than guided by theoretical considerations, the UN in the 1990s took on the task of actively implementing increasingly comprehensive and multi-faceted peace agreements instead of just overseeing their implementation by the parties to the conflict. Generally, peacebuilding mandates include the monitoring and/or administration of post-conflict elections, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, human rights investigations, security sector reform and, ultimately, economic, political and social reform (Paris and Sisk, 2007: 2).

In tackling these tasks, the UN was required to divert its focus from the predominantly military orientation of traditional peacekeeping, where the peacekeepers' core function was to separate the conflict parties, to more consensus-oriented activities where the UN brings together the conflict parties on their own territory to end the conflict amicably and to manage the consequences of the conflict through joint efforts. This strong civilian component is no longer just a complement to traditional peacekeeping activities – like humanitarian assistance was – but an important activity field of its own with specifically trained personnel (Drews, 2001).

The term 'peacebuilding' was coined by Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 "Agenda for Peace".²⁰ As outlined in paragraph 55 of the document, the overarching aim of all peacebuilding efforts is "to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: para. 55). Creating such structures entails a commitment not only to reverse the effects of war but to (re)establish political arrangements "for the institutionalization of peace" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: para. 49), provide economic security, and foster human development. These increasing demands by post-conflict societies to receive assistance in the reconstruction of state and society structures have not only created practical challenges to the United Nations regarding the conduct of such missions but have also fueled a scholarly debate about the legitimacy of peacebuilding missions and the legal foundations of interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.

If the government of a state requests the assistance of the United Nations and gives its consent to post-conflict peacebuilding activities, there are no legal or moral predicaments. But in a post-conflict setting, it may be unclear which conflict group must be addressed as the government to request authorization for the deployment of a peace mission. The former government was most often involved in the fighting as one of the factions when the conflict itself was a contest for governmental power. Thus, in the face of major humanitarian crises and large-scale human suffering, the international community has resorted to broadening the reading of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and interpret internal armed conflicts and even humanitarian crises and cases of internal turmoil, such as Haiti, and the subsequent collapse of state institutions as threats to international peace and security which warrants coercive military action without the consent of the host state (Caplan, 2005: 6; Chesterman, 2004: 2). The moral grounds for this extended interpretation of the Charter and the so-called 'new interventionism' (Chesterman, 2004: 2; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006: 5ff) is the "Responsibility to Protect". The report of an independent commission led by Evans and Sahnoun states that the international community has the obligation to protect a people and guarantee human rights standards and adherence to humanitarian law if the government of a state fails to do so (Evans et al., 2001).²¹

To take this argument a step further means to extend the responsibility to protect to a responsibility to rebuild. The assumption is that withdrawing the troops that halted the fighting without further engagement would put at risk the consolidation of the peace. The responsibility to rebuild entails a sincere commitment by the external actors to establish conditions in which security can be guaranteed in the long run. As state structures are usually at a breakdown at the end of an internal war, the genuine commitment, therefore,

²⁰ For an overview of related concepts and terms see Call and Cousens (2008: 4).

²¹ The recommendations of the commission were incorporated into the UN reform process and endorsed in the reports of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565 of 2004) and Kofi Annan's report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (A/59/2005 of 2005).

encompasses nothing less but the (re)creation of state structures, the promotion of good governance and sustainable development (Evans et al., 2001: 39ff) in order to build durable peace and guarantee long-term protection. Chesterman says that “a post-intervention strategy is both an operational necessity and an ethical imperative” (Chesterman, 2004: 246).

With the beginning of the new millennium, the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and long-term post-conflict engagement has thus replaced the principle of non-interference (Finnemore, 2003; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003; Malanczuk, 1993; Wheeler, 2000). The willingness to intervene on humanitarian grounds also signaled a renewed willingness to use force if needed. Robust peacekeeping that has the legal provisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to respond to violence in order to fulfill its mandate of political and civilian peacebuilding has become a legitimate tool of the UN. While impartiality and the use of minimum force remain basic principles of humanitarian intervention, the consent of the conflict parties has been waived as an unconditional prerequisite for the deployment of a peace mission (Brahimi et al., 2000: 9). Yet, it is intended that “peacekeepers will never lose sight of the objective of sustaining or restoring consent in the interests of the long-term demands of peacebuilding” (Hansen et al., 2004: 7).

