

Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era

Edited by

İdris Bal

Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era

Copyright © 2004 Idris Bal
All rights reserved.

BrownWalker Press
Boca Raton, Florida
USA • 2004

ISBN: 1-58112-423-6

BrownWalker.com

Editor

İdris Bal was born in Kütahya (Turkey) in 1968. Between 1985-1989, he studied Political Science at Istanbul University. After graduation, he became a research assistant at the Police Academy, Faculty of Security Sciences (a state University) in Ankara and continued his studies in the Politics Department of Nottingham University, UK. He received his MA in International Relations in September 1992. Then, he studies in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Manchester University and received his Ph.D. degree in 1998. After he returned to Turkey, he was appointed as Assistant Professor Dr. in 1998. He was deputy editor of Journal of Police Sciences (Polis Bilimleri Dergisi) between 2001- 2003. “Fulbright” awarded him a scholarship and he studied at Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University in the term 2003-2004. He worked on “Place of Turkey in US Foreign Policy After 11 September Attacks and Cooperation Against Terrorism”. He is currently lecturer at Faculty of Security Sciences, Police Academy (a state university) in Ankara. He is also lecturing in Institute of Social Sciences (master courses) in Atılım University (a private university) in Ankara. He has four published books; *Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publications, 2000, 232 pages; (Ed.), *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy at the Threshold of the 21. Century)*, Istanbul: Alfa Publications, 2001, 732 pages; (Co-ed.), *Dünden Bugüne Türk Ermeni İlişkileri (Turkish Armenian Relations from the Past to the Present)*, Ankara: Nobel Publications, 2003, 734 pages; (Ed.), *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21. Century)*, Ankara: Nobel Publications, 2004, 994 pages, (revised and expanded version of the second book). He has several articles on Turkish Foreign Policy, Eurasian social, political and economic developments, World Politics, Turkish-US-EU relations, Islam, Middle East and terrorism. His research interests include world politics, US foreign policy, Turkish foreign policy, global rivalries, hydrocarbon issues, Islam and politics, and global terrorism.

Contents

<i>Foreword</i>	VII
<i>Ersin Onulduran</i>	
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	IX
<i>İdris Bal</i>	
Introduction	1
<i>İdris Bal</i>	
1. Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814-2003	5
<i>Cengiz Okman</i>	
2. Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints	27
<i>Ramazan Gözen</i>	
3. Impacts of International Capital Flows to Turkish Economy During the 90's.....	53
<i>Saziye Gazioglu & Erol Bulut</i>	
4. Turkey and the World in the 21st Century.....	79
<i>Faruk Sönmezoglu</i>	
5. Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities.....	97
<i>Hüseyin Bağcı & İdris Bal</i>	
6. Turkey-USA Relations and Impacts of 2003 Iraq War	119
<i>İdris Bal</i>	
7. The European Union and Turkey	153
<i>İbrahim S. Canbolat</i>	
8. “Turkestroika” as Precondition for Turkey’s European Dream.....	165
<i>Dirk Rohtus</i>	
9. The Role of Turkish Migration and Migrants in Turkey’s Relations With the EC/EU	181
<i>Fulya Kip Barnard</i>	

10. Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security.....	197
<i>Mustafa Türkes</i>	
11. The Cyprus Question Between 1974 and 2004 and its Relation to Turkish Foreign Policy.....	211
<i>Nasuh Uslu</i>	
12. Turkey and Russia	253
<i>Victor Panin & Henry Paniev</i>	
13. Turkey and the Caucasus.....	269
<i>Zeyno Baran</i>	
14. Turkey's Relations with the Turkic Republics.....	291
<i>Gül Turan, İlter Turan & İdris Bal</i>	
15. Turkish Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument in Post Cold War Era: The Cases of Turkic Republics and the Post September 11th Era	327
<i>İdris Bal</i>	
16. Instability in the Middle East and the Relevant Role of the PKK.....	347
<i>İdris Bal</i>	
17. Turkey's Middle East Challenges: Towards a New Beginning?	363
<i>Meliha Benli Altunışık</i>	
18. Politics of the Euphrates and Tigris Waters.....	379
<i>H. Bülent Olcay</i>	
19. Opening the Closed Window to the East; Turkey's Relations with East Asian Countries	401
<i>Deniz Ülke Arıboğan</i>	
20. Post- September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited	421
<i>Hüseyin Bağcı & Saban Kardas</i>	
<i>Contributors</i>	457
<i>Index</i>	459

Foreword

Ersin Onulduran,

*Professor of International Relations,
Faculty of Political Science, Ankara University*

There is an oft used saying in Turkish, which can be roughly translated as: “It is not easy being a Turk”. I think this expression summarizes the feelings of some of the observers of Turkish foreign policy upon hearing about yet another set back for Turkey in the international arena. All has not been bad for Turkey’s foreign policy, however. Like the proverbial Phoenix rising from the ashes of the devastated Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish Republic rose in importance and effectiveness in world affairs through the 80 years of its existence. Looking at Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of 2004, it would not be unfair to say that Turkey’s fortunes are on the rise in the world, and that the foreign policy establishment can take much of the credit for this rise in prestige and importance since, especially the end of the Cold War.

This new book, a collection of essays on various aspects of Turkey’s foreign policy, has a good balance between theory, diplomatic history and analyses of current Turkish concerns. Its main focus is the post World War II. period, but references are made to the Ottoman past and the first years of the Republic as well.

The emphasis of the book, of course, is on the post-Cold War era. This is one of the first systematic treatments of that period of Turkish foreign policy. As the reader will quickly be able to tell, there are a variety of perspectives among the authors. The geographic areas treated are also wide and far-reaching. The chapter on Turkey and the Far East, for example deals with an area, which is not often seen in books on Turkish foreign policy. I was impressed also by the fact that the subjects treated were diverse. Issues related to Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership were addressed alongside Turkey’s relations with countries of the Balkans and the Republics of Central Asia.

It is important that any book on foreign policy that aims to explain the foreign policy of a country not confine itself to a single and narrow geographic perspective. In this book, the regional and global issues are treated with equal breadth and depth. Although Turkey is medium sized regional power, it is in many ways affected by global political happenings and it, in turn, affects global issues. Turkey’s ultimate help with the U.S. lead coalition effort in the Iraqi campaign will have far reaching effects for the region and for the image of the U.S. as the leader of the Western Alliance. Here is an example: Turkish - American relations appeared to suffer a small set back when The Turkish parliament failed to pass a resolution to permit the U.S. forces to pass through the country to open a northern front in Iraq in March of 2003. However, this small rift was mended relatively quickly, when Turkish policies began to change smoothly to help the Coalition effort in other ways including permitting logistic and humanitarian help and an offer to send Turkish troops to sent to Iraq, which was not taken up by the United States.

All this and more are competently dealt with by the authors in the various chapters of the book.

I am confident that both the interested general public and the specialists seeking a new perspective on Turkey's recent foreign policy actions will find this book very useful. It will be a reference book on post Cold War Turkish foreign policy matters for some time to come.

Ankara, April 2004

Acknowledgments

This book analyzes Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War era. There are twenty articles by twenty one authors in the book. I would like to thank all of them for taking part in this comprehensive project. I have received help and encouragement from many people in the preparation of this book. I would like to thank Ersin Onulduran for his encouragement and writing a foreword for the book. I would like to thank also Hüseyin Bağcı, Gül Turan, İlder Turan, Victor Panin, Cemal Kafadar, Saziye Gazioğlu, Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, Mustafa Türkeş, Ramazan Gözen, Cengiz Başak, Veysel Karani Bilgiç, Bülent Olcay for their help and encouragement in different stages of the preparation of the book.

Abdullah S. Eyles and his wife Zülfiye Eyles, Fikret Işık and Nejat Kumral provided assistance in the proofreading stage of the work. Hilal Şahin and Zehra Çobanoğlu helped me in typesetting of the book. Mesut Muhammed Solak and Ömer Yılmaz helped me in the preparation of final manuscript as well. I am grateful to all of them. I also would like to thank Brown Walker Press and Jeff Young for their cooperation in the preparation of the book.

I wish this book would be helpful to everyone who is interested in international relations, world politics, the Middle East and Turkey in particular.

İdris Bal

Ankara, April 2004

idrisbal@fulbrightweb.org

Introduction

İdris Bal

With the end of the Cold War discipline the world has entered a new era. Parameters have changed; new handicaps as well as new opportunities have been created for countries. Turkey, as a neighbor of the former USSR, a member of NATO and located at the center of a sensitive region covered by Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East, has been radically affected by the end of the Cold War. Turkey has lost some of her bargaining cards in the new era and therefore has needed new arguments. This need encouraged Turkey to take active steps in the post Cold War era. This comprehensive book focuses on Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War era. However, apart from historical background given at the beginning of most of the chapters, there is a chapter at the beginning of the book that summarises Turkish foreign policy since the Ottoman Empire. Books on Turkish foreign policy usually focus on Turkish relations with the West and the USA. However, all regions including Asia are taken under consideration in this book. This book analyzes Turkey's relations with the US, the EU, the Balkans, the Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia and Far East Asian countries. At the same time, effects of economic crises and domestic developments on foreign policy, the Turkish model in Turkish foreign policy, water conflict, the Cyprus question, and the Kurdish problem are all analyzed.

There are twenty chapters in this book. The book begins with a Foreword by Prof. Dr. Ersin Onulduran. The first chapter belongs to Cengiz Okman; *Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules and Trends, 1814-2003*. The chapter gives a comprehensive framework for Turkish foreign policy from the Ottoman Empire up to present time and serves as a background chapter of the book.

Ramazan Gözen's chapter *Turkish Foreign Policy in Turbulence of the Post Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints*, focuses on the external and internal environment and their implications for foreign policy. Gözen initially analyzes the new characteristics of the external environment as far as its implications for Turkey are concerned. Then, he analyses responses of the domestic environment in so far as their implications for foreign policy. Finally, he focuses on patterns in Turkish foreign policy during the 1990s.

The third chapter, *Impacts of International Capital Flows to Turkish Economy During the 90's*, belongs to Saziye Gazioglu and Erol Bulut. This chapter focuses on economic crises in Turkey. Initially, the authors give an account of the Turkish economy after 1980. Then, they discuss the 1994 economic crisis. Finally they examine the November 2000 and the February 2001 crisis in Turkey.

The following chapter belongs to Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Turkey and the World in the 21st Century*. Sönmezoğlu initially analyses the basic characteristics of International politics in the 21st Century and then he focuses on the main characteristics of the Turkish Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. He emphasizes in his chapter: "Turkish foreign policy

in the 21st century must not be simply reactive, but rather more proactive and more carefully planned. Within the goals of maximum interest and minimum conflict, these are the fundamental elements of a successful foreign policy aiming to reach targets with minimum cost.”

The fifth chapter, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities*, belongs to Hüseyin Bağcı and myself (İdris Bal). This chapter analyzes Turkish foreign policy in terms of new problems and opportunities in the post Cold War era. To this end, firstly changing parameters and problems for Turkey are underlined, and then new opportunities for Turkey and Turkey’s strategic importance are analyzed.

The following chapter is my own, *Turkey-USA Relations and Impacts of the 2003 Iraq War*. This chapter analyzes factors that encouraged Turkey and the US for further cooperation in the post Cold War era. Then, the role of the 2003 Iraq War (third Gulf War) and its implications for US-Turkish relations are taken under consideration. There is a discussion in the concluding part of the chapter regarding the implications of the Iraq War and the future of Turkish-US relations. In fact although there is one chapter on Turkish-US relations, because of the position of the US in world politics and close relations between Turkey and the US, the impact and role of the US in Turkish relations is also examined in other chapters.

The following three chapters are related with EU-Turkish relations. Turkish Relations with the EU is at the top of the Turkish political agenda. Turkey expects to get a date in this year to begin negotiations with the EU for full membership. Therefore, relations between Turkey and the EU are examined from three different perspectives in this book. İbrahim Canbolat’s chapter *The European Union and Turkey* analyses the formation and the systematic feature of the European Union and then the relationship between Turkey and the EU are considered.