The UN responded to the changed demands on the ground with some alterations to its organizational proceedings. First, a number of peacebuilding missions have been administered by the UN’s Department of Political Affairs (DPA) rather than by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). DPA was originally concerned with political analysis and policy planning, whereas DPKO carried out the peace missions in all their practical aspects. In his 1997 report on UN reform, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan designated DPA to be the focal point for post-conflict peacebuilding and statebuilding and thereby manifested an organizational as well as an ideological adjustment (Annan, 1997: para. 121). Although DPA cooperates closely with DPKO, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and other UN bodies, peacebuilding and statebuilding have become core functions of DPA. The department also performs a variety of related tasks, including electoral assistance, the cooperation with regional and other international organizations, policy planning and policy coordination, and even gender mainstreaming.

Second, two of the UN’s missions since 1991 were mandated by the General Assembly and not by the Security Council. The operations in Guatemala and Haiti²² entailed genuine peacebuilding elements like human rights monitoring and institution building. Since the General Assembly does not, according to the UN Charter, have any discretion regarding peacekeeping operations, these operations did not have a military component nor were they designed to be combined with any of the traditional peacekeeping tasks (Drews, 2001: 186).

Third, in order to formalize and streamline the UN’s peacebuilding efforts, the General Assembly and the Security Council jointly established the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005. Its main purposes are the following (S/RES/1645 (2005) and A/RES/60/180):

- To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

²² MICIVIH, the International Civilian Mission in Haiti, was established through GA Resolution 47/20 on 20 April 1993 at the request of President Aristide and was mandated to observe the human rights situation in Haiti; MINUGUA, the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala, was established through GA Resolution 48/267 on 19 September 1994 to verify the peace agreement between the government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca.

- To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

The idea was to fill an institutional gap. Peacebuilding is neither specifically included in the UN Charter nor was it officially embedded in the UN's institutional proceedings. However, owing to the dispute regarding its establishment and especially regarding the controversial question of membership to the Organizational Committee, the Peacebuilding Commission has yet to prove to be an efficient tool for attending to the long-term requirements of post-conflict countries. At the time of writing, only four post-conflict countries were on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic).²³ Intended to tie capacities, experiences, and resources of various actors and agencies, the main accomplishment of the Peacebuilding Commission has so far been to bring international attention to the issue of peacebuilding and to the challenges and tasks associated with it. Together with the Peacebuilding Commission, the General Assembly, and the Security Council created the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office. Countries which are not on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission may receive funding for specific projects through the Peacebuilding Fund. As of February 2010, more than a hundred projects in 15 countries were supported with a total of project allocations of nearly 200 million US\$.²⁴

Fourth, in response to the challenge of having operational objectives that are no longer limited to enforcing or overseeing peace accords but that entail a range of development activities, the UN has designed its latest peace missions as so-called "integrated missions". The concept was introduced by Eide et al. (2005) who conducted an independent study for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The idea of integrated missions is to "[subsume] various actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework" (Eide et al., 2005: 14). In order to use the comparative advantages of the UN system, the UN's various specialized agencies and other donors²⁵ are integrated into the overall mission structure under the common leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). By pooling resources and increasing the level of coordination, this structure is intended to improve mission efficiency and effectiveness. In addition, UN missions coordinate closely with other international, intergovernmental and regional organizations. Organizations like the European Union, the OSCE and ECOWAS regularly contribute personnel, resources and expertise to UN-led peacebuilding missions.

²³ Countries can only be included on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission if their governments express an interest to do so; there cannot be referrals against the wish of the respective government.

²⁴ The 15 supported countries are Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Timor Leste, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. <http://www.unpbf.org/index.shtml>

²⁵ The largest UN agency in integrated missions is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); others are United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO) etc.