Dirk Roelants’ chapter “*Turkestroika*” as Precondition for Turkey’s European Dream, analyzes the Turkish system as well as Turkey’s relations with the EU. He initially focuses on the foundations of the State, and some of the handicaps of the present system, then he analyses the Turkish ambition to become a full member of the EU. In doing this, he makes special reference to especially the Kurdish question and political Islam in Turkey.

The third chapter related with the EU belongs to Fulya Kip; *The Role of Turkish Migration and Migrants in Turkey's Relations With the EC/EU*. She analyzes Turkish migration to the EU in detail. She discusses some issues such as basic characteristics of Turkish migration, factors affecting Turkish migration, evaluation of Turkish migration, changing role of migration in Turkey’s relations with the EU.

Mustafa Türkeş’s chapter *Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Balkans: Quest for Enduring Stability and Security*, sketches out the underlying factors which played significant roles in the process of the formation of Turkey’s Balkan policy, and then identifies and analyzes the foreign policy strategy taken up by the Turkish governments, and finally discerns continuity and change in Turkey’s Balkan policy from 1990 to 2003.

Nasuh Uslu’s chapter *The Cyprus Question Between 1974 and 2004 and Its Relation to Turkish Foreign Policy* examines the Cyprus problem from the beginning up to the present time. He examines recent events related to the Cyprus issue with constant

references to views, interests and interventions of the concerned powers. Especially the Turkish and American actions and approaches are the main focus of the study. Uslu concludes “it has become clear that the Greek Cypriots have expected to dominate the whole island by using their membership in the EU, which they secured regardless of the result of the referendum. The Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots have accepted to make concessions for the sake of integration with the European Union, but the Greek Cypriots, relying on their secured membership in the EU, have chosen not to solve the problem by making some sacrifices.”

Victor Panin and Henry Paniev’s chapter *Turkey and Russia*, analyzes Turkish-Russian relations. They focus on new bases for relationship, the Caucasus, cooperation in the Middle East, role of Islam, perspectives of the Russian Turkish relations on the civilizational level respectively. They emphasize new opportunities and possibilities of cooperation between two countries in post Cold War era.

Zeyno Baran’s chapter *Turkey and the Caucasus*, focuses on Turkey’s relations with Russia and the countries of Caucasus; Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. She focuses on energy issues and the American factor and also US-Turkish cooperation. Her chapter ends with policy suggestion regarding the problems of the region.

The chapter by Gül Turan, İltir Turan and myself (İdris Bal), *Turkey’s Relations with the Turkic Republics* focuses on Turkey’s relations with the Turkic states. The chapter initially outlines the historical background, then, the evolution of relations between Turkey and the Turkic republics are analyzed. The relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Turkic states of Central Asia are analyzed through three stages. High levels of optimism and expectations about the future mark the first stage. The second comprises the period of the mutual discovery of constraints that helped define the limits of the relationship. The third stage is described as the routinization of the relationship.

The following chapter is my own chapter; *Turkish Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument in Post Cold War Era: The Cases of Turkic Republics and the Post September 11th Era*. The chapter outlines the position of Turkey during and after the Cold War era and identifies what is meant by the term 'Turkish Model'. Then, it focuses on the rise of the Turkic republics with the end of the USSR and analyzes Western support for the Turkish model, Turkish policies towards those republics and their reactions. Finally it makes emphasis on Turkey and the Turkish model in the post September 11 era, and the importance of cooperation between the US and Turkey against terrorism. It concludes, “It is very likely that a successful Turkish model will attract other Islamic countries and serve for peace and cooperation in the world, but not as a model developed around her present-day characteristics - a far cry from the ideal.”

Turkey is a European country as well as a Middle Eastern country. The Middle East is famous for its instability and this instability also has several implications for Turkey. Therefore, the following three chapters are related with the Middle East. The chapter *Instability in the Middle East and the Relevant Role of the PKK* is my own chapter. It outlines and analyzes the factors that prepare instability in the Middle East. Then, the contribution of the PKK’s (Kurdish Workers Party) to instability in the region, are briefly examined. It is emphasized in the chapter that there are several reasons related with cultural, social, economic, and strategic conditions of the region that create instability.

Meliha Benli Altunışık's chapter *Turkey's Middle East Challenges Towards a new Beginning* focuses on Turkey's policy towards the Middle East in general in the post Cold War era. Regarding the problems that Turkey faces in her policy towards the era, she, for instance, underlines that "On the one hand, Turkey is sometimes criticized for its 'disinterest in the Middle East' and 'severing its ties with the region'. On the other hand, when Turkey is active in the region there are apprehensions about its role. It is either considered as a 'Western stooge' or 'trying to impose a hegemony', political, military and economic".

The third chapter about the Middle East belongs to H. Bülent Olcay, *Politics of the Euphrates and Tigris Waters*. He focuses on the water issue between Turkey, Syria and Iraq. He examines the purpose of Turkey's water management projects and its influence on relations with her neighbors, the effect of water on Turkey's position in the Middle East and other important foreign policy matters related with the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.

Deniz Ülke Arıboğan's chapter *Opening the Closed Window to the East; Turkey's Relations with East Asian Countries* examines Turkey's relations with Far East Asian countries. She concludes, "by building moderate relations and maintaining a trustworthy profile, Turkey can build a perfect bridge between East and West, between Turks and Asians and between Muslims and non-Muslims creating an accord rather than a clash of civilizations."

The last chapter of the book belongs to Hüseyin Bağcı and Saban Kardas; *Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited*. This chapter analyzes the debate surrounding Turkey's increasing strategic importance in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks on Washington and New York. The chapter analyses from different perspectives that following the September 11 attacks, the importance of Turkey increased in world politics. They, for instance, argue that "The conventional importance attributed to Turkey's strategic value became more visible following the events of September 11, and consequently Turkey has come under the spotlight. As a result, Turkey and Turkish foreign policy started to receive great interest, and the mood in the discussions about Turkey and Turkey's strategic importance was usually optimistic."

1 Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814-2003

Cengiz Okman

From a methodological point of view, foreign policy is a very particular field of study of overlapping perspectives, and in general terms it can be conceived as a never-ending phenomenon of a specific unit, namely the state. It is through such a process that the state constantly tries to adjust itself to its ever-changing environment¹ in a manner to coincide with its internal process of differentiation.² Outcomes of these processes are of vital importance to any state providing it with the chance of survival in a desirable way and direction. For this reason, both processes are supposed to be underlined by consciously designed purposeful systematic activities. These activities are defined in accordance with certain rules and principles—whether or not they are officially declared.³ By the very nature of the concerned organisms -- here the states -- these internal and external orientations can be evaluated in accordance with specific rules and evolve along with certain principles. However, in clarifying foreign policy principles, the determination of the essential characteristics of the system prevailing during each, period under analysis deserves particular attention since related principles are usually constructed with reference to structural imperatives.

On the Conceptual Framework

Turkish foreign policy can be visualized in its historical depth since its systemic regularities have been functionalised in the course of a long differentiation process in periodic cycles, also marked by occasional transformation periods. In this sense the 19th century is the remarkable period providing us with the basic facts in drawing some conclusions consistent with the

¹ One way or the other, either -- for instance, in Grotian terms--by diplomatically tracing a path by abiding with the rules of “material-physical” and “moral” conditions or in Machiavellian terms, by taking such norms as flux or change, fear and greed, negotiating from strength and techniques of bargaining into consideration, or sometimes tracing completely the Kantian path, the “state” undergoes a process of adjustment. The main objective for the “state” – in trying to trace such styles and ways of diplomacy (in the sense of foreign policy) – is to adapt itself to the requirements of the environment imposed upon itself. On these terms see, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, “Theory of Diplomacy”, Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter, (Eds.), *Diplomacy*, London: Leicester University press, 1990, pp.180-205.

² Such a differentiation is not limited to specific sections; on the contrary, it extends over entire segments of the socio-political order. On the concept of differentiation in this sense see, D.D. Katz and R.L. Kahn, “Common Characteristics of Open Systems,” F.Emery (Ed.), *Systems Thinking*, London: Penguin Books, 1970, pp.81-105.

³ The activities of the states in specific -- especially earlier-- periods of history might not have been determined and declared in accordance with certain rules and principles openly. Yet, with the advance of theory in our times, we have the full opportunity to analyze the orientations of the states and deductively explain their activities in accordance with some theoretical rules retrospectively; and, affiliate their actions with certain principles. In this way, it may be possible to assign certain principles to their political orientations whether or not they are officially and consciously adopted and announced in the past.

developments in the 20th century. Indeed, a close analysis indicates that the Ottoman initiatives have -- though in varying scope and forms -- always been underlined by the basic principles dictated by the prevailing systemic structure (namely balance of power -- BOP) and its related rules in this period. The final structural design that began to shape up in the form of a kind of “balance of terror”⁴ towards the end of the century began to impose new sets of strains upon the Empire with serious implications leading towards the greatest transformation in its history starting right after the First World War. It was upon such a background that the foreign policy orientations of a modern state began to be organized into a new structural framework under quite different environmental conditions soon leading to another particular global order after WWII. Through such a historical process the evolution of the foreign policy has been marked by two distinct structural periods, each followed by transitional terms, the one still in progress at present.

Consequently, “responsiveness to structural attributes” can be assigned to Turkish foreign policy as a general theoretical framework in its historical depth. It is such a general framework that the selected principles turn out to be the styles and ways adopted as the underlying basics for the policy moves in each period.

The 19th Century; The Longest Structure Relevant Period

The 19th century can be labelled as the period of relative consistency in the sense that the Empire persistently tried to adjust its policy attributes to the continuously changing requirements of the BOP politics for over one hundred years. Shifts in the 19th century dynamics naturally caused some fluctuations in the Ottoman orientations; yet, the general trend remained the same.


In this century, the Ottoman Empire faced both external and internal problems. It had a very large territory yet did not possess the technical, economic and institutional resources to integrate its diverse populations into a single political community capable enough to meet external demands. The Empire was in a critical state subjected to the potential threat of gradual territorial dismemberment and ethnic cleansing. Thus the fundamental problem was to establish a stable and positive link between internal and external conditions. The survival of the Empire was at stake and a careful diplomacy was thus key to Ottoman survival. The ultimate solution rested on exploiting the balance of power (BOP) among the main European states and the prevailing fear among them that if either one power or a coalition of powers dominated the Ottoman Empire, this would lead to a major show down with their rivals. This was the conceptual framework chosen by the Empire; and, foreign policy and diplomatic styles were to be adjusted to the systemic/structural imperatives.⁵

One of the traditional weaknesses that have affected the ottoman foreign policy has

⁴ In reality, starting from the third quarter of the century, the essential characteristics of the classical BOP order began to change and the states no longer seemed to be abiding by the established rules of the system. The new trend was towards a pre-transitive period to be labeled as the “balance of terror”, as stated by many writers, to denote a rapidly evolving arms race and building rival camps.

⁵ The findings on what the Ottoman governments thought or planned in the foreign policy field and their conceptualization of then existing structural realities for the most part are not based on official documents, especially until the third quarter of the century. Most of the findings on this subject thus rest upon the later analyses and partially inferred from their actions, or from what other sources and findings of European diplomats believed and reported at the time.

been the insufficient institutional resource available for it.⁶ However, in the course of the continuous initiatives that were launched throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire has been able to build up a reasonably effective foreign policy structure, similar to those of other autocratic monarchies at the time.⁷ This was one of the positive aspects of the differentiation that could be attributed to the Ottoman state apparatus in its efforts to try to adjust itself to environmental imperatives at the time. Though academically it might not have been properly and sufficiently worked out and presented clearly, in reality the Ottoman state always acted in accordance with a “fundamental goal” and “policy line” relevant to the circumstances and position at the time.



Alignment-realignment optimisation axes for the Ottoman Empire

Indeed, to handle the problem of survival in meeting the principal threats in three main zones of conflict (in the Balkans, the Straits and Egypt and to some extent the Middle East) was to be handled by assessing and exploiting the international situation to their advantage. The preferred policy line, then, was to be marked by the broad range of “flexible alignments” design based upon fully pragmatic approaches depending on the circumstances at the time. It is in such a general framework that the Ottoman foreign policy was constantly aimed at the optimization of its “zones of action”, the term denoting the time—and direction of the engagements as possibly the most rational choices.

⁶ J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol.15, 1961, pp.141-52.

⁷ It was not in this long lasting process that, starting from the establishment of the permanent embassies in various European capitalist (1793-96) and continuing during the Tanzimat reforms of 1839-1856 and changes after late 1870s, a series of incremental adjustments were simultaneously introduced and diplomatic methods were revised. See, İlber Ortaylı, “Osmanlı Diplomasisi ve Dış İşleri Örgütü.” *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol.1, pp.278-81; Roderic H. Davidson, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-76*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, a scholarly study of Turkish political reform and diplomacy.

In the century-long process of alignment re-alignments, Great Britain and Russia have mutually taken part in two extremes, one as the frequent ally and the other as the constant enemy, and the other powers have also taken part in between periodically.⁸ However, towards the end of the century with the BOP order beginning to shake to its foundations, Germany emerged as the most likely and enduring candidate for the alliance. In this way, two traditional land powers, both with central positions in their respective regions, began to proceed towards a common but undesirable destiny for both.

However, such an undesirable end does not mean that adaptation of the supreme strategy of exploiting BOP was a wrong path to trace. On the contrary, the Ottoman Empire had been quite successful in at least slowing down the decline, but they had never been able to prepare essential capabilities to provide themselves with the opportunity to adapt to a different structural order once the 19th century order began to crack.⁹

In the 19th century one very important development to be noted is the gradual evolution of the European-Ottoman systemic exchanges into a new functional framework. Accordingly, socio-cultural and socio-political dynamics of the internal structures from the both sides have mutually begun to function as driving forces in the formation and direction of their foreign policies respectively.¹⁰ Taking internal domains as the centers of interests was a new phenomenon. On these premises a new process that was gradually facilitated by the European demands in socio-political and cultural terms and the systemic Ottoman responses on the same directions began to evolve. It is in this process that the Ottoman Empire, in a way, constantly sought recognition by the European powers on multi-dimensional bases. The Treaty of Paris signed in 1856, is a fine example in this respect.¹¹ This treaty had a great deal of significance, since it was treated as recognition of the Empire's status as a European power.¹² Here, the important point is that "the continuation of this recognition has since remained one of the Turkish State's main

⁸ In the essence of the British Ottoman combinations lies a theoretically proven fact that a maritime power – a circumferential actor—always needs a land power, particularly with a central position over the landmasses. This positional link in global politics is not an ephemeral phenomenon, rather it repeats in different periods in different forms (e.g., today US –Turkey). This has been the case with Ottoman foreign policy that has continued up until the present age, yet in the final period the British were replaced by another maritime actor; that is, the USA. On the rising and declining cycles see, J. Peter Taylor, *The political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis*, New York; Wiley& Sons Inc., 1993, pp.31-62.

⁹ In fact one of the systemic deficiencies inherent to Turkish Foreign policy has been its ineffectiveness in coping with adaptation problems during each transition period. Periods covering the post Napoleonic wars era, the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the 1990s exhibit identical experiences in this respect.

¹⁰ On this mutually evolving process see, C. Okman, "Avrupa Birliği", *Karizma*. Ocak-Şubat-Mart 2001, No.5, pp.147-161.

¹¹ In the first decade of the 19th century Sened-i İttifak (Covenant of Union) set the initial signs of the new process and was followed by the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 (and the Statute of 1855) and 1876, 1908 constitutional movements are the substantial precedents for the contemporary movements starting in 1923. From an analytical point of view, all of these turning points can be, conceived as the integral parts of a unique evolutionary process still in progress at present.

¹² Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London; Oxford University Pres, 1961. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963.

foreign policy goals.¹³

Initial Decades of the 20th Century

The period dated back to the late 19th century and extending all the way up to the second World War was the age of declining hegemonic powers that were gradually being replaced by others; for instance, Great Britain was to refer to appeasement policies as the only rational way of consolidating its global status, and sought permanent alignments as the means of providing security in Europe.¹⁴ Rising inter-bloc rivalries accompanied by an intense arms race, and new tendencies in handling crises gradually invalidated the remaining traces of the rules and dominant principles of the classical BOP period. The classical order began to disintegrate.¹⁵

After the first showdown (between 1914-1919), the point of intersection of the rising and declining powers was discernable in definitive terms; the British in decline (partially accompanied by France) and the USA-Germany on the rise. Never settled inter-state rivalry, in scope and character, evolved into a stage opening the ways to yet another great show down, the greatest that has never been witnessed. Prevailing global conditions in overall terms did not represent any particular type of structural order.¹⁶ Rather, in terms of the general outlook of the interstate exchanges and the way essential systemic attributes were conceived, this period exhibited the characteristics of a “transition” epoch, the longest one in history, lasting for almost 40 years.¹⁷

¹³ Remarkable parallels can be drawn between the terms of the Treaty of Paris then and the Copenhagen Criteria at present; indeed, after the Crimean war of 1855-56 in Paris, the signatories agreed to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire in return, the Ottoman government agreed to give guarantees of good treatment of its Christian subjects. One of the remarkable points was that the Europeans could provide the Ottoman Empire with the chance of Joining the European Concert if suggested reforms could ever be put into effect. Çoşkun Üçok, *Siyasal Tarih 1789-1960*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1975, pp.123-125.

¹⁴ On the British appeasement policies at the turn of the century see, D.C. Watt & John Bull, *America in Britain's place, 1900-1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. This period is labeled as the world order of the British succession (1904-WWII) George Modelski, “The long Cycle of global politics and the Nation State”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, April 1978, pp.214-35; J. Peter Taylor, pp.39-49.

¹⁵ In this period, it seems that the conceptualization of the rules—and the principles—relating to such attributes as the “stability-instability”, “differentiation etc., at both intra and interstate levels,” coincided neither with ones that existed in the classical BOP nor with those of the Cold War Period. On the conceptual part see, Sten Sparic Nilson, “Measurement and Models in the Study of stability,” *General Systems Year Book*, V. XIV, pp. 121-35; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. And Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics; Trend and Transformation*, 5th ed., New York: St Martin's Press, 1995, pp.73-82.

¹⁶ Taking 10 different world orders (3 have already been lived up, and the rest with only hypothetical value) into consideration, the period comprising 4 initial decades (especially the last two) can hardly be fitted in any one of these groups. On the structural explanations see, Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, New York: John Wiley& sons-Inc., 1967, pp.21-54.

¹⁷ Within the time framework chosen for this study, three such periods can be identified; the first one, starting right after the Napoleonic Wars, the second in the process of the collapse of the classical BOP starting from the early 20th century and maturing after the First world War and the last one after the end of the Cold War which is still in progress. On the conceptual premises see, Rein Taagepera, “The Growth Curves of Empires,” *General Systems Year Book of the Society for General Systems Research*, Washington

In meeting the radically altering external as well as internal requirements in the course of this transitional period, nature and the scope of the general guidelines of action—directly and indirectly—adopted by Turkish Foreign policy makers were exhibited in three different periods consecutively.

The first period included the initial decades of the 20th century starting from the last years of the 19th century. In this period the foreign policy was to be adjusted to the dominant principles of a new type of power balance. Contrary to the classical BOP period, the Ottoman Empire was gradually to be re-oriented towards a permanent alliance process and to choose a suitable power and to be party to a multidimensional harsh intra-continental rivalry. Such a methodological shift was justified on pragmatic grounds since by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the freedom of movement for Turkish diplomacy was to go through heavy constraints due to the fact that it was becoming more difficult to play off one European power against another in the wake of the wide spread division among main European states in two camps. This situation created a hard dilemma for Turkish foreign policy in that old avenues of alignments soon were to be blocked. Britain, for instance, was working for an entente with France and Russia and major powers were very anxious not to provide each other by establishing close ties with the Ottoman government.¹⁸ Soon, it was to become clear that ever lasting neutrality would not be a positive —or even possible—choice either. Alliance with Germany found its course under very the particular developments in 1914 leading to the long expected outcome, namely the First World War.¹⁹ The war gave rise to some developments; however, with powerful effects on the post-war Turkish state's foreign policy, one of these was the tragic epoch concerned with the so-called Armenian case with ramifications lasting until the present time; the other concerns the relations with Arabs under the negative psychological impact of treachery; and, finally, implications of the changing regime in Russia. Another interesting development in its historical setting was related to the fundamental reversal of the positions adopted by the British and Soviet policies on the straits as the British began to seek to have the straits opened to warships while the Soviets aimed to keep them closed. The war appears to have marked the end of the another ground rule of earlier Ottoman diplomacy in the sense that the empire joined a war among the major powers for the first time taking its own initiative—after the battle cruisers

D.C.: Menthol Health Research Ins., 1968. Vol. XIII, pp.171-177. Kurt Finsterbusch, "World Systems and the Theory of National Actors", *General Systems; Yearbook of the Society for the General Systems Research*, V.XIX, pp.147-153.

¹⁸ Such a shift would not take place spontaneously with the early signs of division among the European Powers. The Ottoman Empire would try to maintain the minimum conditions of survival through a semi-neutral position; and especially after the Young Turk Revolution they would switch to the policy of trying to establish friendship with all of the main powers. Yet, by the end of the first decade of the 20th century, this policy would leave the Ottoman State without an alliance with any of the European Powers. This became evident when it faced its final trial of strength in the Balkans in 1912-13 see; Hasan Ünal, "Young Turks" Assessments of International Politics, 1900-9," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.32, 1996, pp.30-44.

¹⁹ Initiatives launched consecutively Nov. 1908 through 1913 for a defensive alliance with British or for some form of alignment with the triple entente have been the final attempts in this respect. Even the offers to Russia were to be turned down just before the outbreak of the war. Frank Weber, *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914-1918*, Ithaca, NY.: Cornell University Press, 1970, pp.135-6 and 142-156.

Goeben and Breslau incident—without any immediate and direct threat to its own territories; this was an orientation that had never been the case until then.

The second phase, from structural point of view, is the period of 1920-31, which can be conceptualized as a kind of power vacuum interlude. This stage of geopolitical order could—through analogy—be visualized like the “rivalry and concert” order after 1871 with two powers in favor of status quo, one in Europe and one in the rest of the world.²⁰ The problem was not just to build a peace, but rather to construct a peaceful international order that would successfully manage all international conflicts in the future.²¹ The years, following the World War I, witnessed the high points of political idealism known as the period of institutionalization in this respect.²² The state sovereignty was to be brought under the jurisdiction of international norms and rules.

The greatest episode for Turkey in this period was marked by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, almost immediately leading to the process of the “national struggle with the supreme objective of achieving independence and founding a new nation-state to be underlined by a new set of fundamental principles referring to the conception of the “national unity” and “nation”.²³ These principles were to be accepted as the bases of the broad guidelines of action shaping Turkish foreign policy in the following decades. In overall terms, this period of struggle exhibited a remarkable example of a political orientation of a general strategy of the “indirect approach”.²⁴ The principles inherent in such a strategic thought were successfully put into effect in the implementation of foreign

²⁰ Yet according to Taylor, this is where the similarities end. After Versailles, France seemed to be the leading power though its position was quite artificial and short term soon to be replaced by Germany. In the rest of the world Britain remained the status quo power, but on the line of the decline since 1871. J.P. Taylor, pp.45-48.

²¹ Kalevi J. Holsti, Pearce and War; *Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp.175-176 and 208-209.

²² On the process see, William R. Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World: An International History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp.95-133.

²³ The New Concept of Unity was officially to be announced by the voting of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) in January 1920, and the Contextual and qualitative aspects of the concept of nation and citizen were to be explained by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in his series of statements defining the nation of the Turkish people in reference to an inclusive understanding of the human element as affiliated with a political authority regardless of differences in ethnic, religious and language terms. A. Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1969, pp.351-491 and 21-47. Also the idea of “peace at home peace in the World,” is a fine example of the understanding on the organic relationship between the Underlying mentalities of the internal and external policy orientations; Tuncay Mete, *T.C.nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması: 1923-31*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1985, p.453; Nimet Arsan, *Atatürk'ün Tamim Telgraf ve Beyannameleri 1917-35* Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1964, p.351. On the essentials of the Turkish Politics; Enver Ziya Karal, *Atatürk: Düşünceler*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1986. It is also worth noting that the Treaty of Lausanne (Section II) on the concept of the Turkish citizen, shares the similar views with Atatürk and above stated authors.

²⁴ Departing from the actual experiences of the past, a broad analysis of the concept of the “indirect approach” is submitted by Liddel Hart see. B.H. Liddel Hart, *Strateji: Dolaylı Tutum*, translated by Cemal Enginsoy, Ankara: Gen. Kur. Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1973. However, to have a sound vision of the Turkish experience, the findings of this study have to be reinterpreted by applying the related norms of the “control” and “maneuver” notions in a broader framework. See, Cengiz Okman, *On the Theory of Strategy*, İstanbul: D.H.O. Basımı, 1998.

as well as internal policies by the forces identified as the “national movement” without even official recognition as a state and under the actual conditions of the post-war occupation.

It was in such a framework that the “national action” was effectively divided into two stages: the first covering the months between May 1919 and early 1920, and the second until October 1923. In the first stages of the policy of indirect approach was facilitated through congressional actions (July through September in Erzurum and Sivas) leading to the declarations of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) on 28 January 1920. These declarations can be assessed as the basic documents fully coinciding with the future imperatives of Turkish foreign policy.²⁵

During the second stage the style of the indirect approach changed its general outlook by placing relatively heavier emphasis on coercive policy manoeuvres including the selective use of military assets by carefully analyzing external and internal conditions and trying to exploit the balance of power and rivalries among the main European states.²⁶ In fact, this was the basis on which their Ottoman predecessors had relied throughout the 19th century. In this sense, the founders of the new state also proved their distinct conceptual ability in perceiving and exploiting the situations in their historical depth in political as well as social and psychological terms. This ability was of vital importance in conveying and applying the basic principles of the above stated type of political approach. Signing the Treaty of Friendship in Moscow (16 March 1921), concluding a treaty with French (October 1921), then, can all be conceived as the basic stages of a policy that would lead to the armistice agreement in Mudanya (10 October 1922); and, through the same perspective, was the political environment whose further and successful exploitation in this manner marked the final stage in Lausanne in the summer of 1922.

The second stage of the global transition period, covering the years 1920 through early thirties, can be defined as a kind of “Power vacuum interlude” during which the geopolitical order was superficially like the rivalry and concert order after 1871.²⁷ In Europe, France, one of the status quo powers, seemed to be a leading actor in the continent, and Britain in the wider world but in a constant process of decline. Under the light of the realities of the time, the respective positions of both powers were quite artificial and therefore would not continue to fulfil the requirements of maintaining stability on the continent. In reality both of them were insecure, Britain beyond Europe and France within Europe. It was becoming clear that a new co-sponsor of any world order would inevitably be needed. The US., on the other hand, with selective policies in its interventions was tracing a gradually rising trend well beyond isolationism.²⁸ By this time

²⁵ Basic lines on the type, scope and qualitative aspects of the foreign policy were formulated in these sessions organized consecutively in a short period of time. On the summary of documents see, M. Gönübol, (Ed.), *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası*, Ankara: Akım Kitabevi, 1989.

²⁶ The use of force has been carried out on selective grounds as the “rules of the force application” -- starting from İnönü I continuing through İnönü II, Sakarya and ending up in Afyon--have carefully been determined and applied in accordance with established modes of indirect approach.

²⁷ Peter Taylor, p.43.

²⁸ French efforts in seeking security guaranties from other powers (following the US’s failure to Join the League) through Rapallo (1922) and Lacarno (1924) initiatives; and outside Europe, on the part of Britain, naval agreements with Japan and the US as the second round of appeasement policies were prerequisites

the world situation was rapidly changing. The process of deteriorations in the global economic order reached a very critical stage following the financial collapse of the New York Stock Market in 1929, withdrawal of the British currency off the gold standard (two events that severely effected the popularity of the governments throughout the world); and, the Manchuria crisis in China putting Japan into political rivalry were the main events marking the end of the phase of the power vacuum.

For the new Turkish state this phase signifies a historically remarkable episode during which, a) the structural and functional transformations in the internal order were to be harmonious and carried on further in a manner to meet the requirements of survival as a modern state at the time, and b) the essential systemic conditions for an effective and efficient adaptation to the rapidly evolving political environment were to be assured. This was a formidable challenge to face that required a prudent approach in the selection and timing of the priorities and consolidating the principles of the new state at home and abroad. However, the geopolitical conditions in the second phase of the transition period offered a unique security environment without any immediate threat -- perhaps for the first time since the last quarter of the 18th century--that provided the Turkish state with the chance to achieve a degree of security and international recognition.

Such a contextual framework enabled Turkish decision makers to design a comprehensive unified political vision coinciding with the realities of the foreign and internal domains under a general defensive posture. Accordingly, foreign policy would take second place to internal reconstruction where the Turkish state determined to proceed on quite untraditional lines through an ambitious modernization process.²⁹ Western ideas and institutions, concepts and models have effectively and efficiently adjusted to the socio-political realities of the internal domain of the time.³⁰ In the end, these western attributes came to serve not as the channel of transmission for foreign influences but as the self-reliant political leadership and philosophers of a changing nation state.³¹

In its overall design the foreign policy -- in terms of the conversion of principles into the process of strategic action—was designated to a) prepare the proper environmental conditions suitable to the domestic processes, and in this respect b) eliminating the problems left over from the prewar phase of the transitionary period, and to this end c) preparing the essential grounds to see the country recognized as a respected European power and safeguarding its security coinciding with internal and external realities at the time. Thus, a policy of neutrality with a general conservative outlook and antirevisionist stand -- in an environment where alliances were simply unavailable and practically

for a new balancer within the system. See, W.R. Keylor, pp.3-40.

²⁹ A Comprehensive account of the Turkish modernization process -- in its historical context-- is submitted in; Robert E. Ward and Dank Wart A. Rustow, (Eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968.

³⁰ As it is defended by R. Davison, "much of the foreign contribution to Turkish political modernization came in the form of ideas and institutions, concepts and models, which the Turks could make their own by adoption or adaptation," Roderic H. Davison, "environmental and Foreign Contributions", *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, pp. 64-117.

³¹ As stated by Schorger, "The impetus for modernization of the society derives from modernized indigenous elements as much as, or more than, from external sources. Turkish experience bears this out." *Ibid.*, p.115 (in reference to a paper submitted by William Schorger, in 1961).

meaningless at the time --was assumed to be a dominant policy posture. It was within such a general framework that the series of issues starting from the population settlements and related disagreements on property procedures and on the status of patriarch mainly with Greece, to the critical Mousul dispute of 1923-1926 with Britain had been stabilized. At the same time, such timely policy initiatives as the Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship with the Soviet Union (in Dec. 1925) and reapprochement manoeuvres towards Greece and partially towards Britain by the late 1920s played an important role in the preparation of an environment suitable to the rapid systemic differentiation at home.

In fact, such an overall orientation was soon to be proven as rationally very effective when -- starting from the early 1930s -- the freedom of action attained that far would enable Turkey to design and pursue policy moves abroad even under the light of the rapidly deteriorating global conditions in the last phase of the transitional period. In global terms the last phase marked by the gradual reconstruction of the division, giving rise to formulation of the pan-region theories precipitating the collapse of the free trade order and finally leading to the formation of the antagonistic world blocks.³² Instability mounted to a peak level; and taken in its overall context, “the period from 1914 to 1945 has often been designated as the Thirty Year’s war of the twentieth century”.³³

In the last phase of this episode Turkey abandons its initial introverted stand and gained an extraverted position to its fullest extent. Tracing an essentially anti revisionist line, the main determinants of the foreign policy were selected in a manner to meet the challenges through two interrelated time perspectives; a) as a long term perspective, preparing the normative premises and taking political initiatives accordingly, and b) as the short term perspective, preparing reliable and credible ways and means of countering rapidly evolving critical situations. In its general outlook an active stand was dominant; and, the “indirect approach” was still a preferred framework for strategic action.³⁴ In this respect, affiliation with the League of Nations and adoption of its principles as the basis of the international reality (July 1932), and the establishment of a sound future vision for the historically contested status of the straits through the Agreement of Montreux (July 1936) were fine examples of the achievements realized through the manoeuvres on the first line.³⁵ Such a policy frame could be worked out without breaking the links with

³² On the evolution of the pan region theories, J. O Loughlin and H. Vander Wusten, “The Political Geography of Panregions,” *Geographical Review*, No.80, 1990, pp.1-20 and further on the process of division, J.P. Taylor, pp.46-49; and S. Dalby, *The Coming of the Second World War*, London; Pinter, 1990; and on the economic processes, I. Walterstein, “Long Waves as Capitalist Process”, *Politics of the World Economy*, Cambridge; Cambridge Un. Press, 1984, pp.559-75.

³³ William R. Keylor, p.43.

³⁴ In this period in the practice of “indirect approach” as a political guide to action --in contrast to the previous decade--the relative weight of the military domain increases. Military assets are often, yet very carefully, referred to as the partial means of political maneuvers (at least lurking in the background) in the related processes of coalition formations (e.g.) British, French and Balkan processes) as well as handling issues and solving problems (e.g. Hatay case in 1938-39). Stanford j. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp.373-388.

³⁵ As it was stated by Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the integral maintenance of the covenant of the League was to be conceived as the foundation of Turkish foreign policy. See, Brock Milman, “Turkish Foreign and

Moscow and even without irritating Italy and Germany. In addition, limits of neutrality were skilfully manipulated without radical shifts from the established lines of political direction.

In conclusive terms, the last two phases of the long transitional period can be conceived as having a very special meaning in the Turkish foreign policy tradition. Indeed, Turkey was able to transform the entire order into a different “systemic whole” in the 1920s and, departing from these newly established premises was able to launch initiatives (in 1930s) and realized remarkable achievements with strong future ramifications. In quantitative terms of “time and number of achievements ratio”, there has not been any comparable period until the present.

The Cold War: The Exceptional Period

It was not possible to continue on the evolving line of the global power division to the extent of giving rise to the pan-region schemes, especially when the geopolitical codes of the great powers began to overlap. Thus, by the end of the 1930s, the division of the world rapidly evolved into a power struggle between two alliances to last for over forty years.

Turkish policy stand was essentially underlined by the simple principle of not assuming any involvement in power struggle unless all the alternative options were exhausted and legal requirements for such involvement were met.³⁶ Thus, a “balanced neutrality” was selected as a national guidance of policy. It was balanced in the sense that relations with both sides—through summit meetings and ambassadorial processes—could efficiently be carried on almost until the last stages of the war.³⁷ However, such uneasy neutrality inflicted serious implications upon Turkey’s economy causing severe shortages of goods and wild inflation, forcing the government to take a series of legal and financial measures.

In the decades following the war, the power configuration basically evolved into a relatively “tight bipolar” order.³⁸ In this period the USSR replaced Germany as a new source of threat for the western order, yet the emerged structure proved to be more permanent than any other that had gone before. However, as the result of the inability of the major powers in their efforts to create a desired new world order (starting from where they had left off in the 19th century) the bipolarity introduced itself as an exceptional period, rather than as an order produced by a rationally designed--and agreed upon--scheme. In that sense, it was not submitted, especially in the form of a “Cold War” within such an unexpectedly evolved framework, it was possible to think about the British

Strategic Policy, 1934-42”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1995, Vol.31, p.491.

³⁶ Legal requirements for such involvement were determined by the agreements concluded with France and England in 1939 consecutively and have continuously been subjected to a series of reviews held among Turkey, England and France in the course of the war. (e.g.) Adana meetings).

³⁷ The treaty of nonaggression (July 18. 1941) and a trade agreement (oct. 9. 1941) could be designed without damaging the ties with allies.

³⁸ In a “relatively tight” bipolar order –which prevailed in this period—the system is stable when both bloc actors are (at least relative to the loose type) hierarchically organized, and the rules of the system are to a much greater extent dominated by the bloc actors than would be the case in a looser type. The Cold War bipolarity also presents a “relative” type as compared to the “tight” type in its absolute terms where other actors cease to exist on the theoretical ground. Morton Kaplan, pp.36-45.